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Abstract 
Three mathematical models named the Single Objective Economic (SOE), Compromised 
Water Allocation (CWA), and Multiple Economic Objectives (MEO) models were 
developed for modelling equitable and efficient water allocation among competing users of a 
transboundary basin, based on a multi-period node-link river basin network. Furthermore, 
the Integrated Water & Dam Allocation (IWDA) method was proposed in order to integrate 
water allocation modelling and locating and sizing new water projects of a transboundary 
basin. 
The SOE model is a single economic objective model that allocates water to competing 
stakeholders such that the overall profit of the basin is maximised, subjects to river water 
system constraints and the environmental water requirement satisfaction in the entire basin. 
The CWA model challenges multi-objective programming with aggregated objective 
functions for providing a sustainable water allocation. Three basin-wide aggregated objective 
functions, addressed the overall basin’s profit, the environmental water supply in the entire 
basin, and the limitation of transferring water from upstream to downstream are considered 
in this model. The environment is considered as a stakeholder in this model, which 
competes with other stakeholders for more water supplies in the CWA model. 
The MEO model involves directly the profits of stakeholders in water allocation modelling. 
It maximizes the profits of all stakeholders simultaneously, while the environmental water 
satisfaction in the entire basin is considered as a firm constraint. In order to solve this model, 
two three-step approaches (the Single Lambda and Multiple Lambda solution methods) 
were introduced. These solution methods are established based on maximizing the 
minimum ratio of achieved profits of the stakeholders from their water shares to their 
highest possible profits. 
The IWDA method, which is treated as the key contribution of this thesis, consists of three 
steps. The first step runs the Multi-Objective Water & Dams Allocation (MOWDA) model 
in order to allocate equitably water to the stakeholders of the basin along with providing the 
optimal locations and capacities of new proposed dams for various scenarios (number of 
dams). The second step utilizes a sensitivity analysis approach for comparing the results of 
the MOWDA model for various scenarios (number of dams) in order to provide the 
optimal number of required reservoirs in the basin. The third step runs the Minimum 
VII 
 
Capacity (MinCap) model to find another optimal water allocation scheme for the basin 
which leads to the lowest required dams’ capacities, for the final number of required dams 
(determined by step 2).  
Throughout the study, both the feasibility and the effectiveness of incorporating equity 
concepts into economic optimal water resources management modelling were addressed. 
The applications of all aforementioned models to the Sefidrud Basin in Iran demonstrate 
the models can serve as a powerful tool for sustainable water resource management and 
conflict resolution between the stakeholders. It can be stated that the IWDA method can be 
utilized for providing the maximum welfare in a transboundary river basin. This method 
satisfies the environmental water requirements in the entire basin, locates and sizes optimally 
new water projects (dams) that help to confront with water shortage of the basin, and 
distributes available water resources between the stakeholders such that their achieved profits 
are satisfactory. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Water is essential for the survival and the well fare of human beings. It supports all aspects of 
human society such as agriculture and industry and at the same time, it is an integral part of 
ecosystems. Due to concerns about the increasing water scarcity, water pollution, and 
climatic change, in the last decade more research are being dedicated to water resources 
management, especially water allocation. 
There are several important issues concerning water allocation, which are addressed of them 
in this thesis that we elaborate them as follows: 
(1) Spatial and temporal heterogeneity: Water resources are not fairly distributed over the 
world geographically and temporally. Some regions receive plentiful rain, above 1500-
3000 mm annually, since the share of some areas similar deserts are less than 100 
mm (Al Radif, 1999). In addition, water requirements are time-dependent variables. It 
means that the amount of water requirement varies over time. For instance, water 
demands of plants during the growing season vary according to growth stages of plants 
and in fact, the high water consumption period does not coincide with times of 
rainfall. 
(2) Demography: The water demand is rapidly increasing due to the quick raise of the 
world population. According to “Population Division” report (UN, 2013), the world 
population of 7.2 billion in mid-2013 is projected to increase by almost one billion 
people within the next 12 years, reaching 8.1 billion in 2025, and to further increase 
to 9.6 billion in 2050 and 10.9 billion by 2100. This rapid population growth and 
consequently water demand enlargement, causes severe consequences in which high 
pressure on fresh water resources is highlighted. 
(3) Water Scarcity: Water deficit is now a common occurrence in many countries. 
Around 1.2 billion people face water scarcity today (UNDESA, 2013) with a 
prediction of water scarcity for nearly half the global population by 2030 (UN News 
Center, 2013). The major reasons for water scarcity are high water demand from 
population growth, degraded water quality and pollution of surface and groundwater 
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sources, as well as the loss of potential sources of fresh water supply due to old and 
unsustainable water management practices. 
(4) Conflicts between users: Conflicts, in fact, arise when different water users compete 
for inadequate water supply in both intra-country and international river basins. The 
balance between water resources and water demands in some river basins is changed 
in favour of demands due to a rapid increase in water demand associated with 
population growth rise. This unbalanced situation causes water disputes in some 
regions of the world that is already evidenced at the national level by conflicts between 
provinces/states over shared rivers and at the international level by disputes between 
countries over water resources of transboundary rivers (Qaddumi, 2008). For 
example, the competition for water has led to disputes between Indians and 
Bangladeshes, Americans and Mexicans, and among all 10 Nile basin riparian (Wolf, 
1999). 
(5) Water policy regulations: The lack of collaboration between stakeholders in 
watersheds (especially in transboundary basins) in the absent of a strong constitution 
and institution for supervising water shares, causes unfair water availability in the 
watershed and also harmful consequences to rivers biodiversity. One-sided actions for 
supplying water requirements by a stakeholder are often ineffective, inefficient, or 
impossible (Mostert, 2005) and cannot be sustainable. Furthermore, they intensify 
water conflicts in the watersheds. 
(6) Equitable allocations: Water allocation is central to the management of water 
resources. Since stakeholders’ water portions are unclear and contested, water 
resources management is meaningless and helpless for utilising limited water 
resources efficiently and effectively. Hence, the necessity of founding appropriate 
water allocation methodologies has been realised by researchers and water authorities. 
There are still many obstacles to achieving equitable, efficient and effective water 
allocations, however ample studies have been carried out in this area.  
(7) Carryover. The abundance of water during some periods and regions versus scarcity 
of them during the others make necessary to carryover water resources. This is usually 
obtained by construction of dams and reservoirs in watersheds.  
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1.2 Scope of the Research 
The overall purpose of this research is to establish a methodology that supports water 
authorities in allocating water in watersheds (especially transboundary basins) to the 
stakeholders in an equitable, efficient, and environmentally sustainable way. Furthermore, 
this methodology should be able to introduce the outline of optimal development of water 
resources (such as new dams) in the watersheds. We aim to devise and implement an 
integrated water allocation modelling approach that results in the achievement of an optimal 
economic and environmental utilisation of water, subject to hydrologic and other constraints. 
The model is developed generically that can be implemented to any river basin. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background behind 
the research.  
Chapter 2 elucidates the issues related to water allocation in watersheds, especially in 
transboundary watersheds, reviews the principles of water allocations, and the approaches 
and models for water allocation that have been used in the literature.  
Next, Chapter 3 introduces the case study of this study; the Sefidrud Basin, which the 
developed models in this research are applied to it. 
Chapter 4 presents the Single Objective Economic (SOE) model. It is a single objective 
model that aims to evaluate the capability of economic single objective water allocation 
models for resolving water conflicts in watersheds. It allocates water resources of an 
undeveloped watershed in a way that its profit is maximised. The model is on the basis of a 
node-link river basin network and presented by a linear programming formulation. The 
results of the SOE model have been published in Water Resources Management journal 
(Roozbahani et al., 2013). 
Chapter 5 introduces a multi-objective water allocation model, the Compromised Water 
Allocation (CWA) model, which are suitable for water allocation of an undeveloped 
watershed. The CWA model’s objective functions consist of three conflicting objective 
functions, which represent economic, environmental, and social factors. The model is based 
on a node-link river basin network and the compromise programming approach is employed 
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for finding the solutions of this model. The results of the CWA model have been published 
in the Environmental Modelling and Software journal (Roozbahani et al., 2015). 
Chapter 6 introduces another multi-objective water allocation model, the Multiple Economic 
Objectives (MEO) model, which similar aforementioned models are suitable for water 
allocation of an undeveloped watershed. The MEO model maximises the profits of all 
relative stakeholders in a watershed at the same time while the environmental water 
satisfaction is considered a firm constraint in this model. Two new solution methods for 
finding the solutions of MEO model are also introduced in this chapter. These new solution 
methods allocate water to stakeholders in a way that all stakeholders achieve a (maximised) 
same ratio of their highest possible profits. The results of MEO model have been published 
in Water Resources Management journal (Roozbahani et al., 2014) for first solution method. 
In addition, the solutions of MEO model based on the second solution method are 
described in a paper, submitted to the ANNALS of Operations Research journal (requested 
second revision). 
In Chapter 7, the Integrated Water & Dam Allocation (IWDA) approach is introduced to 
integrate water and dams allocation in a watershed. It is a three-step method, which its first 
step runs the Multi-Objective Water and Dams Allocation (MOWDA) model. It is a multi-
objective water allocation model, which is able to allocate fairly water between the 
stakeholders and propose the locations and sizes of new reservoirs in the basin for various 
scenarios (number of dams in the basin). The objective functions of this model are to 
maximise the profits of all stakeholders from allocated water to them and the one of 
introduced new solution methods in Chapter 6, is also employed for solving this model. The 
second step of IWDA utilises a sensitivity analysis approach, providing the optimal number 
of required reservoirs in the basin. The third step of IWDA employs the MinCap model to 
find how much the proposed dams’ capacities, for the final number of required dams 
(determined by step 2) can be reduced while the model provides the same profits for the 
stakeholders, achieved from the MOWDA model.  
For evaluating the results of the MOWDA model, the Single Objective Water and Dams 
Allocation (SOWDA) model is also introduced in Chapter 7. The structure of the SOWDA 
model is the same as the MOWDA model with the difference that it is a single objective 
model and finds the optimal water allocation of the basin and the optimal locations and sizes 
of new dams, based on the maximisation of the basin’s profit. The results of the SOWDA 
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model are presented in a paper, submitted to Journal of Hydrology. The results of IWDA 
implementation to the case of this study are described in another paper, submitted to Water 
Resources Research journal. 
The computation results of all developed models in this research are interpreted and 
analysed in detail. Chapter 8 summarises the results of this research, and lists some 
recommended directions for future development. Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of the 
thesis. 
 
Figure ‎1.1 The structure of the thesis 
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Chapter 2  Perspectives on Water Allocation and 
Literature Review 
The first part of this chapter commences with a brief discussion about the reasons of water 
conflicts happening in transboundary watersheds. It follows with given explanations about the 
roles of water resources developments through dams’ construction in intensifying and 
mitigating water conflicts in transboundary watersheds. The generalised principles of water 
allocation are reviewed at the end of the first part. The second part of Chapter 2 reviews 
approaches and models mainly based on single and multi-objective optimisation, which have 
been used for the water allocation of transboundary watersheds. 
2.1 Problem Statement 
The significant importance of water for society, economy, and the environment is not an 
overstatement. Water is an essential resource that is necessary for healthy living conditions 
and sound ecosystems. The increasing water demands related to rapid population growth 
and economic development places expanding pressure on water resource. This water 
tension is expected to get worse when it is projected that a quarter of the world’s population 
encountering severe water scarcity in the next 25 years, even during years of average rainfall 
(Schiff & Winters, 2002). Hence, water scarcity and its result; water conflicts, are big issues 
that water authorities of watersheds around the world are faced with them. 
2.1.1 Water Conflicts in Transboundary Watersheds 
Transboundary watershed refers to a basin, which is partitioned such that it does not match 
to political borders. The main drainage of this watershed crosses some administrative 
boundaries such as countries in international level and provinces in national level. In this 
case, the number of potential stakeholders and consequently, their specific interests increase 
(Wolf, 1998) while the main drainage traverses across more administrative boundaries. 
Water conflict in transboundary watersheds is mainly caused by the actual or perceived 
reduction in quantity and/or quality of available water in the watersheds resulting from the 
actions of stakeholders. The actual and perceived reduction in available water resources 
bring into existence when a stakeholder operates a new water development project; e.g., a 
dam (actual reduction) or plans to do water development (perceived reduction). In this 
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situation, two types of reactions could be expected from other stakeholders. Firstly, they 
struggle to increase their water shares by new water developments and secondly, if there are 
no possibilities for water developments, they try to stop water development in the particular 
stakeholder or at least decrease the negative effects of it on their water requirements 
satisfaction. These both actions could cause serious water conflicts between stakeholders in 
the basin. It should be emphasised that there is often no care to the environmental water 
satisfaction in the basin when the stakeholders compete for water exploitation. The water 
conflicts in transboundary watersheds requires extremely high attention when there are some 
260 transboundary watersheds that cover about 50% of the land surface of the world and 
affect about 40 percent of the world’s population (Wolf, 1999). In continues, two main 
forms of the water conflicts in transboundary watersheds will broadly be explained. 
2.1.1.1 Water Conflicts between Stakeholders with Consumptive Water 
Use 
The term "transboundary watershed" refers to a basin where multiple stakeholders, with 
diverse values and different water requirements, share ownership, stewardship, or 
exploitation of its water resource (Brels et al., 2008). The prime characteristic of these 
watersheds is that the activities of a stakeholder upon the shared water resource can directly 
influence the quantity, quality, and availability of water in other stakeholders. Due to 
population growth, land degradation, rapid urbanization, and climate change, freshwater in 
transboundary watersheds are under severe stress and the balance between water resources 
and water demands in these basins is changed in favour of demands. Therefore, the limited 
water resources of transboundary watersheds cannot meet the stakeholders’ increasing water 
requirements and the stakeholders start a competition over more water utilisation for their 
demands’ satisfaction. 
The unbalanced socio-economic development in a transboundary watershed often turns the 
water competitions to serious water conflicts. Developed downstream and under-developed 
upstream is a common characteristic of most watersheds included transboundary basins in 
the world. The downstream stakeholders depend on water resources of upstream regions to 
sustain the satisfaction of their huge water demands. However, the upstream stakeholders 
struggle to exploit more water for various sectors’ development (e.g., agricultural sector) to 
improve their economic and social conditions. In this circumstance, for national 
transboundary basins, downstream stakeholders push water authority to stop upstream water 
8 
 
utilisation and upstream stakeholders force the water authority to give them permission for 
more extensive development of water resources. It should be emphasised this kind of water 
conflict in international river basins create significant disputes where there are many water 
authorities with selfish behaves in these basins. 
Somehow, the concentration of salt in rivers is the reason of water disputes. In these cases, 
the main drainages of transboundary basin with freshwater pass through salt domes and then, 
the concentration of salt increases in rivers. In these basins, downstream regions where 
receive semi-saline water, have adapted to this quality of water. This stable situation, which 
downstream stakeholders are getting used to it after many years, changes when upstream 
stakeholders that normally have access to high quality water; utilise water more than what 
they used to exploit in order to improve the social and economic conditions. In these cases, 
the water conflicts are too complicated because the water exploitation of upstream 
stakeholders is dependence on the quality and quantity of water, required by downstream 
stakeholders. A real example of this sort basin is Gomrud river basin in Iran (Kerachian & 
Karamouz, 2007). 
2.1.1.2 Water Conflicts between Stakeholders with Consumptive Water 
Uses and the Environment 
The environmental water demand is the amount of water that needs to flow in a river 
ecosystem for the specific purpose of managing the condition of the ecosystem (World 
Bank, 2003). The failure of maintaining this water requirement has led to a decline in the 
ecosystems’ health, which not only endangers water-dependent ecosystems, but also it 
directly influences many economic activities that rely on the ecosystems. For instance, in 
many basins, people livelihood depends on rivers and they live by jobs like fishing and 
navigation in rivers. Therefore, paying no attention to the environmental water satisfaction 
has direct and indirect effects on human living. It should be emphasised that water supply to 
the environment can be considered as a reserved freshwater that the current generation keep 
it for future generation.  
The environmental water supply often suffers from large water shortages during water 
competitions in transboundary watersheds. In fact, when there is no enough water for 
meeting all stakeholders’ water demands, stakeholders have lesser concerns about the 
quantity and quality of water supply to the environment. Somehow, they would rather to use 
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the water share of the environment in productive sectors such that agricultural, industrial, 
and urban rather than releasing it into rivers. This problem is serious in the watersheds 
where the stakeholders suffer from uneven developments and under-developed stakeholders 
try to compensate for their backwardness. Therefore, supplying water requirement of the 
environment often is in conflicts with meeting other stakeholders’ water demands in 
transboundary watersheds.  
2.1.2 Dams and Their Effects on Water Conflicts in Transboundary 
Watersheds  
Dams are one of human invention with significant roles in economies and societies’ stability. 
They are often multipurpose, utilised for flood control, irrigation, navigation, sedimentation 
control, and hydropower. Due to many domestic and economic benefits, dams can be 
considered as the cornerstone of water resources development and management in a 
watershed. In fact, the purpose of a dam is to store water when water availability exceeds 
water demand and then releases the stored water to supply the water requirements when the 
demand exceeds the natural water supply. Seasonal variations and climatic irregularities in 
rivers’ runoff impede the efficient use of basins’ water resources. The main portion of a 
basin’ water resource is often produced in uncultivated seasons when demand is lowest. 
Hence, dams have a significant role for making the most of the rivers’ runoff and raising 
available water supply that leads to mitigate water scarcity and increase water security. 
Besides increasing water supply as a direct benefit, dams have indirect benefits for the 
residents who live around it. Dams increases jobs opportunities; temporarily during their 
construction and permanently after operation, and certainly boom the economy of the 
domestic regions. In addition, extensive infrastructure developments such as roads and 
energy networks expansion come to these regions while dams are being constructed. These 
indirect benefits of dams have immense positive effects on both economy and society. 
Therefore, dams not only are a way for diminishing water scarcity in basins, but also they are 
an effective solution for improving economy and reducing social problems such as 
immigration and delinquency. It should be emphasised that, in fact, dams undoubtedly have 
negative circumstances on the environment and the ecosystem, but these impacts can be 
relieved with taking into consideration them during dams’ study, design, and water allocation 
processes. 
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Apart from aforementioned direct and indirect dams’ benefits, they have a key role in water 
conflict negotiations by raising the authority of stakeholders over the shared surface water. 
When a dam is built on a transboundary river in an administrative boundary, the amount of 
available water for other stakeholders where are in downstream regions completely depends 
on the dam’s operation policy, which is determined by its associated stakeholder. This 
problem is already evidenced in some transboundary watersheds, for instance, the Nile 
watershed (BBC, 2014). In these circumstances, dams give a high bargaining power in water 
conflicts negotiations to stakeholders who operate and use them. Hence, besides increasing 
water supply availability, there is another reason for dams’ construction competition between 
the stakeholders, which is to raise their bargaining powers in water conflicts negotiations. 
To sum up, dams’ construction can raise water supply availability and bring about some 
direct and indirect advantages for the domestic regions. However, they can turn water 
competitions into serious water conflicts and make new reason for disputes in a 
transboundary basin if stakeholders struggle to construct uncooperatively dams in their 
administrative boundaries. In this circumstance, water developments (dams) not only decline 
water security in the watersheds but also cause social, economic, and ecological issues in 
transboundary watersheds. 
2.2 Principles of Water Allocation 
2.2.1 Water Allocation Meaning 
Water allocation is the procedure of sharing a limited water resource between various 
competing stakeholders (Speed et al., 2013), aims to maximise the achieved benefits by the 
stakeholders from the use of water, along with preserving and protecting water resources and 
the environment (UNESCAP, 2000). In other words, water allocation is a mechanism that 
determines how much, when, and for what purpose a stakeholder could exploit water from a 
shared river basin that bring the highest wellbeing for the current residents of the basin while 
the ecology is kept in healthy conditions. Water allocation would not be required if water 
resources of basins were infinite and always obtainable. While water resources, in terms of 
quantity, quality, and availability cannot meet water requirements of their stakeholders, it is a 
necessary action and should be taken into significance consideration in resolving 
international, regional, and local conflicts over water. 
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2.2.2 Objectives of Water Allocation 
In fact, the main target of water allocation is to distribute limited water resources among 
multi-stakeholders such that it brings sustained well-being for people who live in a watershed. 
According to “Principles and Practices of Water Allocation among Water-use Sectors” 
report (UNESCAP, 2000), this general objective implies three other objectives; social, 
economic and environmental which their outcomes and roles in people’ wellbeing are 
summarised in Table 2.1. To achieve these three objectives, a water allocation planning has 
to address three important principals; equity, efficiency, and sustainability (UNESCAP, 
2000) that represent social, economic, and environmental objectives, respectively. In other 
words, water allocation should make a sustainable balance between equity and economic 
efficiency (WWDR, 2009). 
Sustainability, literally, means how biological systems remain diverse and productive 
(Kuhlman & Farrington, 2010). However, in water allocation, it refers to the allocation of 
water to various stakeholders in amounts that the sources of water endure within their 
regenerative capacity in order to sustain ecosystems and their functions (Roa-García, 2014). 
In other words, water resources have to be abstracted in a way that water sources remain 
usable for all the time or for some time (UNESCAP, 2000). Sustainability also addresses that 
water resources exploitation for present needs should be such an extent that ensure the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Savenije & Van Der Zaag, 2000). This 
interpretation of sustainability addresses to the concept of inter-generational equity. To sum 
up, sustainability in water allocation means the allocation of water resources of a basin 
between its stakeholders in a way that the environmental water demand in the entire basin, 
required for remaining the ecology diverse and productive is satisfied. 
Efficiency in water allocation is an economic term that has been applied to water when it 
becomes a scarce resource (Roa-García, 2014). It refers to the way of allocating water to 
various stakeholders that generates higher rather than lower value. The efficiency in water 
allocation can be illustrated through the Pareto principle, which defines optimal allocation as 
the one that no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off (Dinar et 
al., 1997). In other words, the benefit from using one additional unit of water in one 
stakeholder should be the same as it is in any others. If not, society would benefit by 
allocating more water to the sector where the benefits will be highest. Not that, efficiency is 
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not easy to achieve because water allocation involves many factors, some of which have 
conflict with efficiency aims, such as social factors (UNESCAP, 2000). 
Table ‎2.1 Objectives of water allocation and their outcomes 
Objectives Outcomes 
Social 
Provide for essential social needs: 
     • Clean drinking water 
     • Water for sanitation 
     • Food security 
Economic 
Maximise economic value of production: 
     • Agricultural and industrial development 
     • Power generation 
     • Regional development 
     • Local economies 
Environmental 
Maintain environmental quality: 
     • Maintain water quality 
     • Support instream habitat and life 
     • Aesthetic and natural values 
                        *Adapted from UNESCAP (2000), p.33. 
Literally, equity means, “a situation in which all people are treated equally and no one has an 
unfair advantage” (LDOCE, 2008). Therefore, equitable water allocation is to share of water 
between various stakeholders by special attention to water requirements of those that are 
deprived of access to water or to the economic benefits of water. In a transboundary basin, 
equitable water allocation means to share water in a way that is equitable amongst different 
regions. This can include equity between different administrative regions and between 
upstream and downstream areas. Considerations of social equity can also motivate allocation 
planning that seeks to support opportunities for development in underdeveloped regions. 
Note that, equitable water allocation through fair accessing to water or to the benefits derived 
from using water is crucial to promote equitable economic growth between the stakeholders 
of a transboundary basin; however, it is in conflict with efficient water allocation. 
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2.2.3 Sustainable Water Allocation: An Essential Action for 
Achieving Integrated Catchment Management 
Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) is a subset of environmental planning, aims to 
improve and integrate the management of land, water and all related ecological resources in 
a holistic paradigm in order to obtain the sustainable and balanced use of these resources 
(Bowden, 1999). For achieving integrated management in a watershed, the management of 
resources should be such that they are used ecologically sustainable (Jakeman & Letcher, 
2003), which for water resources, it points to the need for integrated water resources 
management according to Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 of UN Documents, Gathering a body of 
global agreements. The integrated water resources management is based on this concept that 
water is a natural resource and a social and economic good, which is an integral part of an 
ecosystem and whose quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilisation (UN, 1992). 
The degradation of the quantity and quality of water in water bodies can change the water 
resources system and its associated biota, affecting present and future generations (World 
Bank, 1996). Therefore, the holistic management of water and integrating sectoral water 
plans and programmes within the framework of national economic and social policy have 
significant importance for ensuring sustainable use of water. Sustainable water allocation is an 
important part of integrated water resources management, which tunes water resources usage 
in a way that it achieves high values of economic, social, and the environmental indicators. 
Put differently, sustainable water allocation, which considers economic, social, and the 
environmental objectives, not only causes the highest profit and satisfaction for economy and 
people but also guaranties a sustained healthy condition for the ecology of a basin. Recent 
development in sustainable water allocation within integral concept of catchment 
management can be found for instance, in the studies of Letcher et al., (2004), Letcher et al., 
(2007), and Cai (2008). 
It should be mentioned here that hydrological modelling is an important component of 
integrated catchment management, as well as sustainable water allocation. It aims to evaluate 
the change of water availability, in circumstances such as under changing land use, in areas 
where no flow gauges exist or in heavily regulated river reaches, and then assesses the 
impacts of water availability changing on water users (Croke et al., 2006). Whereas this 
problem is not directly considered in the present thesis, some fundamental works should be 
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mentioned here such as the studies of Croke et al., (2004), Croke et al., (2006), Shin et al., 
(2013), and Cleridou et al., (2014). 
2.2.4 Needs to Integrate Water Allocation Planning and Water 
Resources Development 
As it was explained in subsections 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.2, most watersheds in the world, especially 
transboundary ones, encounter water scarcity. Hence, water resources development through 
construction of water development projects is an undoubted need. In developed watersheds 
where water projects (e.g., dams) are under operation, their locations and capacities were 
already determined. In these cases, water authorities only involve in allocating available water 
resources of the basins, included rivers’ runoff and stored water of reservoirs, to 
stakeholders. In under-developed transboundary basins, water authorities have to determine 
the water shares of stakeholders and the locations and capacities of new water projects in the 
same time. The decision making of water authorities over water allocation of under-
developed transboundary basins is much harder than developed basin because they have to 
allocate water resources of projects, which their locations and capacities are not determined 
yet. 
It was widely explained in sub-section 2.1.2 that stakeholders of transboundary watersheds 
struggle to have more water projects in their administrative boundaries, due to ample direct 
and indirect benefits of dams. Therefore, making decision about the locations and capacities 
of projects by water authorities are very important in under-developed transboundary 
watersheds and a transparency method has to be considered for this job. Otherwise, this 
decision would intensify water conflicts in the basins. Sustainable water allocation is an 
efficient method to specify the locations and sizes of new projects. It means that selecting 
sizes and locations of new projects should be done in a way that they guaranty an equitable, 
efficient, and sustainable water allocation for the transboundary basins. Put differently, 
capacities and locations of new projects should lead to a fair water distribution in the basin 
besides obtaining the highest profits for the stakeholders while the environment remains 
healthy. It should be noted here, locating and sizing new water projects are also dependence 
on some engineering studies such as geology, topography, and economy and proposed new 
projects by water allocation model, should be considered as an initial plan for a basin’s water 
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resources development, which their possibilities should be evaluated using engineering 
studies. 
2.3 Approaches and Models for Water Allocation 
Operations Research methods have a long tradition in agricultural and related natural 
resource industries (Plà et al., 2014). Thus, models and algorithms, which have been 
developed for water allocation are often based on simulation and optimisation (Nandalal & 
Simonovic, 2002). Simulation models simulate a system’s behaviour in accordance with 
predefined rules in order to evaluate various responses of the system such as economic and 
social for alternative scenarios. Optimisation models provide an optimum solution for the 
system. In short, a system’s performance can be well assessed with utilising simulation 
models whereas optimisation models are helpful when the system performance is targeted 
(McKinney et al., 1999). Coming subsections provides more detail discussion about applied 
simulation and optimisation models for water allocation. 
2.3.1 Simulation Approach 
Simulation is the process of designing a model for a real system to understand the behaviour 
of the system and/or evaluate various strategies for the operation of the system. Simulation 
models have widely been used in water allocation owing to the advantages of simulation such 
as: 
 Mathematical simplicity and easy to comprehend and understand 
 Capability to solve complicated water resources systems with highly nonlinear 
relationships with fewer simplifying assumptions requirement 
 Easy to understand how a modelled water system actually works and find out which 
variables are most important to water allocation pattern. 
Some water allocation simulation models are site-specific and developed for particular 
specific basins such as the Colorado River Simulation System (CRSS) (Wurbs, 1995). 
However, there are other generalised simulation models such as AQUATOOL (Andreu et 
al., 1996), Acres model (Sigvaldson, 1976), HEC5 simulation of Flood Control and 
Conservation System (Mays & Tang, 1992), Interactive River System Simulation Model 
(IRIS) (Salewicz et al., 1991), REALM (Perera et al., 2005 and Braddock & Schreider, 2006) 
that were designed to use as general tools applicable in water resources systems. 
16 
 
Some water allocation simulation models are able to simulate water quality variables (e.g., 
temperature and nutrients) in which Enhanced Stream Water Quality Model (QUAL2E) 
(EPA, 1996) and Water Quality for River-Reservoir Systems (WQRRS) (USACE, 1986) are 
highlighted. Recent simulation models are enhanced with interactive and advanced graphic 
user interfaces. These models allow on-screen configuration of the simulations and display 
of results. MIKE BASIN (DHI, 2001) is a notable example of these models, which takes the 
advantages of Geographic Information System (GIS) to provide basin-scale solutions by 
addressing conjunctive use of surface and groundwater resources, reservoir operation, and 
water quality issues. 
The main problem of water allocation models based on the simulation approach is that they 
often provide numerous feasible solutions and do not yield only one optimal solution. In 
these cases, the evaluation of all plans and selection one of them by decision makers are 
frustrating. Moreover, it is too hard to calibrate a simulation model with a real water system. 
2.3.2 Optimisation Approach 
Optimisation is a simple tool for solving the large problems concisely and analysing the 
solutions by utilising the power of linear and nonlinear formulations. It helps to find the 
answer that yields the best result; achieves the highest profit, output, or happiness; or 
achieves the lowest cost, waste, or discomfort (Singh, 2012a). Optimisation models are based 
on a particular mathematical form, which consists of objective function and constraint 
equations. These models search for an optimum decision, which satisfies all system 
constraints and maximises or minimises some objectives. The optimisation models are 
classified two categories; single objective optimisation (SOP) models and multi-objective 
optimisation (MOP) models. 
The main target of SOP models is to find the “best” solution for a problem, which 
corresponds to the minimum or maximum value of a single objective function. This type of 
models is a useful tool for providing decision makers with insights into the nature of the 
problem (Savic, 2002). However, SOP models cannot provide a set of alternative solutions 
for the problem that trade different objectives against each other. The general form of SOP 
models can be expressed in the form 
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Min (Max)  f(x) 
Subject to: 
ci(x)≤0    i∈ κ 
ci(x)=0     i ɛ 
xX 
 
where f is the objective function and X is the feasible region of problem, which is a subset of 
R
n
. The decision variable (x) may be a vector x = (x1, … , xn) or a scalar (when n=1). The set 
feasible region X is specified through inequalities or equations—or both, which are called 
constraints. Thus, X is often given as the set of all solutions of the system. Note that κ and ɛ 
are index sets and the ci are constraint functions.  
MOP models deal with optimisation problems with two or more objective functions. In a 
MOP model with conflicting objectives, there is no single optimal solution. The interaction 
among different objectives gives a set of compromised solutions, largely known as the trade-
off, nondominated, noninferior or Pareto-optimal solutions. The general form of MOP 
models can be expressed in the form 
 
Min (Max)  Z1(x) 
Min (Max)  Z2(x) 
. 
. 
Min (Max)  Zp(x) 
Subject to: 
ci(x)≤0    i∈ κ 
ci(x)=0     i ɛ 
xX 
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where Z1(x), Z2(x), and Zp(x) are the p individual objective functions. These two optimisation 
models are widely been used in water allocation modelling which are reviewed in next parts. 
2.3.2.1 Single Objective Water Allocation Models 
Many SOP models with various objective functions have been developed in order to find the 
best distribution of water in various watersheds in accordance to their objective functions. 
However, water necessitates allocating efficiently to provide the highest value for the society, 
because of the scarcity of water (Harou, et al., 2009). Hence, maximising the achieved profit 
from water use is an essential objective function for water allocation models. Note that, 
economic objectives are able to summarise all interests in a single financial metric (Harou, et 
al., 2009) and thus, the maximisation of water profit as an economic objective is considered 
in many water allocation modelling to cope with the complexity of considering various 
interests in water allocation problems. 
The conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater is a required task when the available 
water from one source cannot meet the entire water requirements (Harmancioglu et al., 
2013). Some SOP models have been developed for optimal allocation of surface and 
groundwater resources of a system by maximising the water profit, especial in irrigation 
systems. Latif & Douglas James (1991) applied linear programming optimization to 
maximise the net income of water allocation to irrigators over the long period in the Indus 
basin in Pakistan. The model determined the optimal groundwater extraction for 
supplementing canal water to avoid adverse effects of high or low groundwater level. Afzal et 
al., (1992) proposed a linear programming model to optimise the use of different quality 
waters in an irrigation system in Pakistan. With targeting the maximisation of water profit, 
the model made decision about how much land should be put under each crop and how 
much surface and groundwater should be applied to each crop, while the water resource of 
the system comprises poor-quality ground water and limited good-quality canal water. 
Pulido-Velázquez et al., (2006) presented an integrated hydrologic-economic modelling 
framework to optimise conjunctive use of surface and groundwater at the river basin scale. 
The proposed model was a nonlinear optimisation model that maximised the net economic 
value of water use. This model was employed for water allocation of the Adra River Basin 
system, Spain. Sethi et al., (2006) developed a deterministic linear programming model and 
a chance-constrained linear programming model to allocate available land and water 
resources of Balasore district of Orissa province, India, in a way that maximise the net 
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annual return from the study area. In that study, net irrigation water requirement of crops 
was considered as stochastic variable. Raul et al., (2012) carried out similar study for water 
allocation of the Hirakud Canal Command, located in Orissa province, India. Unlike the 
study of Sethi et al., (2006), the uncertainty of surface water was considered in this study.  
Karamouz et al., (2009) introduced a water allocation model based on nonlinear 
optimisation in order to optimise the water resources allocation of the Varamin plain, Iran, 
considering the conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater resources. The economic 
objective of the model was to maximise the net benefit, considering the water pumping cost, 
crop cultivation cost and the benefit of total crop production during the study time horizon. 
For copping the nonlinearity of the model, they used a genetic algorithm. Montazar et al., 
(2010) developed a nonlinear programming in order to carry out water allocation planning of 
the Qazvin Irrigation Command Area, Iran. The model’s objective function was to maximise 
the overall benefits from water use from surface water and groundwater resources for 
irrigation. Singh (2012b) developed a linear programming model for the optimal land and 
water resources allocation of a command area located in Jhajjar district of Haryana, India. 
The model’s objective function maximised the net annual returns of water use from surface 
and groundwater resources, subjected to system constraints such as a groundwater balance 
constraint, which mitigated the waterlogging problems while making optimal use of land and 
water resources. Singh & Panda (2012) used a similar model for the allocation of surface and 
groundwater resources of an irrigated area located in Haryana State of India. 
Good land and freshwater are limited resources and need to be used optimally. Hence, 
some optimisation models have been developed for optimal water allocation, as well as, 
optimal cropping pattern. Chávez‐Morales et al., (1987) proposed a SOP model based on 
linear programming for water allocation of an irrigation district in Mexico. The model took 
into consideration the yield, price, and production cost of crops, land restriction on crop 
areas, storage capacity of the existing reservoirs and aquifer, and requirements of other 
resources such as fertilizer, pesticide, seed, equipment, and labour. The model output were 
the optimal water allocated to irrigators, the optimal cropping pattern, monthly schedule of 
reservoir releases, and aquifer withdrawals while maximised the annual water profit in the 
district. Wardlaw & Barnes (1999) applied a SOP model based on nonlinear programming 
to improve real time irrigation water management in the Lower Ayung River Basin in Bali, 
Indonesia. The model’s objective function was to maximise crop production through 
appropriate water allocation, while maintaining equity between different irrigation schemes 
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and units within schemes. Benli & Kodal (2003) proposed a nonlinear programming for the 
determination of optimum water allocation, optimum cropping pattern, and farm income 
under adequate and limited water supply conditions in southeast Anatolian Region of 
Turkey. The objective function of the model was based on crop water-benefit functions. 
They also tried a linear programming model for the problem, in order to indicate the 
difference between non-linear programming and linear programming models. The same 
approach was adopted by Srinivasa Raju & Nagesh Kumar (2004) to evolve efficient 
cropping pattern for maximising the benefit of water use in Sri Ram Sagar Project, India, by 
employing Genetic Algorithms. They also solved the problem by formulating the problem 
with linear programming to compare these two techniques. Karamouz et al., (2010) 
proposed a nonlinear optimisation model to optimise water allocation and the crop pattern 
of irrigation networks, considering surface and groundwater availability in eight irrigation 
networks in the Tehran province, Iran. The objective function of this model was to 
maximise the net benefits of agricultural products, considering allowable water table 
fluctuations, pumping costs, as well as the impacts of water supply deficit on crop 
production. A genetic algorithm was used to find the (near) optimal solution of the problem, 
due to the nonlinearity of the problem.  
Because of the significant roles of reservoirs for handling irrigation, hydropower generation, 
controlling flood and drought, and flow adjustment for ecological use, many water allocation 
models have been developed for optimal allocation of reservoirs’ stored water and governing 
the operation policy of them. Ghahraman & Sepaskhah (2002) developed a model for 
optimal allocation of water resources the Ardak reservoir dam, Iran to an irrigation project. 
The proposed model consisted of two models. The first model, which was an intra-seasonal 
nonlinear water allocation model, allocated water among different crops in order to 
maximise total water profit. The second model, which was a seasonal water allocation model 
based on stochastic-dynamic programming, was employed for the convergent operating 
policy over seasons for optimal expected water profit over a year. Moradi-Jalal et al., (2007) 
introduced a SOP model based on linear programming for the optimal water allocation of a 
real reservoir-irrigation system in Iran. The model’s objective was to maximise the annual 
benefit of the system from supplying irrigation water to a proposed multi-crop pattern over 
the planning period. This objective function subjected to achieving monthly balance in the 
reservoir, covering water demand for crop production, considering evaporation loss from the 
reservoir, and governing equations for reservoir release and operations. Moghaddasi et al., 
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(2010) developed a regional optimal allocation model based on nonlinear optimisation to 
help water resources management of the Zayandeh-rud river basin, Iran. This model 
allocated water among different crops and irrigation units in a way that maximised the 
economic value of allocating water among different crops and irrigation units. The water 
allocation model was coupled with a reservoir-operating model, which was developed based 
on the certain hedging that dealt with the available water and water demands mutually. 
Divakar et al., (2011) proposed a SOP model for optimal bulk allocations of limited 
available water based on an economic criterion to competing use sectors such as agriculture, 
domestic, industry and hydropower. The proposed model included a reservoir operation 
module and a water allocation module. The reservoir operation module determined water 
resources availability and water allocation module shared water between different use sectors 
in a way that maximise the net economic benefits of water use. This model was applied to 
the Chao Phraya basin in Thailand. 
The formulation of water allocation problem at the regional or basin level is complex and 
complicate, due to the size of the model and the interactions of various sectors on each 
other. Reca et al., (2001a) proposed a three-layer optimisation approach based on linear 
programming for water allocation at the basin level. In this proposed approach, irrigation 
timing for a single crop was optimised in the first level. In the second level, models allocated 
water and land resources to the cropping pattern on an irrigation area scale. In this level, the 
optimal benefit of water use in agricultural sectors at different areas was estimated. In the 
third level, model optimised water allocation among all types of users on a hydrologic system 
scale. Stochastic nature of water availability was also taken into account in this model. The 
proposed approach was employed to optimise water management in the Bembezar river 
irrigation district, Spain (Reca et al., 2001b). Quba'a et al., (2002) carried out a study for 
allocating water within and among competing sectors in Tyre–Qasmieh region, the south 
Lebanon. For this purpose, an optimisation model using linear programming was developed 
in order to achieve the highest economic return from water use. The model’s objective 
function subjected to a greenhouse area, crop production, and seasonal per capita water 
requirements. Cai et al., (2003) introduced a new integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic 
model based on SOP for water allocation of the Syr Darya River basin in Central Asia. The 
introduced model was able to reflect the interrelationships between hydrologic, agronomic, 
and economic components. All these components were integrated into a consistent system. 
The core of this system was a multi-period network model of the river basin, ranging from 
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crop root zones to the river system, whose objective function was to maximise total water use 
benefit from irrigation, hydropower generation, and ecological water use. The model was 
solved by a decomposition approach due to its nonlinearity and the number of decision 
variables. Cai (2008) carried out similar study for water allocation of the Maipo River Basin, 
Chile. Devi et al., (2005) presented a linear programming model for optimal water 
allocations of the transboundary Subernarekha River in India. The model’s objective 
function was to find the maximum annual benefits from irrigation and hydropower subject to 
various constraints on the system. They presented various water allocation patterns for the 
basin based on various water supply scenarios (75% water year dependable flow, dry, and wet 
years). Karimi & Ardakanian (2010) introduced a new long-term water allocation model at 
basin level based on linear programming. The introduced model considered water supply–
demand interaction in agriculture and industry sectors, by use of socio-economic parameters; 
such as, production, cultivated land area, revenue, and employment. It was also able to 
reflect the interrelationship between essential hydro-system and supply–demand 
components, as well as, explore both socio-economic, and water allocation consequences of 
various policy choices. Huang et al., (2012) developed an integrated optimisation method for 
water allocation of the Tarim River Basin, China by coupling two-stage stochastic 
programming with inexact quadratic program to cope with the stochasticity of water 
resources. The proposed nonlinear model maximised the river basin’s benefit from water 
use in an agricultural sector. 
Integer programming (IP) and mixed-integer programming (MIP) models have almost no 
tradition in water allocation; however, they have been employed for other tasks associated to 
water resources management. For instance, Anwar & Clarke (2001) used an MIP approach 
for scheduling canal irrigation among a group of users who request water at varying times in 
each scheduling period. Srinivasan et al., (1999) proposed a mixed integer linear 
programming (MILP) model for supporting water-supply planning and reservoir-
performance optimisation. Teegavarapu & Simonovic (2000) developed a mixed integer 
nonlinear programming model with binary variables to study daily hydropower operation of 
four cascading reservoirs. Mixed-integer programming has been employed by Loaiciga et al., 
(1992), Datta & Dhiman (1996), and Misirli & Yazicigil (1997) for the optimal groundwater 
management. 
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2.3.2.2 Multi-Objective Water Allocation Models 
Multi-objective optimisation (Cohon & Marks, 1975) is an effective method to achieve 
reasonable results when several indicators have to be considered simultaneously (Jaramillo et 
al., 2005). Multi-objective optimisation techniques generally fall into two categories (Cohon, 
1978). First category includes techniques that generate noninferior (Pareto-optimal) solution 
sets. Second category comprises techniques that incorporate multi-objective trade-off 
preferences to select the best alternative. Methods classified in the first category inform 
decision-makers of the performance trade-offs for the most efficient competing alternatives 
and they do not select the best alternative selection from the non-dominated solution. The 
Hop-Skip-and-Jump method (Brill et al., 1982) is a technique in this category for generating 
efficient alternatives solutions with very different, but still Pareto efficient/non-dominated, 
performance. The second category set of techniques uses various approaches to reduce the 
non-dominated solution set to a single best alternative. These approaches may use multi-
attribute utility theory (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993), prior assessments of weights (Lund, 1994), 
geometric definitions of best (Zelany, 1974), and other iterative methods. Note that, the 
second category of techniques is mainly employed, particularly for water resources 
management problems involving conflict among competing parties.  
Due to multidisciplinary aspects of water resources management, MOP has been 
increasingly employed in this area. For instance, Eschenbach et al., (2001), Consoli et al., 
(2008), and Tabari & Soltani (2013) used MOP technique for reservoir operation. It was also 
employed by Shamir et al., (1984), Emch & Yeh (1998), and Park & Aral (2004) for 
groundwater management. Nayak & Panda (2001), Sarker & Ray (2009), and Zeng et al., 
(2010) formulated crop-planning problems as multi-objective optimisation models. MOP 
technique has also been employed for the environmental flow management (Szemis et al., 
2013, and Yang, 2011) and urban water management (Fattahi & Fayyaz, 2010, and 
Zarghaami & Hajykazemian, 2013). 
Water allocation is a multidimensional task and often several objectives, beside the 
economic indicator, have to be considered simultaneously for achieving reasonable and 
efficient solutions. Hence, multi-objective models are successfully utilised for water 
allocation modelling in some cases. Babel et al., (2005) introduced an integrated water 
allocation model based on MOP technique for optimal allocation of limited water from a 
storage reservoir to different user sectors, considering socio-economic, environmental and 
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technical aspects. The proposed model comprised three modules; a reservoir operation 
module, an economic analysis module, and a water allocation module. The model optimised 
the water allocation considering two objective functions; maximising the satisfaction; as well 
as, the net economic benefit by the demand sectors. The weighting technique was employed 
for finding the solutions of the proposed model. Xevi & Khan (2005) developed a multi-
objective model for water allocation problems when there is a conflict between irrigation 
water demand and in stream environmental flow requirements. Three objective functions, 
maximising net returns, minimising variable cost and minimising the total supplementary 
groundwater pumping requirements to meet crop demand from the irrigated areas were 
considered in this model. The goal programming technique was employed for solving this 
model, applied to the hypothetical Irrigation Area using real data at Berembed weir on the 
Murrumbidgee River (Australia). 
Liu et al., (2010) developed a MOP model for optimal allocation of water resources in a 
saltwater intrusion area in Pearl River Delta, China. They considered three objective 
functions for their model; maximising economic interest, maximising social satisfaction, and 
minimising the amounts of polluted water, due to the social, economic, and environmental 
aspects of the problem. They used the genetic algorithm to find the solutions of their model. 
Han et al., (2011) introduced a multi-objective linear programming model with interval 
parameters for the allocation of multi-source water resources with different water qualities to 
multiple users with different water quality requirements for the Dalian city for 2010, 2015 
and 2020 planning years. In this study, an interactive compromising algorithm was also 
introduced for obtaining a feasible solution vector for the problem. The model’s objective 
functions were the maximisation of the net benefit of allocated water to agriculture, the 
minimisation of sewage drainage and the maximisation of greenbelt irrigation area. Ahmadi 
et al., (2012) introduced a genetic algorithm–based multi-objective model for water allocation 
of a case study in the Aharchay watershed, Iran. The model provided desirable water quality 
and quantity for various sectors while maximising agricultural production in the upstream 
region, mitigating the unemployment (social) impacts of land use changes, and providing 
reliable water supply to the downstream region. Rezapour Tabari & Yazdi (2014) developed 
a multi-objective water allocation model based on inter-basin water resources and restoration 
of outer-basin water resources. The proposed models’ objective functions were to supply 
inter-basin water demand, reduce the amount of water output of the boundary of Iran and 
increase water transfer to adjacent basins (Urmia Lake basin). The non-dominate sorting 
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genetic algorithm was used for performing the proposed model regarding the complexity and 
nonlinearity of the objective functions of the model. 
Water allocation of transboundary watersheds is more complicated than unshared basins 
where stakeholders of transboundary basins are often administrative boundaries such as 
states/provinces in national level or countries in international level with normally huge water 
demands. In these cases, unsustainable water allocation can cause serious water disputes 
between the stakeholders and somehow brings about political problems between the 
stakeholders. Hence, social, economic, and the environmental factors (UNESCAP, 2000) 
must take into consideration for the water allocation formulation of transboundary basins. 
The Aral Sea basin is a transboundary watershed that several mathematical models were 
developed to allocate water between its stakeholders. Three main optimisation models were 
formulated by McKinney & Cai (1997), Cai et al., (2002), and Schlüter et al., (2005) for this 
purpose. The purposed models by these researchers for water allocation of the Aral Sea 
basin marginally considered three essential water allocation indicators. The objective 
functions of these studies consisted of economic (economic efficiency in water infrastructure 
development), social (for instance, equitable distribution of water deficits among 
stakeholders), and the environmental (the Aral Sea water requirement) indicators, however, 
marginal value of water use was not considered in these models. Moreover, the satisfaction 
of the environmental water requirement for the whole body of watershed was disregarded. 
Due to the employment of weighted-sum technique for solving these models, varieties of 
weights for the objective functions were selected and thus, the models proposed many water 
allocation schemes for the Aral Sea basin. Note that, providing many water allocation 
patterns for a basin often confounds water authorities. 
The Euphrates and Tigris River basin is a transboundary watershed which three countries, 
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria are its main stakeholders. Various models based on optimisation and 
game theory and have been developed to allocate the basin’s water resources to these 
countries (Kucukmehmetoglu & Guldmann, 2004, Kucukmehmetoglu, 2009, and 
Kucukmehmetoglu, 2012). Kucukmehmetoglu & Guldmann (2010) utilised a multi-objective 
model for water allocation of this basin. The model’s advantage was to involve all 
stakeholders’ profits (the profits of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria) in water allocation by 
considering the maximisation of each stakeholder’ profit from consuming water in different 
sectors as the model’s objective functions instead of maximisation of the basin’s profit. 
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However, the environmental water satisfaction was not taken into account in this model. 
Moreover, they used the weighted-sum technique and constraint technique to find the 
solutions of their model and selected three different weights for the objective functions while 
the justification of these weights was not transparent. 
2.3.2.3 Location-Allocation Problems in Water Resources Management 
Location-allocation refers to problems which aim to determine an optimal location for one 
or more facilities that will service demand from a given set of points (Azarmand & 
Neishabouri, 2009). Many Location-Allocation models have been developed based on 
Integer Programming or Mixed-Integer Programming for facility locations in various areas 
such as healthcare (Shariff et al., 2012), logistics (Ishfaq & Sox, 2011), supply chain (Zhou et 
al., 2002), and solid waste management (Caruso et al., 1993). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, the location-allocation problem has no experience in the water allocation 
formulation. It can be utilised for locating and sizing new water projects (e.g., dams) in an 
underdeveloped watershed. Note that, the network structure of rivers in a watershed, 
locations, and accessibility of stakeholders of the watershed, the environmental demands, 
and water flow are specific characters that make water projects’ locating and sizing different 
from other facility location models used in other sectors as named above. 
2.3.3 Summing up the literature review 
The scopes of the present thesis do not allow the author to provide more detailed reviews 
about applying optimisation methods in water allocation. However, I can notice that there 
are some important knowledge gaps in this discipline, which I plan to address in the present 
thesis. These gaps can be highlighted and summarised as follows: 
1. Introducing some water allocation models at basin level by stressing on 
transboundary watersheds 
2. Introducing new solution method for multi-objective water allocation models, which 
their objective functions has the same dimension, without giving any weights to the 
objective functions 
3. Incorporating a dam component to multi-objective water allocation modelling which 
searches for the optimal locations and capacities of new dams in an underdeveloped 
transboundary watershed based on the objective functions. 
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The novelty of the study reported in this thesis can also be justified by the selection of the 
case study Basin, the Sefidrud River in Iran, where such comprehensive research was 
implemented first time. 
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Chapter 3  Study Area 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the overall purpose of this study is to establish a methodology 
that supports water authorities in allocating water in watersheds (especially transboundary 
basins) to the stakeholders in an equitable, efficient, and environmentally sustainable way. 
Furthermore, this methodology should be able to introduce the outline of optimal 
development of water resources (such as new dams) in the watersheds. To achieve this 
purpose, I have developed various water allocation models and evaluated their capabilities 
for introducing an optimal economic and environmental utilisation of water by applying 
them to the Sefidrud Basin, Iran. This basin is one of the biggest watersheds of Iran that 
suffers from a serious water conflict between its stakeholders. This chapter contains a 
description of this Basin by presenting more information about its water resources, water 
demands, and others beneficial information. 
3.1 General Characteristics of the Sefidrud Basin 
The Sefidrud Basin is located in the Northwest part of Iran, and lies within eight Iran’s 
provinces. These provinces, which are known as stakeholders of the Basin are Kordestan 
(Province 1), Hamedan (Province 2), Zanjan (Province 3), East Azarbaijan (Province 4), 
Ardabil (Province 5), Tehran (Province 6), Qazvin (Province 7), and Gilan (Province 8). The 
Sefidrud Basin covers an area of about 59217 km
2
 (MGC, 2011) which is 3.4% of the surface 
area of Iran. The population in the basin was 2,086,069 million in 2007 and it is projected to 
grow to more than 2,266,670 million at 2025 (MGC, 2011). Figure 3.1 shows the Basin’s 
location in Iran and its stakeholders. The area and current population of each province are 
presented in Table 3.1. 
The annual average precipitation in the north part of the Sefidrud Basin (Province 8) is 
about 1000 mm while it is from 200 mm to 400 mm in its south (Provinces 1 to 7). The 
annual average temperature in the Basin is between -5 and 25 Celsius, which tends to be 
warmer in the south than the north (MGC, 2011). The Sefidrud River (80 km, draining 5767 
km
2
) is the main waterway in this Basin that finally releases to the Caspian Sea. The 
Ghezelozan (670 km, draining 48600 km
2
) and Shahrud (210 km, draining 4850 km
2
) rivers 
are the two major head attributes of the Sefidrud River (MGC, 2011). The Ghezelozan River 
passes through Kordestan (Province 1), Hamedan (Province 2), Zanjan (Province 3), East 
Azarbaijan (Province 4), and Ardabil (Province 5) provinces and at the lower part flows into 
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Gilan (Province 8). The Shahrud River, after passing Tehran (Province 6) and Qazvin 
(Province 7) provinces, joins to the Ghezelozan river and flows into the Gilan (Province 8) 
province. It should be emphasised that the name of head tributaries changes to Sefidrud 
river after joining together. 
Table ‎3.1 The area and population of provinces in the Sefidrud Basin (Unit: Percent) 
Province Area Contained in the Sefidrud Basin Population in 2007
 
1 23.3 12.8 
2 3.4 1.5 
3 30.9 22.9 
4 19.5 11.2 
5 6.8 4.5 
6 1.9 0.3 
7 7.4 1.6 
8 6.8 45.2 
Sum 100 100 
 
 
Figure ‎3.1 The location of the Sefidrud Basin and its stakeholders 
30 
 
3.2 Water Demand and Water Supply in the Sefidrud Basin 
According to an estimate for 2025 by (MGC, 2011), the total annual water demand in the 
Sefidrud Basin is 7990 million cubic meters (MCM). The agricultural sector is the primary 
user of water resources, accounting for 91% of the total demand. The municipal and 
industrial water demands are about 8% and 1% of the total demand, respectively. Hence, 
these two demands are ignored in the present study. The agricultural demands of the Basin’s 
stakeholders are displayed in Table 3.2. As shown in this table, the largest agricultural 
demand in the Basin belongs to Province 8 with 2107 MCM demand while it has about 6.8% 
and 45.2% of contained area and population of the Basin. 
According to (MGC, 2011), the potential of average long-term surface water supply (50 
years) in the Sefidrud Basin is about 6214 MCM, as shown in Table 3.3. This table also gives 
the source of the surface waters from the Sefidrud Basin stakeholders. As shown in this 
table, the share of Province 8, which has the largest water demand (2107 MCM), from the 
Basin surface water supply is 749 MCM. According to this table, Province 4 and 3 with 1407 
and 1233 MCM, respectively, have the biggest share of surface water production in the 
Basin. Table 3.3 also shows the available ground water resources (exploitational resources 
approved to use) in the Sefidrud Basin. As can be seen in this Table, the quantity of 
available groundwater supply in Province 2 is about 2 MCM that shows this province is 
completely depended to surface water supply for satisfying whose water demand. 
Table ‎3.2 The agricultural demands of the Basin’s stakeholders (Unit: MCM) 
Province Agricultural Demand 
1 1029 
2 126 
3 1967 
4 753 
5 447 
6 410 
7 431 
8 2107 
Sum 7270 
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Table ‎3.3 The portion of each province in potential basin water resources (Unit: MCM) 
Province Surface Water Ground Water Sum 
1 1039 450 1489 
2 55 25 80 
3 1233 579 1812 
4 1407 92 1499 
5 680 21 701 
6 464 2 466 
7 587 109 696 
8 749 59 808 
Sum 6214 1337 7551 
3.3 River Basin Network Scheme 
Figure 3.2 shows the network scheme of the Sefidrud river basin water resource system. This 
network represents the Basin with nodes and divides its catchment into regions. It should be 
mentioned here that the structure of the Basin network (the locations of nodes) is actually 
predefined by the availability of data (water supply and demands) for the nodes. The 
supply/demand nodes are associated with 27 main stream flow gauges in the Basin (Figure 
3.3). They provide water supply from surface and groundwater resources for agricultural use 
in their vicinities. The directed vertices of this graph represent the river reaches. These 
directions indicate the only possible way for water to flow between nodes. When more than 
one node is situated in a province, the sum of the water allocated from these nodes 
represents the total amount of water allocated to the relevant province. Shared nodes 
between stakeholders in the network are replaced with dummy nodes to calculate easily the 
water share of associated stakeholders in the shared nodes. Table 3.4 presents associated 
data to each node in the Basin network scheme such as the annual average of surface water 
resource produced in the mid-stream catchment of the node with whose upstream nodes, its 
groundwater supply, its annual agricultural water demand, and the marginal value of water 
use in the node (MGC, 2011). It should be mentioned here that the annual average of 
surface water resource for each node has been derived from annual recorded runoff of the 
particular node and its upstream nodes during 1957 to 2007. This period was selected 
because there is no statistically significant trend (positive or negative) in the Basin discharge 
during this period (MGC, 2011).  
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Figure ‎3.2 The Sefidrud Basin network 
 
 
Figure ‎3.3 The location of the network nodes in the Basin 
In this study, the environmental water requirement in each node is calculated, utilising the 
modified Montana method (Torabi Palatkaleh et al., 2010a). Montana (Tennant, 1976) is 
the most renowned method for determining the environmental water requirement, which 
was developed in the USA. Tennant (1976) established some classes of flow classifications to 
associate habitat quality with various percentages of mean annual flow. These classes, which 
are for various conditions of habitat quality on a seasonal basis, are presented in Table 3.5.  
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Table ‎3.4 The annual average of surface and groundwater supply (MCM), annual 
agricultural water demand (MCM), and agricultural water profit (Iranian Rial/M
3
) for each 
node in the Sefidrud Basin network scheme 
Node Province 
Water Supply 
Water Demand Water Profit 
Surface Water Groundwater 
1 
1 
31 25 40 440 
2 181 227 334 440 
3 16 111 111 440 
4 32 16 32 440 
5 83 12 35 440 
6 
1 8 1 72 440 
2 0 0 84 440 
3 0 0 139 1515 
7 
1 
332 6 170 440 
8 200 28 126 440 
9 151 0 84 440 
10 
1 30 23 24 440 
2 35 25 42 440 
3 82 68 83 1515 
11 
3 
232 66 230 1515 
12 161 72 146 1515 
13 125 128 241 1515 
14 205 127 292 1515 
15 280 73 594 1836 
16 116 29 96 1515 
17 
4 
530 5 165 1836 
18 105 5 14 1836 
19 160 14 91 1836 
20 
4 450 39 388 1836 
5 0 0 250 1836 
21 
5 
31 2 3 1836 
22 180 17 172 1836 
23 10 1 14 1836 
24 
5 460 0 8 1836 
3 205 45 242 1515 
25 6 420 2 410 1417 
26 7 684 85 324 1417 
27 
7 70 24 107 1417 
8 610 59 2107 1933 
Sum 6214 1337 7270 - 
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Note that, the Modified Montana method (Torabi Palatkaleh et al., 2010a) estimates the 
environmental water need based on a percentage of the mean monthly flow in the node, 
instead of the mean annual flow. In this work, the percentages for “Fair or degrading” 
environmental status are taken into account (10% mean monthly flow for October to March 
and 30% mean monthly flow for April to September). These percentages are officially 
accepted by the Iranian water authorities to be considered for calculating the environmental 
water requirements of rivers in Iran (Torabi Palatkaleh et al., 2010b). The environmental 
water requirement in each node is presented in Table 3.6. 
Table ‎3.5 Percentages of mean annual flow required for maintaining the specific habitat 
quality 
Environmental status 
Percentage of Mean Annual Flow 
Low flow season High flow season 
Optimum range 60-100 60-100 
Outstanding 40 60 
Excellent 30 50 
Good 20 40 
Fair or degrading 10 30 
Poor 10 10 
Severe degradation <10 <10 
3.4 Water Dispute in the Sefidrud Basin 
The Sefidrud Basin is an underdeveloped watershed. The comparison of the Basin water 
resources and water requirements included the environmental water need displays that all 
stakeholders confront with rising water requirements while there is no enough water resource 
for meeting all demands. This fact brings about two type water competitions for utilising 
more water in the Sefidrud Basin; firstly, the water competition between upstream and 
downstream stakeholders and secondly, the competition of upstream stakeholders with each 
other. 
Similar to other basins, mountains (major water harvesting areas) are upstream and flat plains 
(major water consumers) are located downstream in this Basin, and thus water resources of 
downstream stakeholder (Province 8) depend on transferred water from upstream regions. 
Because of unbalanced water development in the Basin, developed downstream and 
undeveloped upstream, the upstream stakeholders suffer from economic and social 
problems, caused by mainly low-income generation. In this circumstance, the upstream 
stakeholders have a high desired for water developments by utilising produced water in their 
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boundaries in order to improve their economic situation, whereas downstream stakeholder 
(Province 8) depends on transferred water from upstream to downstream. This competition 
between upstream stakeholders and downstream stakeholder has now turned into a serious 
water conflict in the Basin. Nowadays, the Iranian water authority is under high social and 
political pressures for allocateing more water and budgets for water developments in 
upstream stakeholders while downstream stakeholder uses the same leverage to prevent 
constructing any water projects in upstream.  
Table ‎3.6 The environmental water requirement in each node in the Basin network 
Node Environmental Water Requirement (MCM) 
1 7 
2 47 
3 4 
4 11 
5 75 
6 77 
7 81 
8 126 
9 36 
10 272 
11 54 
12 363 
13 34 
14 87 
15 525 
16 28 
17 125 
18 25 
19 65 
20 856 
21 3 
22 42 
23 2 
24 1064 
25 115 
26 294 
27 1449 
 
The second type of water conflict is between the upstream stakeholders. They are truly 
aware that the Iranian water authority could only allocate limited water and budgets for water 
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development in all upstream stakeholders, due to the huge percentage of resident in 
downstream stakeholder (45.2% of the Basin population) and the Iranian government 
responsibility for sustaining their living. Hence, they all try to increase their shares from that 
limited potential for water development in all upstream regions.  
In these circumstances, the Iranian water authority has a serious concern about how the 
environmental water demand is satisfied in the Sefidrud Basin. It should be emphasised that, 
in fact, the stakeholders have a low priority for the environmental water satisfaction while 
they suffer from water shortage.  
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Chapter 4 The Single Objective Economic Model 
As noted in Sub-section 1.2, the target of this study is to introduce a methodology that 
supports water authorities in allocating water in transboundary watersheds to the 
stakeholders in an equitable, efficient, and environmentally sustainable way. Moreover, this 
methodology should be able to introduce the outline of optimal development of water 
resources (such as new dams) in the watersheds. For achieving this aim, firstly, some water 
allocation models are introduced for undeveloped watersheds, without any water resource 
development projects. The models’ implementation results for a real case study (the 
Sefidrud Basin) are assessed to find which model’s results can meet the sustainability criteria, 
required for a sustainable water allocation, explained in Sub-section 2.2. In the second stage 
of this study, the selected water allocation model from the first stage is improved in order to 
be able to determine the optimal locations and capacities of new water development projects 
(e.g., dams) for the basins. In this chapter, the first water allocation model, which is a single 
objective model based on linear programming is introduced. This model allocates water 
resources of a transboundary basin between its stakeholders without considering water 
development projects in the basin. 
4.1 Introduction 
Water allocation is inherently a hard issue and using complex mathematical formulation 
often makes this task more complicated. Hence, it is logical to try firstly simple modelling 
techniques. Complicated modelling formulation methods can be used for water allocation 
modelling if the results of simple methods do not satisfy essential requirements for 
sustainable water allocation. Linear programming has widely been employed for water 
resources management on account of its simplicity. It has been successfully applied to some 
water allocation problems that reviewed in Chapter 2. It was emphasised that water is a 
limited and valuable resources and necessitates allocating efficiently (Harou, et al., 2009). 
Hence, maximising the achieved profit from water use is an essential objective function for 
water allocation models. As stated in Chapter 2, only a few studies have utilised linear 
programming technique for water allocation of transboundary watersheds in order to 
maximise the water profit. In this chapter, the framework of the single objective economic 
model (SOE) is presented. The SOE model allocates water resources of a transboundary 
basin between its stakeholders in order to maximise the basin’s profit. The next sub-section 
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describes the configuration of the SOE model, followed by illustrating the results of the SOE 
model’s implementation for the Sefidrud Basin. 
4.2 The Formulation of SOE Model 
A river basin system is schematized as a node-link network (Letcher, et al., 2007). It 
represents the spatial relation between various offstream and instream demands in the basin. 
Figure 4.1 presents a schematic river basin system, considered in the SOE model. Nodes 
represent the supply/demand sites and links represent the linkage between river reaches. 
The model incorporates both off-stream and in-stream water uses. It should be emphasised 
that instream water use is the environmental water requirement in this study. In this network, 
the amounts of water requirements for various sectors are deterministic. Instream water 
requirement can be assessed by using hydrologic methods. Water resource of each node 
comprises surface and groundwater resources. Surface water supplies are historic recorded 
runoff in nodes. Groundwater resources are exploitational resources in the nodes’ 
catchments, which are approved to use. Water supply and demand are balanced based on 
the objective of maximising water profit to water use. 
 
Figure ‎4.1 The schematic of a river basin network in the SOE model 
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4.2.1 Notations 
4.2.1.1 Sets and indices 
The SOE uses the following set of variables: 
a: is the superscript for agricultural sector; 
u: is the superscript  for urban sector; 
d: is the superscript for industrial sector; 
k: is the index for stakeholder; 
t: is the index for time step; 
 :is the set of stakeholders;  
k : is the set of nods in stakeholder k ( )k  ; 
k
i : is the index for node i that belongs to stakeholder k; 
ki
 : is the set of nodes (l) that are neighbour of node ik and are located in upstream of 
node ik; 
'i : is the node that is neighbour of node ik and is located in downstream of node ik; 
 : is the set of time periods. 
4.2.1.2 Decision variables 
The model decision variables are outlined as follows: 
i tk
ax : is allocated water to agriculture in node ik from surface water resource at time t 
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
ux : is allocated water to urban sector in node ik from surface water resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
dx : is allocated water to industry in node ik from surface water resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
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i tk
ay : is allocated water to agriculture in node ik from groundwater resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
uy : is allocated water to urban sector in node ik from groundwater resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
dy : is allocated water to industry in node ik from groundwater resource at time t
( , )ki t   . 
4.2.1.3 Exogenous variables 
ki t
AP : is agricultural profit associated with node ik at time t
 
( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
UP : is urban profit associated with node ik at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
IP : is industrial profit associated with node ik at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
'( )ki i t
R

: is transferred water from the node ik to node 'i  at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
( )kl i t
R  : is transferred water from the node l to node ik at time t ( , , )k ii l t     . 
4.2.1.4 Input and modelling parameters 
k
a
i : is agricultural net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to agriculture in node ik ( )ki  ; 
k
u
i : is urban net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to domestic sector in node ik ( )ki  ; 
k
d
i : is industrial net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to industry in node ik ( )ki  ; 
ki t
 : is produced water in node ik ( )ki   at time t, it is actually the produced water 
between nodes il   and node ik; 
ki t
 : is agricultural water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
 : is urban water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
 : is industrial water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
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ki t
 : is environmental water demand of node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   , it has to flow in 
rivers; 
ki t
 : is available groundwater resource in node ik at time t ( , )ki t   . 
4.2.2 The Objective Function of the SOE Model 
The objective function of the SOE model is to maximise the overall basin’s profit (OBP), 
achieved from water use in all times in the optimisation horizon. The basin’s profit is 
comprised from obtained profits from water use in agricultural, industrial, and municipal 
sectors. The SOE model’s objective function is presented in Equation 4.1. 
Maximise     ( )
k k k
k k
i t i t i t
k ti
AP UP IPOBP
  
    (4.1) 
ki t
AP , 
ki t
UP , and 
ki t
IP  are calculated using equations (4.2)-(4.4). 
) = (
ki t i k kk
a a a
i t i tyAP x             (4.2) 
) = (
ki t i k kk
u u u
i t i tUP x y             (4.3) 
) = (
ki t i k kk
d d d
i t i tIP x y             (4.4) 
4.2.3 The Constraints of the SOE Model 
The model’s constraints are presented as follows: 
1. Water balance at node ik: 
')( ( )
0
ik
i t i t i tk k kkk k
a u d
t l t i i t
l
i iR R x x x




                 (4.5) 
This constraint explains that the water inputs to node ik have to be equal to water released 
from this node. The water inputs include the produced surface water in the mid-stream 
catchment between node ik and nodes l (l∈
ki
  where 
ki
  is the set of node ik’s neighbouring 
nodes upstream), at time step t (
k ti
 ) and the transferred water from the nodes l to ik at time 
step t ( )(
i
kl t
l UN
iR 

 ). The water released from node ik are the transferred water from node ik 
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to node i
’
 (i
’
 is a neighbouring node for node ik downstream) at time step t ( '( )ki i t
R

) and 
water allocated to various sectors; agricultural (
i tk
ax ), industrial (
i tk
dx ), and municipal (
i tk
ux ). 
Note that, 
( 0)t
R

 is the water released from the last node ( ) in the basin network which 
belongs to the last stakeholder downstream ( ) to node 0, at time step t. The last node can 
be wetlands, lakes, or seas in general. It should be emphasised that the basin network is a 
directed graph. In other words, transferred water from node ik goes only to its downstream 
neighbouring node (t
’
).  
2. Transferred water from node ik to its downstream: 
'( )
0
k ki i t
i tR               (4.6) 
According to Constraint (4.6), the transferred water from node ik to node i
’
 at time step t  
(
'( )ki i t
R

) has to be greater than or equal to the environmental water need in the node ik at 
time step t (
ki t
 ). It means the model has to consider the satisfaction of the environmental 
water satisfaction as the first priority. 
3. Variables’ Bounds: 
These constraints include upper bounds on the allocated water to agricultural activities, 
domestic use, and industry needs, and logical non-negativity bounds for other variables, are 
given by the formulae below: 
0
i t i tk k k
a a
i t x y               (4.7) 
0
i t i tk k k
u u
i t x y               (4.8) 
0
i ik k kt t
d d
i t x y              
 (4.9) 
0
i t i t i tk k k k
a u d
i t y y y                (4.10) 
0
ikt
ax             (4.11) 
0
ikt
ux 
 
         
 (4.12) 
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0
ikt
dx 
 
         
 (4.13) 
0
ikt
ay             (4.14) 
0
ikt
uy 
 
         
 (4.15) 
0
ikt
dy 
 
         
 (4.16) 
'( )
0
ki i t
R

            (4.17) 
4.3 The Results the SOE Model Implementation 
The SOE model is implemented for the Sefidrud Basin using two sets of data for the surface 
water resources of nodes as its inputs. The first set of data is the average annual recorded 
streamflow for the past 50 years. The second input data set is the annual recorded 
streamflow for the past 50 years. In other words, I run both models based on the average 50-
year data and annual data for 50 years. The model with average annual streamflow input is 
called the Long Term Average (SOE-LTA) model and the model with the second data set is 
called the Fifty Years (SOE-FTY) model. The SOE-LTA model ignores the inter-annual 
climate fluctuations and does not distinguish between dry and wet years. It approximately 
represents the situation that there is a dam in each node and the surface water can fully be 
kept from wet years to be used in dry years. In some sense, the results of this model 
represent maximum basin potential to supply its water demand. On the other hand, the 
SOE-FTY model represents the real situation in the basin when surface water resources are 
out of any control (i.e. no dams affecting the water redistribution are in the basin). In this 
case, the model takes into account the climatic variability in this area. The comparison 
between the SOE-LTA and SOE-FTY models provides better understanding of the problem 
of how water usage development in the basin depends on constructing the new dams in the 
basin. 
4.3.1 The SOE-LTA Model Results 
The results of the SOE-LTA model implementation are showed in Figures 4.2 to 4.4 and 
Table 4.1. Figure 4.2 shows that the model allocates surface water to nodes in a way that the 
shares of upstream nodes, which have less marginal value of water, are almost zero and the 
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model predicts the use of only ground water resources to supply their demand. For instance, 
the allocated surface water to nodes 1 to 9, which are located in the Province 1 and the 
Ghezelozan River upstream, is zero and the groundwater resources satisfy their water 
requirements. The share of node 25, which belongs to the Province 6 and is located the 
Shahrud River upstream, from the surface water resources is also small. In contrast, all 
produced streamflow in Provinces 1 and 6 are released to the downstream provinces. Figures 
4.3 and 4.4 clearly demonstrate that although about 16% of basin surface water resources 
(Table 3.3) are produced in the Province 1, its share from the basin surface water resources 
is zero and only non-transferable ground water resources are allocated to be used in this 
province. 
This situation is different for the Province 6. According to the model results (Figure 4.3), 
only 25% of Province’s water demand is satisfied. This water supply is provided from the 
surface water and ground water resources in shares of 98% and 2% (Figure 4.4). As showed 
in Figure 3.1 from previous Chapter, the Province 6 is the user of the Shahrud River, which 
is the lower tributary of the Sefidrud River, and there are two provinces, 7 and 8, located the 
downstream region of Province 6. The importance is that for these two upstream provinces 
(1 and 6), the nature of allocated water to them is different, dominating ground water 
resources for Province 1, and prevailing of surface water resources in Province 6. The major 
reason for this issue is the total downstream demand in the provinces located below Province 
1 is significantly larger than that in the provinces below Province 6. 
 
Figure ‎4.2 The amount of supplied surface and ground water to nodes by the SOE-LTA 
model in comparison with demand of nodes 
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Figure ‎4.3 The comparison of the water profit and the percentage of supplied demand to the 
stakeholders by the SOE-LTA model 
According to Table 4.1, the total allocated water to the stakeholders from the basin water 
resources is 6043 MCM while the total basin water requirement is 7270 MCM. This 
indicates that by taking into account the satisfaction of the environmental water requirement, 
the maximum potential of the Sefidrud Basin for supplying the stakeholders’ water needs is 
6043 MCM. Put differently, if the whole basin surface water resources were under control 
(having a dam in each node), the total supplied water from surface and ground water 
resources would not be more than 6043 MCM if the Iranian water authority plan to manage 
the water resources in a sustainable way. 
 
Figure ‎4.4 The comparison of the allocated surface and ground water to stakeholders by the 
SOE-LTA model 
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Table ‎4.1 Comparing the demand and water allocated by the SOE-LTA model to the 
stakeholders (Unit: MCM) 
Province Demand  
Allocated water 
Surface Water Ground Water Total 
1 1029 1 450 451 
2 126 1 25 26 
3 1967 1214 579 1793 
4 753 662 92 754 
5 447 402 21 423 
6 410 57 2 59 
7 431 322 109 431 
8 2107 2047 59 2106 
Sum 7270 4706 1337 6043 
 
Table 4.2 shows the achieved profits of the stakeholders from allocated water to them. As 
illustrated, the upstream stakeholders (e.g., Province 1, Province 2, and Province 6) do not 
benefit from water allocation scheme, proposed by the SOE-LTA model while their shares 
from the Basin’s profit (2%, 0.1%, and 0.8%, respectively) are much lower than other 
stakeholders’ shares. It should be noted that the achieved profits of upstream stakeholders 
mainly come from allocated groundwater resources to them and their portions from surface 
water are almost zero. 
4.3.2 The SOE-FTY Model Results 
The results of the SOE-FTY model implementation are presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 
and Table 4.3. As shown in Figure 4.5, the total water demands of some stakeholders cannot 
be satisfied in many years. For instance, Province 1 has had water shortages in 49 years out 
of 50. In contrast, Province 8 faces water deficit for 5 years out of 50 years. Table 4.3 
indicates that the average water supply in the basin is 5511 MCM, which is the maximum 
water allocating to the stakeholders. 
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Table ‎4.2 The shares of the stakeholders’ profits from the Basin’s overall profit given by the 
SOE-LTA model 
Province 
Allocated Profit (Percentage) 
Surface Water Ground Water Total 
1 0.0 2.0 2.0 
2 0.0 0.1 0.1 
3 18.7 8.9 27.6 
4 12.3 1.7 14.1 
5 7.5 0.4 7.9 
6 0.8 0.0 0.8 
7 4.6 1.6 6.2 
8 40.2 1.2 41.3 
Sum 84.1 15.9 100.0 
4.3.2 The SOE-FTY Model Results 
The results of the SOE-FTY model implementation are presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 
and Table 4.3. As shown in Figure 4.5, the total water demands of some stakeholders cannot 
be satisfied in many years. For instance, Province 1 has had water shortages in 49 years out 
of 50. In contrast, Province 8 faces water deficit for 5 years out of 50 years. Table 4.3 
indicates that the average water supply in the basin is 5511 MCM, which is the maximum 
water allocating to the stakeholders. 
Although all the basin stakeholders, even Province 8, have water shortages, the situation in 
the upstream provinces is most difficult. For instance, according to Table 4.3, Province 8 
confronts water shortages for 10% (100-90 (temporal reliability)) of times, while Province 1, 
2, 3, and 6 face water shortages in 98%, 96%, 98%, and 84% of entire observed period, 
respectively. In addition, according to Figure 4.5, the minimum water supply for Province 8 
is 63% while it is 44%, 20%, 29%, and 1% for Provinces 1, 2, 3, and 6, respectively. 
Furthermore, the maximum shortage in Province 8 happens only once, whereas the 
maximum shortage of the upstream provinces repeats in 31 years out of 50 for Province 1, in 
20 years for Province 2, in 8 years for Province 3, and in 27 years for Province 6. As shown 
in Table 4.3, the volumetric reliabilities for Provinces 1, 2, 3, and 6 are 60%, 63%, 72%, and 
32%, respectively and their temporary reliabilities are 2%, 4%, 2%, and 16 %. 
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Figure ‎4.5 The percentage of total allocated water from the Basin’s water resources to the 
stakeholders by the SOE-FTY model 
The Iranian water authorities select the 90% threshold of demand satisfaction in 90% of 
years as a major reliability criterion for water supply systems in the country (Torabi 
Palatkaleh, Roozbahani, et al., 2010). Therefore, at least 90% of water demand for 90% of 
years in horizon plan time has to be satisfied. The minimum supplied water for each 
province for 90% of times is given in Table 4.3. The total Basin’s water supply satisfied for 
90% of times is 3567.7 MCM that is less than the Basin average water supply (5511 MCM). 
This value signifies that the potential of the Basin to supply the stakeholder’s water demand 
without any dams is 3567.7 MCM, where 1337 MCM of this amount comes from the 
groundwater resources. Thus, the potential of the Basin to supply water demand from 
surface water resources remains 2230.7 MCM, in which 2106.7 MCM is allocated 
exclusively to Province 8. The percentage of supplied water to each province from surface 
and ground water are presented in Figure 4.6. It shows ground water resources have a key 
role in satisfying water demand in the upstream provinces while this situation is opposite for 
downstream provinces such as Province 8, where the surface water resources play the key 
role. 
Table 4.4 shows the achieved profits of the stakeholders from allocated water to them by the 
SOE-FTY model. In the similar behaviour, the upstream stakeholders (e.g., Province 1, 
Province 2, and Province 6) do not benefit from water allocation scheme, proposed by the 
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SOE-FTY model while their shares from the Basin’s profit (3.1%, 0.2%, and 2.1%, 
respectively) are much lower other stakeholders’ shares.  
Table ‎4.3 Average supplied water, the reliability of supplied water to the stakeholders, and 
supplied water in 90% of time to the stakeholders given by the SOE-FTY model  
Province 
Water 
Demand 
Average 
Supplied water 
Volumetric 
Reliability (%)  
Temporal 
Reliability (%) 
Supplied 
Water in 90 % 
of times 
1 1029 613 60 2 450.1 
2 126 40 63 4 24.7 
3 1967 1314 72 2 578.8 
4 753 649 86 44 150 
5 447 354 79 20 62.5 
6 410 130 32 16 2.4 
7 431 354 82 38 192.5 
8 2107 2057 98 90 2106.7 
Sum 7270 5511 - - 3567.7 
Table ‎4.4 The shares of the stakeholders’ profits from the Basin’s overall profit given by the 
SOE-FTY model 
Province 
Allocated Profit (Percentage) 
Surface Water Ground Water Total 
1 1.2 14.3 3.1 
2 0.1 0.7 0.2 
3 17.3 57.1 23.1 
4 14.1 9.7 13.5 
5 8.3 2.3 7.4 
6 2.4 0.2 2.1 
7 4.8 9.0 5.4 
8 51.7 6.5 45.1 
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
50 
 
 
(a) Allocated water from surface and groundwater resources 
to Province 1 
 
(b) Allocated water from surface and groundwater resources 
to Province 2 
 
(c) Allocated water from surface and groundwater resources 
to Province 3 
 
(d) Allocated water from surface and groundwater resources 
to Province 4 
 
(e) Allocated water from surface and groundwater resources 
to Province 5 
 
(f) Allocated water from surface and groundwater resources 
to Province 6 
 
(g) Allocated water from surface and groundwater resources 
to Province 7 
 
(h) Allocated water from surface and groundwater resources 
to Province 8 
Figure ‎4.6 The percentage of supplied surface and ground water to the stakeholders by the 
SOE-FTY model 
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4.4 Summary 
This chapter, in its first part, described a single objective economic (SOE) model for 
economic optimal water resources allocation among competing stakeholders of a 
transboundary basin. The SOE model searches for a solution, which maximises the basin’s 
net profit, obtained from water allocation to its stakeholders. A linear benefit function is 
adopted as the model’s objective function, which is subjected to some river basin system 
constraints, as well as, a firm constraint for the satisfaction of the environmental water 
requirement. 
The first part of this chapter was followed with the description of the SOE model 
implementation results for a real transboundary watershed, the Sefidrud Basin. The SOE 
model was run with two different categories of input streamflow data. The first one, or the 
SOE-LTA model, was implemented for average annual streamflow series calculated over 50 
years and the second one, known as the SOE-FTY model, was executed for all 50 years of 
streamflow records taken separately.  
The results of the SOE-LTA model demonstrated that the model’s results suggest satisfying 
water demands of upstream stakeholders from the non-transferable groundwater resources 
and transfer almost all streamflow accumulated in the upstream provinces to the downstream 
stakeholders, due to low water profit in upstream stakeholders in comparison with 
downstream stakeholders. The results of the SOE-LTA model also indicated a threshold of 
6043 MCM as the maximum sustainable potential for the basin water use. The results of the 
SOE-FTY model indicated that the optimum scheme of water allocation in the Sefidrud 
Basin, based solely on the economic objectives, could intensify the current conflicts in the 
basin when much more surface water is allocated to downstream stakeholders and the 
upstream provinces experience water shortages more often. The evaluation of the SOE-FTY 
model results also showed that the average supplied water in the basin is 5511 MCM. 
The comparison of achieved profits of the stakeholders from water allocation schemes, given 
by the SOE-LTA and SOE-FTY models showed that the SOE modelling approach cannot 
provide a sustainable water allocation for the transboundary watersheds when there is a big 
gap between obtained profits of the upstream and downstream stakeholders. In this situation, 
no stakeholders would be satisfied from their earned profits, and the conflict remained 
unresolved in the Basin, despite the fact that the water allocation schemes met the 
environmental (sustainability) and economic (efficiency) criteria.  
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Chapter 5 The Compromised Water Allocation Model 
5.1 Introduction 
The complexity of water sharing problems and the need of multiple objectives’ involvement 
for obtaining a sustainable water allocation convince water researchers to increasingly 
implement multi-objective optimisation techniques for water allocation tasks. In previous 
Chapter, the SOE model was introduced. The SOE model determines water shares of 
shared basins’ stakeholders (provinces/countries) by maximising the profits of the basins 
while its single objective function subjects to some constraints especially the satisfaction of 
environmental water supply in the whole basins. The implementation of the SOE model to 
the Sefidrud Basin showed that its solutions cannot lead to a sustainable water allocation 
because it unfairly shared the obtained benefits of water usage between the stakeholders. 
Moreover, it provided more water for satisfying water demands of upstream stakeholders 
from groundwater resources while groundwater is no-transferable and the conflicts of the 
stakeholders are on shared surface water resources. A new water allocation model, which is 
based on multi-objective optimisation, is introduced in this chapter. This model is the 
Compromised Water Allocation (CWA) model, which is named after one of the methods 
allowing researchers to optimise simultaneously several objective functions. The compromise 
programming technique is developed to solve multi-objective optimisation problems and is 
described in details in this chapter. The target of the CWA model is to provide a trade-off 
compromise between economic, social, and the environmental factors in water allocation of 
transboundary basins. This compromise solution provides a maintained water allocation 
scheme for transboundary basins, which guaranties a sustainable resolution for water 
conflicts in shared watersheds. Sustainability is treated here as a water allocation scenario, 
which satisfies the triple bottom line approach, satisfying economic, social and environmental 
objectives. The performance of this model is assessed by its implementations in the Sefidrud 
Basin. Similar to the case of the SOE model, described in Section 4, no dam construction 
scenarios are considered for the CWA modelling approach. 
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5.2 Notations 
5.2.1 Sets and Indices 
The CWA model uses the following set of variables: 
a: is the superscript for agricultural sector; 
u: is the superscript  for urban sector; 
d: is the superscript for industrial sector; 
k: is the index for stakeholder; 
t: is the index for time step, which can be a month, a half year, or a year; 
T: is the total time steps; 
 :is the set of stakeholders;  
k : is the set of nods in stakeholder k ( )k  ; 
k
n : is the index for the number of nodes for stakeholder k; 
k
i : is the index for node i that belongs to stakeholder k; 
ki
 : is the set of nodes (l) that are neighbour of node ik and are located in upstream of 
node ik; 
'i : is the node that is neighbour of node ik and is located in downstream of node ik; 
 : is the set of time periods. 
5.2.2 Decision Variables 
The model decision variables are outlined as follows: 
i tk
ax : is allocated water to agriculture in node ik from surface water resource at time t 
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
ux : is allocated water to urban sector in node ik from surface water resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
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i tk
dx : is allocated water to industry in node ik from surface water resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
ay : is allocated water to agriculture in node ik from groundwater resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
uy : is allocated water to urban sector in node ik from groundwater resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
dy : is allocated water to industry in node ik from groundwater resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
5.2.3 Exogenous Variables 
ki t
AP : is agricultural profit associated with node ik at time t
 
( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
UP : is urban profit associated with node ik at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
IP : is industrial profit associated with node ik at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
E : is the environmental water shortage associated with node ik at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
'( )ki i t
R

: is transferred water from the node ik to node 'i  at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
( )kl i t
R  : is transferred water from the node l to node ik at time t ( , , )k ii l t     . 
5.2.4 Input and Modelling Parameters 
The CWA model parameters are outlined as follows:  
k
a
i : is agricultural net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to agriculture in node ik ( )ki  ; 
k
u
i : is urban net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to domestic sector in node ik ( )ki  ; 
k
d
i : is industrial net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to industry in node ik ( )ki  ; 
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ki t
 : is produced water in node ik ( )ki   at time t, it is actually the produced water 
between nodes 
ki
l   and node ik; 
ki t
 : is agricultural water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
 : is urban water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
 : is industrial water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
 : is environmental water demand of node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   , it has to flow in 
rivers; 
ki t
 : is available groundwater resource in node ik at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
5.3 The Formulation of the CWA Model 
CWA is formulated based on the basin water network, which was already presented in 
Figure 4.1. The characteristics of this network were already described in Subsection 4.2. It 
only needs to be emphasised that water resource of each node in this network comprises 
surface and groundwater resources. 
5.3.1 The Objective Functions of the CWA Model 
Five objective functions which address economic, environmental, and social factors are taken 
into account in the CWA model. First objective function (Z1) maximises the profit of a 
shared basin derived from the allocated water to agricultural, urban, and industrial sectors, 
similar to the studies by Divakar et al. (2011) and Ali & Klein (2014). The second objective 
function (Z2), which represents the environmental factor, minimises the environmental water 
shortage in the entire basin, in each node and each time step. The other three objective 
functions (Z3, Z4, and Z5) represent the social aspect. Z3 maximises allocated water to the 
downstream region. In fact, basins are characterised by mountains upstream and flat plains 
downstream. This characteristic of the basins leads water authorities to develop downstream 
regions, which make higher profits in comparison with the upstream regions. Obviously, a 
high portion of the basins’ population usually live in downstream territories and water 
authorities are responsible for sustaining the satisfaction of their increasing water 
requirements. In the same manner, Z4 minimises transferred water from the upstream area to 
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the downstream region since there is a high public expectation in upstream regions, which 
normally are underdeveloped, for using generated surface water resources in upstream areas 
rather than releasing them to downstream. In other words, Z4 represents the selfish 
behaviour of stakeholders when they prefer to utilise the available water resources for 
meeting their water requirements instead of releasing them for downstream stakeholders. In 
fact, the objective functions Z3 and Z4 imply social indicators. Z3 biases downstream and 
satisfies the people who live downstream, while Z4 prefers to keep more water upstream that 
is the preference of people who lives upstream. Z5 maximises the minimum water supply to 
stakeholders at all-time steps (McKinney & Cai 1997). The objective functions are presented 
as follows: 
Maximise     
1 ( )k k k
k k
i t i t i t
k ti
AP UP IPZ
  
    (5.1) 
Minimise     
2 k
k k
i t
k ti
EZ
  
   (5.2) 
Maximise     
3 ( )
D D
t
D D D D D D
a u d a u d
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i
Z x x x y y y
 
       (5.3) 
Minimise     
'4 ( )k
k k
i i t
k ti
RZ
 

 
   (5.4) 
Maximise      5 1 2, ,...,t t ktZ Min P P P  (5.5) 
where D represents a stakeholder which is in the lowest part of the basin. 
ki t
AP , 
ki t
UP , 
ki t
IP , 
and 
ktP  are calculated using equations (5.6)-(5.9): 
) = (
ki t i k kk
a a a
i t i tyAP x             (5.6) 
) = (
ki t i k kk
u u u
i t i tUP x y             (5.7) 
) = (
ki t i k kk
d d d
i t i tIP x y             (5.8) 
( )
( )
k k
k k
k k k
i
kt
i
k k k k k k
i t i t i t
a u d a u d
i t i t i t i t i t i t
P
x x x y y y


  


    

 

  
       (5.9) 
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5.3.2 The Constraints of the CWA Model 
The model’s constraints are presented as follows: 
1. Water balance at node ik:  
')( ( )
0
ik
i t i t i tk k kkk k
a u d
t l t i i t
l
i iR R x x x




                 (5.10) 
2. Environmental water shortage: 
'( )
0
kk k
i ti i t i t
ER 

              (5.11) 
According to Constraint (5.11), the summation of transferred water from node ik to node i
’
 at 
time step t (
'( )ki i t
R

) and the environmental water shortage in node ik (
ki t
E ) has to be greater 
than or equal to the environmental water need in the node ik (
ki t
 ). The amount of the 
environmental water shortage (
ki t
E ) is zero if the transferred water from node ik to node i’ is 
greater than the environmental water need. 
3. Variables’ Bounds: 
These constraints include upper bounds on the allocated water to agricultural activities, 
domestic use, and industry needs, and logical non-negativity bounds for other variables, given 
by 
0
i t i tk k k
a a
i t x y               (5.12) 
0
i t i tk k k
u u
i t x y               (5.13) 
0
i ik k kt t
d d
i t x y               (5.14) 
0
i t i t i tk k k k
a u d
i t y y y                (5.15) 
0
ikt
ax             (5.16) 
0
ikt
ux 
 
          (5.17) 
0
ikt
dx 
 
          (5.18) 
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0
ikt
ay             (5.19) 
0
ikt
uy 
 
          (5.20) 
0
ikt
dy 
 
          (5.21) 
'( )
0
ki i t
R

            (5.22) 
5.4 The Compromise Programming Technique 
Compromise Programming (Zelany, 1973) is suggested to solve the CWA model. This 
technique identifies a solution that is closest to the ideal solution, which is determined by a 
measure of distance. Due to its simplicity, the Compromise Programming technique is 
recommended to be applied for water resources systems management issues that are 
formulated with multi-objective programming (Simonovic, 2009). For instance, it was 
successfully utilised for urban water management (Abrishamchi et al., 2005, Zarghaami & 
Hajykazemian, 2013, Fattahi & Fayyaz, 2010), water allocation (Bella et al., 1996, Higgins, 
Archer, & Hajkowicz, 2008, Read et al., 2014), reservoir operation policy (Shiau & Lee, 
2005, Consoli et al., 2008), and integrated water resources management (Geng & Wardlaw, 
2013). 
Figure 5.1 illustrates a multi-objective model with two objective functions (OF1, OF2). The 
ideal solution (IS) for this model, which maximises both objective functions is point IS (OF1
*
, 
OF2
*
) where OFi
*
 is the optimal solution of the model by maximising the objective i, given by 
Maximise     OFi(x)        (5.23) 
subject to: 
xX    
In fact, IS could not be a feasible solution for the model and belongs to the set of infeasible 
solutions. POS1 and POS2 are considered as two Pareto optimal solutions for this model 
that are identified as the closest solutions to the ideal point, according to some measure of 
distance. These solutions are called compromise solutions for the model. 
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Figure ‎5.1 Compromise solutions illustration 
The procedure for evaluation of the set of non-dominated solutions (Pareto optimal 
solutions) is to measure their distances to the ideal solution. One of the most frequently used 
measures of closeness is defined as follows: 
1
*
1
( ) [ ( ( )) ]
r
p p p
p i i i
i
D x w OF OF x

 
 
       (5.24) 
where 
p
iw  is corresponded weight to the objective function i and r is the number of objective 
functions. A compromise solution with respect to   is defined as such that: 
*( ) min ( )p pD x D x
 
  (5.25) 
subject to:  
 ∈   
The set of compromise solutions for the sample model is the set of all compromise solutions 
determined by solving (5.25) for a given set of weights, {w1, w2,…,wr} and for all      . 
When objective functions are measured in different units, a scaling function is used to obtain 
a same range for every criterion (Abrishamchi et al. 2005). Mathematically, in the generic 
form, the compromise programming distance metric is presented as follows: 
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Minimise     
1
*
* **
1
( )
( )
p pr
p i i
p i
i i i
OF OF x
D x w
OF OF
  
   
   
  (5.26) 
where 
*
iOF  is the best value for objective function i and 
**
iOF  is the worst value for objective 
function i. It is considered that the values p
iw  (the weight of objective i) reflect the preference 
of decision makers regarding the importance of criteria. Also, the parameter p reveals the 
importance of the maximal deviation from the ideal point. Varying the parameter p allows 
researchers to move from minimising the sum of individual regrets to minimising the 
maximum regret in the decision-making process (Simonovic, 2009). 
5.5 The Results of the CWA model Implementation 
The results of the CWA model implementation to the Sefidrud Basin are given in this 
subsection. In the first part of this subsection, an approach for screening the recommended 
objective functions for the case of study are introduced. The target of applying this approach 
is to find whether any of the objective functions is redundant with others. Then, the results of 
final water allocation model in terms of the stakeholders’ water shares are illustrated. 
5.5.1 Objective Functions Screening 
To achieve the best results from the CWA model for the Sefidrud Basin, the similarity of 
the objectives’ behaviour should be evaluated and the objectives with the highest conflict are 
needed to be selected for the model. For this purpose, the Pearson correlation coefficients 
were used to quantify linear links between the pairs of all objective functions, introduced in 
Subsection 5.3.1. It should be explained that the Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure 
of the linear correlation (or dependence) between two variables. It is a value between +1 and 
−1 inclusive, where 1 is total positive correlation, 0 is no correlation, and −1 is total negative 
correlation. 
Five single objective optimisation models subject to appropriate aforementioned constraints 
in Section 5.3.2 were developed and solved. Then, by using the solution of a model, the 
amounts of other objective functions were calculated. For example, after solving the first 
model which its objective function was to maximise the Basin’ profit, the values of its 
decision variables were utilised to calculate the amounts of the second, the third, the fourth, 
and the fifths objective functions in each time step. In this circumstance, a matrix with 250 
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rows (the number of time steps times the number of objective functions) and 5 columns 
(number of objective functions) was generated. The correlations between these objective 
functions were computed and the results are presented in Table 5.1.  
Table ‎5.1 The correlations of the objective functions 
 
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 
r* 
t. 
value 
p. 
value 
r* 
t. 
value 
p. 
value 
r* 
t. 
value 
p. 
value 
r* 
t. 
value 
p. 
value 
r* 
t. 
value 
p. 
value 
Z1 - - - -0.12 0.47 0.64 0.84 20.56 0 0.44 1.44 0.152 0.37 1.13 0.26 
Z2 -0.12 0.47 0.64 - - - -0.06 2.22 0.027 -0.64 -8.43 0 -0.53 -0.86 0.388 
Z3 0.84 20.56 0 -0.06 2.22 0.027 - - - 0.39 2.16 0.032 0.31 -0.84 0.402 
Z4 0.44 1.44 0.152 -0.64 -8.43 0 0.39 2.16 0.032 - - - 0.79 13.04 0 
Z5 0.37 1.13 0.26 -0.53 -0.86 0.388 0.31 -0.84 0.402 0.79 13.04 0 - - - 
* The Pearson correlation coefficient 
According to these results, the relationships between the objectives can be classified into 
three categories in terms of their correlation coefficients: positively correlated ( {
1Z , 3Z } and 
{
4Z , 5Z }), independent ({ 1Z , 2Z } and { 2Z , 3Z }), and negatively correlated ({ 2Z , 4Z } and  
{
2Z , 5Z }). According to these categories, the second objective function ( 2Z ) is in conflict 
with the fourth (
4Z ) and fifth ( 5Z ) objective functions, while the correlation of the fourth 
and fifth objective functions is positively high. The comparison of the p-value of pairs  
{
2Z , 4Z } and { 2Z , 5Z } show that the conflict of pair { 2Z , 4Z } is more significant than pair  
{
2Z , 5Z }. Therefore, the second and the fourth objective functions were selected for the 
Sefidrud Basin water allocation model. 
The correlation of the first objective function (
1Z ) and third objective function ( 3Z ) is 
positively high. In order to select one objective function from them, the correlations of pairs  
{
1Z , 2Z } and { 2Z , 3Z } were compared and due to higher negative correlation of  
{
1Z , 2Z }, the first objective function for the Sefidrud Basin water allocation model was 
selected. In short, three objective functions out of five proposed ones were picked for the 
applied model to the Sefidrud Basin; first objective function (FOF), maximising the profit of 
the Sefidrud Basin, derived from the allocated water to agricultural, urban, and industrial 
sectors (Z1), second objective function (SOF), minimising the environmental water shortage 
in the entire Basin (Z2), third objective function (TOF), minimising transferred water from 
the Sefidrud Basin upstream area to its downstream region (Z4). 
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It should be noted that these selected objective functions are aggregated, which means none 
of them addresses directly the individual stakeholders’ welfare. However, the optimal values 
of these objective functions may improve the wellbeing of some stakeholders. For instance, 
minimising the environmental water shortage in the entire basin (SOF) implies that water 
should be released from all nodes in a way that satisfies the environmental water supply. In 
these circumstances, the model encourages releasing water from all nodes to their 
downstream nodes, and as a result, more water goes to the downstream stakeholders. In 
contrast with SOF, TOF rules the model in a way that each stakeholder utilises its available 
water resources to meet their water requirements as much as it needs rather than releasing 
water resources to other stakeholders. 
5.5.2 The Models Results and Analysis 
In this subsection, first, the results of the Maximum Basin Profit (MBP), the Minimum the 
Environmental Shortage (MES), and the Minimum Transferred Water (MTW) models are 
briefly introduced and then the CWA model’s results are described. The MBP model is a 
single objective model that maximises the Basin’s profit and the MES and the MTW models 
are single objective models, which minimise the environmental water shortage and 
transferred water from upstream to downstream regions, respectively. 
5.5.2.1 Results of single objective models 
Table 5.2 shows the results of MBP, MES, and MTW in terms of the allocated water to the 
stakeholders (
                                    
                           
     ), the achieved profits of the Basin 
(
                                              
                                                    
     ), and the reliabilities of 
environmental water satisfaction. The results of these models provide the ideal water 
allocation schemes, associated with their objective functions. For instance, the highest 
possible profit of the Basin is achieved by the MBP model and the highest proportion of 
upstream surface water used in the upstream regions is given by the MTV model. However, 
the solutions of these single objective models are infeasible for the CWA model. 
As shown in Table 5.2, the highest (90% of desirable profit) and lowest profits (72% of 
desirable profit) of the Basin cause by MBP and MES, respectively. These results are 
expected as the MBP model maximises the Basin profit and the MES model minimises the 
environmental water shortage, allocating water to the environment rather than other water 
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usage. Table 5.2 also shows MBP and MTW do not provide the same profit and supplied 
water to the Basin. The MTW model minimises transferred surface water from upstream 
regions to downstream areas and thus, the model tends to fulfil water demands of upstream 
stakeholders from surface water resources and the non-transferable groundwater resources 
of upstream regions remain unexploited. In this circumstance, the overall allocated water to 
the stakeholders by the MTV model is lower than the MBP model. This behaviour of the 
MTV model is clearly presented in Table 5.3. As it seen in this table, in the proposed water 
allocation scheme by the MTV model, 27% of the allocated water to Province 1 comes from 
groundwater resources, however, it is 32% by MBP. Moreover, the contribution of surface 
water resources in supplied water to Province 1 is 67% by MTV, while it is 34% for MBP. A 
similar situation can be seen for Province 2. It should be explained that groundwater supply 
for Province 6 is only 2 MCM (Table 3.3); therefore, this behaviour of the MTV model for 
this stakeholder is not highlighted in Table 5.3. 
Table ‎5.2 MBP, MES, and MTW models results in terms of the percentage of supplied 
water to stakeholders, the percentage of obtained profit by the Basin, and the reliability of 
environmental water satisfaction (Unit: %) 
Model 
Set of Weights Supplied Water to Stakeholder 
Basin 
Profit 
Environmental Water 
Satisfaction Reliability 
FOF
 
SOF
 
TOF
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Volumetric  Temporal  
MBP 1 0 0 65 41 82 99 93 83 92 96 90 69 62 
MES 0 1 0 88 41 76 86 75 70 85 60 72 99 98 
MTW 0 0 1 94 47 86 96 91 89 96 77 85 45 35 
Another important point that should be mentioned here is that the MBP model which 
maximises aggregated profit of the Basin has difficulties in properly expressing the 
consequences of isolated profit maximisation of the stakeholders and hence might not always 
be suited to be used for water allocation modelling. This issue is described in detail in the 
study of Britz et al., (2013). The evaluation of the percentages of supplied water from 
groundwater resources in Table 5.3 shows that the fulfilments of water needs of Province 1 
and 3 have significantly relied on groundwater resources, while there is no similar situation 
for other stakeholders. For instance, 32% of supplied water to Province 1 by the MBP model 
comes from groundwater resources, when it is 3%, 1%, 2%, 0%, 7%, and 1% for Provinces 2, 
4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively. Similar situation can be seen for the results of other models. 
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Table ‎5.3 The proportion of surface and groundwater resources in supplied water to the 
stakeholders by MBP, MES, and MTW models (Unit: %) 
Model 
Supplied Water to Stakeholder 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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MBP 34 32 38 3 67 14 98 1 91 2 83 0 85 7 95 1 
MES 56 32 33 9 57 20 82 5 72 3 69 1 75 11 58 2 
MTW 67 27 44 3 72 14 94 2 89 2 89 0 91 5 75 2 
The volumetric and temporal reliabilities of the environmental water supply, given by MBP, 
MES, and MTW are also presented in Table 5.2. It displays that MPB and MTV could not 
properly satisfy the environmental water requirement in the Basin, especially by the MTV 
model, which provides 45% and 35% as the volumetric and temporal reliabilities of the 
environmental water supply, respectively. 
5.5.2.2 The Results of the CWA model 
To prevent non-linearity in the compromise programming (CP) model, p in the equation 
(5.26) was set to be one. 36 various sets of weights were also considered for objective 
functions in the range of 0 to 1 such that the summation of each set is equal to one  
(
1 2 3 1w w w   ). Note that, w1, w2, and w3 are the weights of the first, second and third 
objective functions, respectively. It is important to note that the MBP, MES and MTW 
models are equivalents of the CWA model with sets of weights (1,0,0), (0,1,0) and (0,0,1), 
respectively. 
Figure 5.2 shows the Basin’s profits, given by CWA for various sets of weights. In this figure 
and other similar figures, values on circular axis show the weight of the objective functions. 
For instance, 0.1, 0.1, 0.8 are representative of w1 =0.1, w2 =0.1, and w3 =0.8. As shown in 
Figure 5.2, the set of weights {w1=0.8, w2=0.1, w3=0.1} results in the highest profit for the 
Basin, however, there are some sets (e.g., {w1=0.3, w2=0.4, w3=0.3}) which provide about the 
same profit for the Basin. The lowest profit of the Basin has been obtained by the CWA 
model with the sets of weights {w1=0.1, w2=0.7, w3=0.2} and {w1=0.1, w2=0.8, w3=0.1}. These 
two sets of weights bring about more water allocation to the environment, rather than other 
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water usage in the Basin. According to Figure 5.2, the Basin’s profit is significantly sensitive 
to the weight of the second objective function (w2), when it gets a value greater than 0.6. This 
fact can be proved with the comparison of the Basin’s profits variances. The variance of the 
Basin’s profit when considering all sets of weights is 21, while it is only 2 when the sets of 
weights with w2 more than 0.6 are removed. 
The satisfaction of environmental water needs is an important parameter in sustainable 
watershed development. The volumetric and temporal reliabilities of the environmental 
water supply are shown in Figure 5.3. The volumetric reliability is the ratio of the volume of 
water supplied which meets the demand, to the total demanded volume (Kundzewicz & 
Kindler 1995). Further in the text, the ratio of the time, when the volume of water supplied 
meets the demand, to the total time period considered are called temporal reliability. Figure 
5.3 shows that the temporal reliability of the environmental demand satisfaction varies from 
35% to 80%, however there are variations from 45% to 94% for the volumetric reliability. 
The maximum reliability of the environmental demand satisfaction (94% volumetric and 
80% temporal) is associated to the set of weights {w1=0.1, w2=0.8, w3=0.1} and the minimum 
one (45% volumetric and 35% temporal) belongs to the sets of weights {w1=0.1, w2=0.1, 
w3=0.8}, {w1=0.1, w2=0.2, w3=0.7} and {w1=0.2, w2=0.1, w3=0.7}. These results clearly illustrate 
the conflict between the second and third objective functions. Due to high marginal value of 
water in downstream stakeholders, the CWA model tends to transfer more water to 
downstream regions in order to make more profit if w1 is significant. Hence, the fluctuations 
of w1 do not lead to significant changes in the environmental water satisfaction. 
Figure 5.4 describes the result of the CWA model in terms of supplied water to the 
stakeholders. According to this figure, the stakeholders can be classified into two categories; 
insensitive and sensitive ones to the objective functions weights. The insensitive stakeholders 
(Provinces 2, 3, 4, and 5) are those, which their allocated water have fluctuated up to 10% by 
changing the weights of objective functions while this fluctuation is more than 10% for 
sensitive ones (Provinces 1, 6, 7, and 8). The significant conclusion from these results is that 
the water conflicts in the Sefidrud Basin are mainly between sensitive stakeholders (Province 
1, 6, 7, and 8) and other provinces are not seriously involved in it. The variances of supplied 
water to Provinces 1, 6, 7, and 8 by the CWA model with various sets of weights are 34, 18, 
20, and 156, respectively. These results illustrate that the sensitivity of Province 8 to the 
weights of objective functions is much higher than other sensitive provinces. 
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Figure ‎5.2 Percentages of the Basin profits, given by CWA model for various sets of weights 
for the objective functions 
 
(a) Temporal reliability of water supplied to the 
environment the entire Basin (%) 
 
(a) Volumetric reliability of water supplied to the 
environment the entire Basin (%) 
Figure ‎5.3 Reliability of water supplied to the environment by CWA model for various sets 
of weights 
The results of the CWA model for various sets of weights are presented in Table 5.4 and 
Table 5.5 in details. As shown in Table 5.5, groundwater resources have a significant role in 
the fulfilment of Province 1 and 3’s water demands while there is no similar situation for 
other stakeholders. It should be noted that the results of the CWA model with various sets 
of weights for the objective functions determine various sets of water shares for the 
stakeholders, associated to sets of weights (Table 5.4). By using these results, the 
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stakeholders can clearly understand what their gains are if any set of weights is selected for 
the CWA model. Accessing this knowledge could lead them to an effective negotiation about 
their water shares with other stakeholders. 
5.5.2.3 The Comparison of the CWA Model’s Results with Single Objective 
Models Outputs 
In this Sub-section detailed analysis for a weight vector as {
1w =0.3, 2w =0.4, 3w =0.3} is 
provided. These weights are not biased either to upstream or downstream regions, due to 
the consideration of a same weight for first and third objective functions. The weight of the 
second objective function, associated to the environmental water satisfaction, is just a bit 
larger than the other objective functions. It can be interpreted as the importance of the 
environmental demand in this set of weights. It should be noted this vector is not a 
recommended set of weights for water allocation of the Sefidrud Basin and has been chosen 
to show the performance of CWA in comparison with the single objective models. 
Figure 5.5 shows the results of the CWA model with the set of weights {
1w =0.3, 2w =0.4, 3w
=0.3} in terms of the water shares of stakeholders and compares them with the results of 
MBP, MES, and MTW. As it is shown in Figure 5.5, the amount of allocated water to each 
stakeholder by the CWA model are more reliable when they are compared to the allocated 
water to the stakeholders by MBP, MES, and MTW. For instance, the percentages of water 
supplied to Province 1 by MBP, MES, and MTW are 65%, 88% and 94%, respectively, 
while it is 89% obtained by the CWA model. Table 5.6 presents the average volume of water 
allocated to the Basin’s stakeholders by the MBP, MES, MTW, and CWA models in the 
columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The maximum water supplied to the stakeholders by the 
single objective models are presented in the column 5. The difference between the results 
reported in column 5 and the results of the CWA model is presented in column 6. As 
shown in column 6, the summation of values in this column is 344 MCM. The similar 
explained analysis has been done for the results of the CWA model with all sets of weights 
and the summations of differences for all set of weights are shown in Figure 5.6. As shown in 
this figure, the CWA model’s result for the weight set {w1=0.3, w2=0.4, w3=0.3} has the 
minimum difference to the maximum allocated water to the stakeholders by the single 
objective models. The water shares of the stakeholders from surface and groundwater 
resources are presented in Table 5.7. 
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(a). Percentages of water supply to Province 1 (%) 
 
 
(b). Percentages of water supply to Province 2 (%) 
 
(c). Percentages of water supply to Province 3 (%) 
 
 
(d). Percentages of water supply to Province 4 (%) 
 
(e). Percentages of water supply to Province 5 (%) 
 
 
(f). Percentages of water supply to Province 6 (%) 
 
(g). Percentages of water supply to Province 7 (%) 
 
(h). Percentages of water supply to Province 8 (%) 
Figure ‎5.4 Percentages of water supplies to stakeholders from surface and groundwater 
resources, given by CWA model for various sets of weights for the objective functions 
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Table ‎5.4 Results of CWA model in terms of the percentage of supplied water to 
stakeholders, the percentage of obtained profit by the Basin, and the reliability of the 
environmental water satisfaction 
Model 
Set of Weights Supplied Water to stakeholder 
Basin 
Profit 
Environmental Water 
Satisfaction 
FOF
 
SOF
 
TOF
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Volumetric 
Reliability 
Temporal 
Reliability 
CP 
0.1 0.1 0.8 94 47 86 96 91 89 96 77 85 45 35 
0.1 0.2 0.7 94 47 86 96 91 89 96 77 85 45 35 
0.1 0.3 0.6 93 47 86 96 91 89 95 78 85 45 35 
0.1 0.4 0.5 89 44 81 92 87 85 93 90 87 60 52 
0.1 0.5 0.4 89 44 79 90 82 83 92 91 86 77 71 
0.1 0.6 0.3 89 44 78 90 82 82 86 63 75 88 75 
0.1 0.7 0.2 89 43 77 90 82 82 85 55 72 93 78 
0.1 0.8 0.1 89 44 77 90 82 81 85 55 72 94 80 
0.2 0.1 0.7 94 47 86 96 91 89 96 77 85 45 35 
0.2 0.2 0.6 92 47 86 96 91 89 96 77 85 45 35 
0.2 0.3 0.5 90 46 84 97 92 87 91 83 86 51 40 
0.2 0.4 0.4 89 44 78 92 86 83 93 96 88 71 67 
0.2 0.5 0.3 88 44 79 90 82 82 93 96 88 75 72 
0.2 0.6 0.2 89 43 78 90 82 82 92 94 87 78 75 
0.2 0.7 0.1 88 43 77 90 82 82 86 66 76 90 79 
0.3 0.1 0.6 92 47 86 96 91 89 96 77 85 46 36 
0.3 0.2 0.5 91 47 85 96 90 89 91 81 86 47 37 
0.3 0.3 0.4 88 43 80 94 89 84 92 92 88 62 52 
0.3 0.4 0.3 89 43 78 92 86 83 92 96 89 73 69 
0.3 0.5 0.2 88 43 78 90 82 82 93 97 88 76 74 
0.3 0.6 0.1 88 43 77 90 82 81 92 97 88 78 77 
0.4 0.1 0.5 91 47 86 96 91 89 95 78 85 46 36 
0.4 0.2 0.4 88 44 82 97 91 88 89 87 87 54 42 
0.4 0.3 0.3 85 44 77 94 89 83 92 96 89 70 66 
0.4 0.4 0.2 85 44 78 91 85 82 93 97 88 74 72 
0.4 0.5 0.1 86 44 78 90 82 81 93 97 88 76 76 
0.5 0.1 0.4 87 44 84 96 90 88 88 86 87 52 40 
0.5 0.2 0.3 85 43 79 94 89 83 92 93 88 64 52 
0.5 0.3 0.2 85 44 77 94 89 81 93 97 89 72 69 
0.5 0.4 0.1 85 43 78 91 84 81 93 97 88 75 75 
0.6 0.1 0.3 82 43 84 99 93 87 77 89 88 56 47 
0.6 0.2 0.2 82 43 78 94 89 80 89 97 89 70 67 
0.6 0.3 0.1 82 43 77 94 89 81 92 97 89 73 72 
0.7 0.1 0.2 73 43 82 95 88 73 77 99 89 67 57 
0.7 0.2 0.1 73 43 80 94 90 79 86 99 89 73 72 
0.8 0.1 0.1 67 42 83 94 90 74 85 100 90 71 68 
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Table ‎5.5 The proportion of surface and groundwater resources in supplied water to the 
stakeholders by CWA model (Unit: %) 
M
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Set of Weights 
Supplied Water to Stakeholder 
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CP 
0.1 0.1 0.8 67 26.7 44 3.2 72 14.5 94 1.8 88 2.3 89 0.3 91 5.4 76 1.7 
0.1 0.2 0.7 67 26.7 44 3.2 72 14.5 94 1.8 88 2.3 89 0.3 91 5.4 76 1.7 
0.1 0.3 0.6 66 26.7 46 1.1 72 14.2 94 1.8 88 2.3 89 0.3 90 5.6 76 1.7 
0.1 0.4 0.5 61 28.1 41 3.2 66 15.4 90 2.2 84 2.4 84 0.3 85 7.9 88 1.7 
0.1 0.5 0.4 59 29.5 36 7.4 61 17.3 87 3.6 80 2.6 83 0.3 86 6.5 90 1.3 
0.1 0.6 0.3 59 29.7 37 7.4 61 17.3 86 3.7 79 2.6 82 0.4 77 9.1 62 1.6 
0.1 0.7 0.2 59 29.8 36 7.4 60 17.6 86 3.9 79 2.6 82 0.4 75 9.9 53 2.0 
0.1 0.8 0.1 59 30.0 36 7.8 59 17.9 86 3.9 79 2.6 81 0.4 75 10.0 53 2.0 
0.2 0.1 0.7 67 26.7 44 3.2 72 14.5 94 1.8 88 2.3 89 0.3 91 5.4 76 1.7 
0.2 0.2 0.6 66 26.7 47 0.1 72 14.1 94 1.8 88 2.3 89 0.3 91 5.4 76 1.7 
0.2 0.3 0.5 62 27.4 45 1.1 69 14.4 95 1.6 89 2.3 87 0.3 84 7.0 81 1.7 
0.2 0.4 0.4 59 29.4 37 6.8 61 17.4 90 2.4 84 2.4 83 0.3 87 6.3 94 1.3 
0.2 0.5 0.3 59 29.7 36 7.4 61 17.2 86 3.7 80 2.6 82 0.3 86 6.5 95 1.2 
0.2 0.6 0.2 59 29.8 36 7.4 60 17.3 86 3.8 79 2.6 82 0.4 84 7.4 92 1.2 
0.2 0.7 0.1 58 30.0 35 7.7 59 17.8 86 3.9 79 2.6 81 0.4 77 9.0 64 1.6 
0.3 0.1 0.6 66 26.7 47 0.0 72 14.1 94 1.8 88 2.3 89 0.3 91 5.4 76 1.7 
0.3 0.2 0.5 64 26.8 47 0.0 71 13.8 94 1.8 88 2.3 89 0.3 84 7.0 79 1.7 
0.3 0.3 0.4 60 28.5 39 4.0 64 16.2 92 2.0 87 2.3 84 0.3 84 8.0 90 1.7 
0.3 0.4 0.3 59 29.5 36 7.4 61 17.4 89 2.7 84 2.5 83 0.3 86 6.5 95 1.2 
0.3 0.5 0.2 59 29.8 35 7.3 61 17.2 86 3.7 80 2.6 82 0.3 86 6.3 96 1.0 
0.3 0.6 0.1 58 30.0 35 7.7 60 17.5 86 3.9 79 2.6 80 0.4 85 7.0 96 0.9 
0.4 0.1 0.5 65 26.7 47 0.0 72 13.7 94 1.8 88 2.3 89 0.3 89 5.6 76 1.7 
0.4 0.2 0.4 60 27.8 44 0.3 67 14.7 96 1.5 89 2.3 87 0.3 80 8.8 85 1.7 
0.4 0.3 0.3 56 29.2 43 1.5 60 16.5 92 2.2 87 2.3 83 0.3 86 6.5 95 1.2 
0.4 0.4 0.2 56 29.5 42 1.8 62 16.2 88 3.1 82 2.5 82 0.3 86 6.4 95 1.2 
0.4 0.5 0.1 56 29.7 41 2.4 62 16.3 86 3.8 80 2.6 80 0.4 86 6.2 96 0.9 
0.5 0.1 0.4 60 27.4 44 0.0 70 14.2 94 1.8 87 2.3 88 0.3 80 8.6 84 1.7 
0.5 0.2 0.3 56 28.3 42 1.1 64 15.4 93 1.6 87 2.4 83 0.3 84 7.5 92 1.7 
0.5 0.3 0.2 55 29.3 42 1.3 60 16.4 92 2.3 87 2.4 81 0.4 86 6.3 96 1.1 
0.5 0.4 0.1 55 29.6 42 1.2 62 16.0 87 3.4 81 2.6 81 0.4 86 6.2 96 0.9 
0.6 0.1 0.3 54 28.4 43 0.0 70 14.0 97 1.3 90 2.3 87 0.3 66 11.1 88 1.5 
0.6 0.2 0.2 52 29.6 43 0.2 62 15.3 92 2.0 87 2.3 79 0.4 82 6.7 96 1.0 
0.6 0.3 0.1 52 29.7 43 0.4 61 15.5 91 2.6 87 2.4 80 0.4 86 6.3 97 0.8 
0.7 0.1 0.2 43 29.8 43 0.0 69 13.6 94 1.4 86 2.3 72 0.4 67 9.9 99 0.4 
0.8 0.1 0.1 42 30.7 43 0.0 66 14.5 92 2.0 87 2.3 78 0.4 79 6.9 99 0.5 
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The volumetric and temporal reliabilities of the water supply to the environment by the 
CWA model with the set of weights {w1=0.3, w2=0.4, w3=0.3} are 73% and 69%, respectively 
(Figure 4). These results mean that the Basin faces a 28% environmental water shortage 
(volumetric) for this set of weights. 
Table ‎5.6 The differences between allocated water to the stakeholders by CWA model with 
weights {
1w =0.3, 2w =0.4, 3w =0.3} and maximum allocated water to them by MBP, MES, 
and MTW models (MCM) 
Province MBP (1) MES (2) MTW (3) CWA (4)  (5) = Max [(1), (2), (3)] (6)=(5)-(4) 
1 672 905 964 911 964 53 
2 52 52 60 55 60 5 
3 1606 1498 1695 1537 1695 158 
4 744 651 724 693 744 51 
5 418 334 405 386 418 32 
6 340 287 367 340 367 27 
7 397 368 415 397 415 19 
8 2022 1261 1628 2022 2022 0 
Sum 6251 5356 6258 6341 6684 344 
 
Table ‎5.7 The water shares of the Basin’s stakeholders from the Sefidrud Basin’s surface 
and groundwater resources, given by CWA model with weights {
1w =0.3, 2w =0.4, 3w =0.3} 
(MCM) 
Province Surface Water Resource Groundwater Resource Sum 
1 607 304 911 
2 45 9 55 
3 1194 343 1537 
4 673 21 693 
5 375 11 386 
6 339 1 340 
7 369 28 397 
8 2002 26 2028 
Sum 5604 742 6346 
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(a). Percentages of allocated water to Province 1 by 
CWA, MBP, MES, and MTW models (%) 
 
 
(b). Percentages of allocated water to Province 2 by 
CWA, MBP, MES, and MTW models (%) 
 
(c). Percentages of allocated water to Province 3 by 
CWA, MBP, MES, and MTW models (%) 
 
 
(d). Percentages of allocated water to Province 4 by 
CWA, MBP, MES, and MTW models (%) 
 
(e). Percentages of allocated water to Province 5 by 
CWA, MBP, MES, and MTW models (%) 
 
 
(f). Percentages of allocated water to Province 6 by 
CWA, MBP, MES, and MTW models (%) 
 
(g). Percentages of allocated water to Province 7 by 
CWA, MBP, MES, and MTW models (%) 
 
(h). Percentages of allocated water to Province 8 by 
CWA, MBP, MES, and MTW models (%) 
Figure ‎5.5 The comparison of the percentages of allocated water to the stakeholders by the 
compromise model with weights {
1w =0.3, 2w =0.4, 3w =0.3} and MBP, MES, and MTW 
models 
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Figure ‎5.6 The differences between allocated water to stakeholders derived by CWA model 
with various set of weights and the maximum water supplied to them by MBP, MES, and 
MTW models (MCM) 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the CWA model with five objective functions was introduced. The proposed 
objective functions addressed the economic, environmental, and social factors that must be 
considered for achieving a sustainable water allocation. The CWA model was applied for 
water allocation of the Sefidrud Basin, Iran that suffers from water competitions between its 
stakeholders that are eight provinces constituting this Basin. The correlation analysis of the 
five proposed objective functions for this Basin showed that two objective functions can be 
eliminated from the model due to their high correlation with the other objective functions. 
Finally, the CWA model was examined for allocating the water resources in the Sefidrud 
Basin, comprised three conflicting objective functions, maximising the Basin’s profit, 
minimising the environmental water shortage, and minimising transferred water from 
upstream to downstream areas. 
Compromise Programming was used to solve the model. As it is not possible to try all 
possible combination of weights, thirty six different sets of weights for the objective functions, 
uniformly representing all possible combinations, were examined in order to determine 
different optimal water allocation patterns. The results of CWA for thirty six set of weights 
showed that the stakeholders can be classified in two categories, insensitive and sensitive 
stakeholders to the objective functions weights. The water shares of non-sensitive 
stakeholders, which included Provinces 2, 3, 4, and 5, do not significantly depend on the 
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weights of objective functions, however, the results showed an opposite circumstance for the 
sensitive stakeholders (Provinces 1, 6, 7, and 8). This knowledge is valuable because the 
decision makers do not need to concern about the weights of objective functions for the non-
sensitive stakeholders. 
To provide detailed results, a set of weights as {w1=0.3, w2=0.4, w3=0.3} was selected that are 
unbiased either to the upstream area or to the downstream region. For this set of weights, the 
results of CWA provided the closest profits for the stakeholders to their maximum feasible 
profits achieved by the single objective function models. Furthermore, in this case the 
environmental demand has only a 28% shortfall. The average allocated water to stakeholders 
are calculated by using this set of weights as 911, 55, 1537, 693, 386, 340, 397 and 2028 
MCM for Provinces 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively. 
The evaluation of the CWA model’s results showed that similar to the SOE model, the 
CWA model tends to provide more water for satisfying water demands of upstream 
stakeholders from groundwater resources while groundwater is no-transferable and the 
conflicts of the stakeholders are on shared surface water resources. This point could be 
considered as a weakness of the CWA approach. 
  
75 
 
Chapter 6 The Multiple Economic Objectives Model 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes formulation and implementation of the Multiple Economic 
Objectives (MEO) model. The MEO model is a multi-objective model designed to 
maximise the profits of all basin’s stakeholders from allocated water to them while the 
environmental water demand satisfaction is postulated in the basin. The stakeholder profits 
are the net benefits derived from the allocated water to agricultural, urban, and industrial 
sectors for each stakeholder. The unbalanced investment and consequently unfair income 
generation between the stakeholders of a basin is the main reason of water disputes. This 
unfair situation can be recognised with tracking its social consequences such as 
unemployment rates in stakeholders. Based on this fact, the maximisation of realised profits 
from the basin water resources for the stakeholders is selected to be the MEO model’s 
objective functions. This well-chosen indicator can also play the role of a social factor while 
the model’s results convince stakeholders that they achieve the maximum profits from the 
shared water resources. The MEO model is developed based on mixed integer 
programming and two new solution methods, introduced in this chapter, are developed and 
implemented for figuring out a Pareto optimal solution of this model. 
There are some advantages for the MEO model in comparison with the CWA model, 
introduced in Chapter 5. The first one is to consider the environmental water satisfaction as 
a firm constraint in the MEO model. In these circumstances, the MEO approach must meet 
the environmental water requirements in entire basins; while the CWA approach treated the 
environment like a stakeholder, which could suffer from water shortage. The second 
advantage is to involve all stakeholders in water allocation in the MEO model where the 
maximisations of their profits are considered to be the objective functions of the MEO 
model. The consideration of an aggregated economic objective in the CWA model reduces 
the roles of the stakeholders as the important elements in water conflicts, in water allocation 
processes. The third advantage of the MEO model is no need to utilise various sets of 
weights for transforming it to a single objective model. This benefit will widely be explained 
in further subsections. 
It is very important point to be explained that unlike the SOE and CWA models, the MEO 
model only allocates surface water resources of transboundary basins between their 
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stakeholders and groundwater resources could be used for satisfying water shortages from 
surface water resources. In other words, it is assumed that the water conflicts in 
transboundary basins are over surface water resources and groundwater resources are not 
engaged in these conflicts. This new behaviour of water allocation formulation for the MEO 
model originates from two strong facts. Firstly, surface water resources are shared resources 
between all basin’s stakeholders where groundwater often is shared between a few 
stakeholders in a transboundary basin. Therefore, the utilisation of surface water resources 
by a stakeholder affects all other stakeholders while there are no similar effects for 
groundwater. Secondly, the results of implementation of the SOE and CWA models imply 
that these models unfairly utilise groundwater to supply a high portion of water requirements 
of stakeholders, which have groundwater in order to allocate more surface water to 
stakeholders which do not have this resource. Note that, the priority of using surface water 
resources for the satisfaction of water requirements is not considered in these models. 
6.2 Notations 
6.2.1 Sets and Indices 
The MEO model indices are outlined as follows: 
a : is the superscript for agricultural sector; 
u : is the superscript  for urban sector; 
d : is the superscript for industrial sector; 
k : is the index for stakeholder; 
t : is the index for time step, which can be a month, a half year, or a year; 
T : is the total time steps; 
  : is the set of stakeholders;  
k  : is the set of nods in stakeholder k ( )k  ; 
k
n
 
: is the index for the number of nodes for stakeholder k; 
k
i
 
: is the index for node i that belongs to stakeholder k; 
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ki

 
: 
is the set of nodes (l) that are neighbour of node ik and are located in upstream of 
node ik; 
'i
 
: is the node that is neighbour of node ik and is located in downstream of node ik; 

 
: is the set of time periods. 
6.2.2 Decision Variables 
The decision variables of the model are as follows: 
i tk
ax  : 
is allocated water to agriculture in node ik from surface water resource at time t 
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
ux  : 
is allocated water to urban sector in node ik from surface water resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
i tk
dx  : 
is allocated water to industry in node ik from surface water resource at time t
( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
z  : 
is a binary variable which equals 1 if the environmental water demand at node ik of 
stakeholder k is satisfied at time step t, otherwise it is equal to 0.  
6.2.3 Exogenous Variables 
The exogenous variables of the model are as follows: 
ki t
AP  : is agricultural profit associated with node ik at time t
 
( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
UP  : is urban profit associated with node ik at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
IP  : is industrial profit associated with node ik at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
'( )ki i t
R

 : is transferred water from the node ik to node 
'i  at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
( )kl i t
R 
 
: is transferred water from the node l to node ik at time t ( , , )k ii l t     . 
6.2.4 Input and Modelling Parameters 
The inputs and parameters of the model are as follows: 
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k
a
i  : is agricultural net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to agriculture in node ik ( )ki  ; 
k
u
i  : is urban net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to domestic sector in node ik ( )ki  ; 
k
d
i  : is industrial net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to industry in node ik ( )ki  ; 
ki t
  : 
is produced water in node ik ( )ki   at time t, it is actually the produced water 
between nodes 
ki
l   and node ik; 
ki t

 
: is agricultural water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
  : is urban water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
  : is industrial water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t

 
: 
is environmental water demand of node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   , it has to flow in 
rivers; 
R
 
: is the reliability level of the environmental water supply. 
6.3 The Formulation of the MEO Model  
Similar to the SOE and CWA models, MEO model formulation is based on the node-link 
network of a basin water network, where was already presented in Figure 4.1 except that 
there are no groundwater resources consideration for nodes in this model. The 
characteristics of this network were already described in Subsection 4.2.  
6.3.1 The Objective Functions of the MEO Model 
The objective functions of the MEO model are to maximise the total net profits (Zk) of water 
use for each stakeholder (k):  
Maximise      1 2 K, ,...,Z Z Z  (6.1) 
where 
11
( )
k k k
T
i t i t i t
t
k
k
k
n
i
AP UP IPZ

    k =1, 2, …, K  (6.2) 
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ki t
AP , 
ki t
UP , and 
ki t
IP  are calculated using equations (6.3)-(6.5): 
 =
ki t i kk
a a
i tAP x             (6.3) 
 = 
ki t i kk
u u
i tUP x             (6.4) 
 = 
ki t i kk
d d
i tIP x             (6.5) 
The total net economic benefit for stakeholder k ( kZ ) is the sum of the net benefits of water 
usage to agriculture (
i kk
a a
i tx  ), the net benefits of water usage to urban ( i kk
u u
i tx  ), and the 
net benefits of water usage to industry (
i kk
d d
i tx  ). It should be emphasised that the 
relationship between the water profit of a sector (
ki
 ) and allocated water to it (
i tk
x ) is not 
always linear. In other words, there is not a fixed water profit for all range of water allocation 
to a sector. For example, in the study of water allocation to various crops in an irrigated 
network with limited planted crop area, the marginal value of allocated water would be 
different based on the stages of plants growth and their needs of water. Water stress during 
critical growth periods reduces yield and quality of crops, and thus farmers are willing to pay 
more for water required. Therefore, the water profit of allocated water to the crops in this 
stage would be higher than other stages of plants growth. In this study, I aim to resolve water 
conflicts in watersheds where water disputes are resulted from limited water resources and 
high demand of stakeholders for water utilisation in various sectors. In this formulation, the 
allocation of bulk water to a sector of the stakeholders is optimised without concerning the 
way that the water is utilised by clients. It would be extremely difficult to determine the real 
dynamic of profit as a function of water allocated to the stakeholders in such a large scale as 
provinces or countries. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider a fixed water profit for all 
quantitative ranges of allocated water in the present research. 
The second point that has to be noted here is that the municipal water supply is often given a 
higher priority than other sectors by water authorities. Therefore, it is supposed that the 
value of 
ik
u  is higher than 
ik
d  and 
ik
a . 
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6.3.2 The Constraints of the MEO Model 
The MEO model’s constraints are presented as follows: 
1. Water balance at node ik: 
')( ( )
0
ik
i t i t i tk k kkk k
a u d
t l t i i t
l
i iR R x x x




                 (6.6) 
2. Reliability of the environmental water supply in node ik: 
'( )
0
k kk
i t i ti i t
R z

              (6.7) 
1
R 0
k
T
i t
t
z

             (6.8) 
It should be noted that water supply to the environment of node ik flows into the river 
between node ik and its downstream node (node i
’
). In this study, the definition of the 
reliability introduced by Kundzewicz & Kindler (1995) is used which is the ratio of the times, 
when the volume of water supplied meets the demand, to the total time period (temporal 
reliability). By introducing constraints (6.7) and (6.8) into the model, the amount of 
transferred water from node ik to node i
’
 at time step t ( '( )ki i t
R

) has to be greater than or 
equal to the water need of the environment in the node ik. The reliability of the 
environmental water satisfaction is controlled using a binary variable (
k
i tz ) in the constraint 
(6.7) which is 1 if the environmental water requirement is satisfied. The summation of this 
variable (
k
i tz ) over the time steps has to be more than or equal to R (constraint (6.8)). In 
fact, R is the number of time steps that the amount of transferred water from node ik to node 
i
’
 has to be greater than the environmental water requirement. It should be noted that the 
reliability of the environmental water satisfaction is an input parameter to the all models in 
this thesis. Moreover, for the sake of computational easiness, the number of time steps that 
the amount of transferred water from node ik to node i
’
 is greater than the environmental 
water requirement is considered as the reliability level, rather than a ratio. 
3. Variables’ Bounds: 
These constraints include upper bounds on the allocated water to agricultural activities, 
domestic use, and industry needs, and logical non-negativity bounds for other variables, given 
by 
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0
i tk k
a
i t x              (6.9) 
0
i tk k
u
i t x              (6.10) 
0
ik kt
d
i t x              (6.11) 
0
ikt
ax             (6.12) 
0
ikt
ux 
 
         
 (6.13) 
0
ikt
dx 
 
         
 (6.14) 
'( )
0
ki i t
R

            (6.15) 
ki t
z = 0 or 1           (6.16) 
The following proposition shows that the above multi-objective problem has an infinite 
number of non-dominated solutions, which in each solution the profit of a stakeholder 
cannot be improved in value unless degrading the profits of other stakeholders. It should be 
mentioned that these solutions have little practical importance because providing too many 
non-dominated solutions for water allocation of a watershed could be confusing for water 
authorities. 
Proposition 1: If at least for one node in the basin network, for example node i (i=2,…,K-1), 
the environmental demand of node j (j=i,…,K) in time step t is less than the total produced 
water at all nodes upstream of j, then the proposed multi-objective water allocation model 
has an infinite number of non-dominated solutions. 
Proof: 
The profits are only generated from the allocated water to nodes of the stakeholders in the 
proposed model. Therefore, all solutions that release the lowest possible water to the node 0 
(by considering the satisfaction of the environmental requirements) are a member of the 
non-dominated solutions set for the proposed model. Hence, this set of the non-dominated 
solutions contains solutions for following formulation:  
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Minimise     


T
t
tNE
yZ
1
)0(  (6.17) 
subject to constraints (6.6)-(6.16). We assumed there is at least a node such as i that the 
environmental water requirement of node j (j = i,…, K) in time step t is less than the 
summation of produced water in the upstream nodes of j in time step t. Thus, the proposed 
model can allocate non-zero water to the upstream nodes in infinite ways. Note that the 
allocated water to the nodes (decision variables) can take any positive values. 
6.4 Proposed Methods for Finding a Pareto-Admissible 
Solution for the MEO model 
In order to find a solution for the MEO model, two solution methods are outlined below. 
These methods are based on maximising the minimum ratio of the profit obtained from 
allocating water to each stakeholder to the highest possible profit that each stakeholder can 
achieve. The methods are established upon this idea that all stakeholders have to receive the 
highest possible benefits from the basin’s water resources in accordance with the objective 
functions of the MEO model but in an equitable manner. In these methods, equity is 
defined as the same percentage of the highest water profits for all stakeholders. Put 
differently, the solution models maximise the minimum water profit from allocated water to 
a stakeholder. These solution methods are explained through three steps. The first and 
second steps are exactly similar for both solution methods and only the third step is 
different. The first and second solution methods are referenced as the Single Lambda (SL) 
and the Multiple Lambda (ML) solution methods in further subsections, respectively. 
6.4.1 First Step (The Highest Possible Profit Models) of Both 
Solution Methods 
In this study, 
*
ktf  is referred as the highest possible profit of the stakeholder k in time step t. 
It is an input to the second step of both solution methods which needs to be determined. 
For this purpose, a single objective model is solved for each stakeholder, which maximises 
the profit of the stakeholder subject to the constraints (6.6)-(6.16), separately. This approach 
is denoted Highest Possible Profit (HPP). The outputs of this model are the values of the 
decision variables that maximise the profit of that particular stakeholder at time step t if that 
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stakeholder is allowed to take as much water as possible after satisfying the basin 
environmental demand. It should be noted that the maximum allocated water to a 
stakeholder could be less than its water demand with respect to the amount of its water 
demands and the environmental water requirements in downstream. Thus, we used “highest 
possible profit” term instead of “highest profit”. 
6.4.2 Second Step of Both Solution Methods or the Highest Ratio of 
Highest Possible Profit (HRHPP) Model 
The second step is to develop another model that maximises the minimum ratio of the profit 
obtained from allocating water to each stakeholder in time step t to the highest possible 
profit that each stakeholder can achieve in time step t. This ratio for time step t is called 
t . 
The formulation of proposed model for achieving to this ratio is as follows: 
Maximise      
1
T
t
tZ 

  (6.18) 
where 
1 2min( , ,..., )t t t kt     (6.19) 
subject to constraints (6.6)-(6.16). Note that λkt is given by 
*
1
( )
k
i i ik k kk k k
k
kt
kt
n
a a u u d d
i i i
i
t t t
f
x x x

  


    
 
       (6.20) 
In order to transfer the above max-min model to a maximum model the following 
transformation is used: 
Maximise      
T
t
t
Z   (6.21) 
subject to: 
*
1
( ) ( )
k
i i ik k kk k k
k
n
a a u u d d
i i i t kt
i
t t tx x x f   

               (6.22) 
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and constraints (6.6)-(6.16). The constraint (6.22) suggests that the profit of the stakeholder k 
in time step t (
1
( )
k
i i ik k kk k k
k
n
a a u u d d
i i i
i
t t tx x x  

     ) has to be greater than a ratio ( t ) of its 
highest possible profit ( *
ktf ), while t  is the same for all stakeholders to consider equity 
between the stakeholders. The decision variables of this model include the allocated water to 
agriculture (
i tk
ax ), domestic use (
i tk
ux ), industry (
i tk
dx ), and t . This method is referred 
further as the Highest Ratio of Highest Possible Profit (HRHPP) model. 
6.4.3 Third Step of the SL Solution Method  
Step 3 of SL solution method is to develop a single objective optimisation model, in which it 
maximises the water profit of the basin, subject to constraints (6.6)-(6.16) and (6.22). In this 
model, the values of 
t  for time step t achieved from Step 2 are fixed in constraint (6.22). 
This model is referenced as the Final Water Profit (FWP) model. The function of this 
model is to maximise the overall basin’s profit (OBP) while the profits of all stakeholders in 
time step t must be greater than 
*
t ktf  . In other words, this model allocates equitably water 
to the stakeholders based on the results of Step 2 (when the value of the parameter   is 
obtained) and then apportions the leftover of water among other stakeholders with respect to 
the water profits of them. The FWP model formulation is as follows: 
Maximise     ( )
k k k
k k
i t i t i t
k ti
AP UP IPOBP
  
    (6.23) 
subject to: 
*
1
( ) ( )
i
k kki i ikk k
k
t
n
a a u u d d
i i i kt
i
t t tx x x f   

      
 
     
 
 (6.25) 
and constraints (6.6)-(6.16). The flowchart of the SL solution method is presented in Figure 
6.1. 
6.4.4 Third Step of the ML Solution Method 
The HRHPP model gives the highest value to 
t  while it is mainly constrained by the 
stakeholders’ water resource limitation and also the stakeholders’ released water to 
downstream for satisfying the environmental water needs in time step t. It means that the 
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model cannot increase the value of 
t  from a particular value due to the imposed limitation 
of a stakeholder to the model while the profits of other stakeholders can be more than 
*
t ktf   with regard to the constraint (6.22). Thus, t  would increase if we ignore that 
particular stakeholder as one competing stakeholder in the basin. The ML solution method 
is based on satisfying the water demand of the stakeholder which causes a limitation for the 
value of 
t  and calculating the new t  for time step t. By this way, this particular stakeholder 
obtains its highest possible profit and is left aside from water competition while other 
stakeholders are involved in the next step of modelling which finds the value of new 
t  for 
other stakeholders.  
 
 
Figure ‎6.1 The flowchart of the SL solution method 
The third step of the ML solution method comprises some sub-steps. The first sub-step is to 
solve the HRHPP
1
 model. The abbreviation HRHPP
1
 (HRHPP
s
 is the HRHPP model for 
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the sub-step s) is used to denote to the model in the first stage. The results of the HRHPP 
model in terms of 
t  are an input of HRHPP
1
 model. The HRHPP
1
 model formulation is as 
follows: 
Maximise      
1
T
t
t
Z   (6.26) 
subject to: 
1 *
1
( ) ( )
i
i i ik k kk k k
k
t
n
a a u u d d
i i i kt
i
t t tx x x f   

                   g     (6.27) 
*
1
( ) ( )
i
m mmi m i im m
m
t
n
a a u u d d
i i i mt
i
t t tx x x f   

      
 
  ∈ g   
 
 (6.28) 
and constraints (6.6)-(6.16), where m is an index for stakeholders which belong to tg  and 
tg  is the set of stakeholders that the ratio of their profits obtained from allocating water to 
them by the HRHHP model (the second step) to their highest possible profits in time step t 
are equal to 
t . 
The solution of the HRHHP
1
 model gives the highest value for 1
t  that satisfies all imposed 
constraints of stakeholders to the model. Let 
1
t  (
s
t  is the value of t  for the stage s) be the 
solution of the HRHPP
1
 model and 
1
tg  be the set of stakeholders that 1
1
t
t g
   (for all t). 
The second stage is to find a new value for 2
t  by ignoring 
1
tg  from the model. For this 
purpose, the value of 
1
t  (t=1,…, T) in the constraint (6.22) are set for only 
1
tg  (t=1,…, T) 
and the HRHPP
2
 model is solved. In other words, the HRHPP
2
 model satisfies the water 
demand of the stakeholders which belong to 
1
tg  (t=1,…, T) in a way that their profits are at 
least 
1
1 *
gtt
f   (t=1,…, T). In these circumstances, the formulation of the HRHPP
2
 model is 
given as follows: 
Maximise      
2
T
t
t
Z   (6.29) 
subject to: 
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2 *
1
( ) ( )
i
i i ik k kk k k
k
t
n
a a u u d d
i i i kt
i
t t tx x x f   

                   g 
     (6.30) 
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      
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 (6.31) 
and constraints (6.6)-(6.16), where m
1
 (m
s
 is a stakeholder belongs to 
s
tg ) is index for 
stakeholders which belong to 
1
tg  set. Note that 
1
t  (t=1,…,T) are constants in the constraint 
(6.31). The solution of the HRHPP
2
 model gives the value of 
2
t  and also the set of 
stakeholders which belong to 
2
tg  set. Other stages of this method are exactly similar to the 
stage 2. Put differently, in each stage, the stakeholders whose profit cannot increase anymore 
due to its limitation, are ignored from the model (are fixed in the constraints) and the new 
value of 
t  is maximised. These steps continue until the ratios of the stakeholders’ profits to 
their highest possible profits stay constant. The flowchart of the ML solution method is 
presented in Figure 6.2. The comparison of the SL and ML solution method is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3. 
6.4.5 The SL and ML Solution Methods’ Solutions are non-
dominated 
The following proposition shows that the solutions of both solution methods are non-
dominated for time step t. 
Proposition 2: The solution obtained by the SL and ML approaches are non-dominated for 
a time step like t. 
Proof: 
If the obtained solution for specific time step t is dominated, the amount of 


T
t
tNE
R
1
)0(  in 
the obtained solution is greater than   where: 
 )(
1
)0(


T
t
tNE
yMin   (6.29) 
subject to (6.6)-(6.16).  
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In other words, in the obtained solution there is some water released to the node 0 while it 
could be allocated to the stakeholders with unsatisfied demand and increase the λt values. In 
the SL solution method, the FWP model maximises the profit of the basin while it 
maximises the profit of stakeholders with the lowest profit between other stakeholders. The 
ML solution method also runs the HRHPP
s
 models until none of kt  can be increased any 
more. These contradict complete the proof. 
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Figure ‎6.2 The flowchart of the ML solution method 
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Figure ‎6.3 The comparison of the SL and ML solution methods 
6.5 The Results of the MEO Model implementation 
The results of the MEO model implementation to the Sefidrud Basin, utilising the SL and 
ML solution methods are given in this subsection. In first part of this subsection, the results 
of the HPP and HRHPP models will be discussed and then the results of the MEO model 
based on the SL solution method and ML solution method are presented in subsections 
6.5.3 and 6.5.4, respectively. It should be noted that the implemented MEO model to the 
Sefidrud Basin is a monthly model with 600 time steps (50 years × 12 Months).   
6.5.1 The Results of the HPP Models (First Step) - Common in the 
both Solution Methods 
Since eight provinces constitute the Sefidrud Basin, eight mixed-integer linear programming 
models (the HPP models) were developed. In this section, numbered models refer to the 
HPP models for the corresponding provinces. For an example, Model 1 maximises the 
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profit of Province 1. Table 6.1 shows the annual average profits of Provinces given by the 
HPP models. The minimum profit of each province is bold faced and underlined. As shown 
in this table, Model 1; which brings about the highest possible profit for Province 1, causes 
the minimum profits of Provinces 2, 3, and 6. Model 3, which maximises the profit of 
Province 3, brings about the minimum profits of Provinces 4, 5 and 8. Table 6.1 shows that 
the profit of Province 1 is mainly in conflict with the profit of Provinces 2, 3, and 6 and 
Province 3’s profit is mainly in conflict with Province 4, 5, and 8 profits. There is also a 
conflict of interest between Province 7 and Province 6. Table 6.1 clearly illustrates the water 
conflicts in the Basin. In other words, selfish utilising water by a province directly causes a 
reduction on the profits of other provinces. 
Table ‎6.1 The stakeholders’ profits given by the HPP models (Unit: Billion Rials) 
Province Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
1 175 57
*
 59 60 62 62 62 57 
2 5 40 7 7 7 7 7 7 
3 627 749 1748 773 807 768 721 701 
4 637 713 427 1176 689 706 658 671 
5 316 361 211 330 611 369 337 331 
6 84 86 108 110 108 222 86 99 
7 186 186 136 139 136 121 510 125 
8 3605 3672 3004 3305 3527 3681 3483 3807 
* 
The minimum profit of each province is bold faced and underlined. 
Table 6.2 illustrates the ratio of provinces’ profits given by the HPP models to their highest 
possible profit. For an example, the ratio of Province 1’s profit, given by Model 8, to the 
highest possible profit of Province 1 is equal 32%. It means when Model 8 maximises the 
profit of Province 8, the allocated water to Province 1 by this model only makes profit for 
Province 1 equal to 32 percent of its highest possible profit. As shown in this table, Province 
8’ profit has fluctuated around 20% (often less than 10%) of its highest possible profit (3807 
Billion Rials) while for other provinces it is at least more than 40%. For an example, the 
fluctuation of Province 2 is varied from 81% to 86%. In short, the water share of Province 8 
from the Basin’s surface water resource, which is located at the Basin downstream, does not 
significantly depend on the allocated water to other provinces, while this in not the case for 
others. The reason of these circumstances is that all HPP models have to satisfy the 
environmental water requirement of all nodes in the entire Basin in 90% of times. Hence, all 
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models release water from upstream regions to the downstream area (Province 8) to satisfy 
this constraint, regardless of water shortages in upstream regions. However, Province 8 could 
use surplus water, which exceeds the environmental water requirement of the last node in 
the network for supplying its water requirements. 
Table ‎6.2 The percentage of provinces’ profits given by the HPP models to their highest 
possible profits 
Province Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
1 100 32 33 34 36 36 36 32 
2 14 100 18 19 19 18 19 18 
3 36 43 100 44 46 44 41 40 
4 54 61 36 100 59 60 56 57 
5 52 59 34 54 100 60 55 54 
6 38 39 49 50 49 100 39 45 
7 36 36 27 27 27 24 100 24 
8 95 96 80 87 93 97 91 100 
 
In order to determine the sensitivity of stakeholders to the environmental water supply, the 
HPP models were also run without imposing the environmental water requirements. The 
highest profits of provinces with and without imposing the environmental water supply to the 
models are presented in Table 6.3. By comparison the increase of provinces’ profits in 
Table 6.3, it can be concluded that Province 6 is very sensitive to the environmental water 
supply while its highest profits increase 28% without enforcing the models to satisfy the 
environmental water needs. 
Table ‎6.3 The provinces’ highest profits with and without imposing environmental water 
satisfaction to the HHP models (Unit: Billion Rials) 
Province → 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
With environment 175 40 1748 1176 611 222 510 2791 
Without environment 192 41 1902 1218 622 310 576 2872 
Profit increase (%) 9 4 8 3 2 28 11 3 
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6.5.2 The Results of HRHPP Model (Second Step) - Common in the 
both Solution Methods 
Figure 6.4 shows the results of the HRHPP model in the terms of λ for 600 time steps which 
are classified in seasons and various ranges. The parameter λ is always larger than 0.3 which 
it implies that the profits of stakeholders are always more than 30% of their highest possible 
profits. The values of the parameter λ for the summer, when competition between the 
stakeholders is heightened, show that the categories of 0.5-0.6 and 0.6-0.7 have the highest 
frequency in this season. It implies that for 76% of times in the summer the surface water 
resource is allocated to the stakeholders in a way that their profit are at least half of their 
highest possible profits. 
The profits of provinces given by the HRHPP model are shown in Figure 6.5. As shown in 
this figure, the general trends of the water allocation for the Sefidrud Basin are such that the 
provinces’ profits are closer to the highest possible profit in comparison to the lowest profit. 
Note that the lowest profit for each province was determined using the corresponding HPP 
model, where its objective function was to maximise the profit of all provinces except the 
corresponding province. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure ‎6.4 The histograms of λ in various seasons 
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Figure ‎6.5 The highest, lowest profits and the profit proposed by the HRHPP model to 8 
provinces 
The model’s results for time step 300 are presented in Table 6.4. The value of the 
parameter λ obtained by the model for this time step is 0.724 which means the stakeholders’ 
profits for this time step is at least 72.4% of their highest possible profits. The ratio of 
stakeholders’ profits to their highest possible profits for this time step are calculated and 
presented in column (3). It shows that all stakeholders benefited equitability from the Basin 
surface water resource. As shown in Table 6.4, the minimum value of λ belongs to Province 
2 and λ is more than 0.724 for other provinces. It means that Province 2 had the lowest 
profit in this time step and the model maximised the profit of this province. 
Table ‎6.4 The HRHPP model’s results for time step 300 (Unit: Million Rials) 
Province Profit given by HRHPP model (1) Highest possible profit (2) (1)/(2) 
1 5328 7304 0.729 
2 2664 3678 0.724 
3 84678 115352 0.734 
4 89641 122186 0.734 
5 46617 63544 0.734 
6 8319 11336 0.734 
7 41404 51692 0.801 
8 44150 57136 0.773 
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6.5.3 The Results of the FWP model- Final Results of the MEO 
Model based on the SL Solution Method 
Here the results of the FWP model are reported while satisfy the results obtained from the 
HRHPP model. The average yearly allocated water to each province is shown in Table 6.5. 
As presented in this table, the total surface water allocated to stakeholders is 3360 MCM. 
According to these results, Provinces 8 and 2 have the largest and the smallest portions of 
the Basin’s surface water with 1294 MCM and 55 MCM, respectively. In addition, Provinces 
8 and 1 have the smallest and the largest water shortages between stakeholders with 39% and 
73%, respectively. The average monthly allocated water to the provinces by the FWP model 
is also presented in Figure 6.6. As shown, the competition over water utilisation concentrates 
on the spring and summer (months 7 to 12) while the main parts of the stakeholders’ water 
requirements in the autumn (months 1 to 3) are satisfied. 
Table ‎6.5 The yearly averages of allocated water to provinces by the FWP model  
Province → 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Sum 
Water Supply (MCM) 286 55 762 405 212 114 232 1294 3360 
Shortage (%) 73 56 61 46 53 72 46 39 54 
6.5.4 The Results of the HRHPP
s
 models- Results of the MEO 
Models based on the ML Solution Method 
For making the performance of the ML solution method more clear, the results of this 
solution method for two time steps, 445 and 537 are explained. Table 6.6 illustrates the 
given value to 
1
t  by the HRHPP
1
 model for time step 445 (
1
445 ) and the ratio of 
stakeholders’ profits to their highest possible profits using the outputs of the model for 
instance. As shown in this table, the given value to 1  in time step 445 by the model is 0.698 
when the ratios of the stakeholders’ profits to their highest possible profits are between 0.698 
to 1.000. This ratio for Province 2, 6, and 7 is equal to 1
445 . It shows the corresponding 
constraints of Provinces 2, 6, and 7 constrict the model to give values more than 0.698 to 
1
445 . The model allocates water to Provinces 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8 in a way that the ratios of their 
profits to their highest possible profits are more than 0.698 (0.749, 0.897, 1, 1, and 1, 
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respectively) due to the constraint (6.27) which allows the model to allocate more water to 
other provinces.  
         
 
(a) Maximum (possible), minimum, and proposed 
allocated water to Province 1 
 
(b) Maximum (possible), minimum, and proposed 
allocated water to Province 2 
 
(c) Maximum (possible), minimum, and proposed 
allocated water to Province 3 
 
(d) Maximum (possible), minimum, and proposed 
allocated water to Province 4 
 
(e) Maximum (possible), minimum, and proposed 
allocated water to Province 5 
 
(f) Maximum (possible), minimum, and proposed 
allocated water to Province 6 
 
(g) Maximum (possible), minimum, and proposed 
allocated water to Province 7 
 
(h) Maximum (possible), minimum, and proposed 
allocated water to Province 8 
Figure ‎6.6 The maximum, minimum, and proposed (by the FWP model) water supplied to 
the stakeholders (The values are the average for 50 years) 
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Table ‎6.6 The given value of 
1
445  by the HRHPP
1
 model and the ratio of stakeholders’ 
profits to their highest possible profits 
Time Step 
1
445  
*
 
Province 
1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
445 0.698 0.749 0.698 0.897 1.000 1.000 0.698 0.698 1.000 
* Given value by the model 
Table ‎6.7 The given value to 
2
445  by the HRHPP
2
 model and the ratio of stakeholders’ 
profits to their highest possible profits calculated manually 
Time Step  
2
445   
Province 
1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
445 0.970 0.970 0.698 0.970 1.000 1.000 0.698 0.698 1.000 
Table 6.7 shows the result of the HRHPP
2
 model corresponding to the value of 
2
445  and the 
ratio of stakeholders’ profits to their highest possible profits calculated manually using the 
values of the model’s decision variables. As illustrated in this table, the given value to 
2
445  by 
the model is 0.970 and the ratios of Provinces 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8 profits to their highest 
possible profits are 0.970, 0.970, 1, 1, and 1, respectively. These results describe that the 
HRHPP
2
 model shares water between these provinces as a manner that Provinces 1 and 3 
can make more profits and consequently higher ratios in comparison with the results of the 
HRHPP model. As shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7, the ratios of Provinces 4, 5, and 8 profits 
to their highest possible profits in both tables are 1. It means that the available water 
resources for these provinces are more than their water requirements.  
Table 6.8 illustrates the given value to 
1
537  by the HRHPP
1
 model. As shown, the value of 
1
537  and the ratio of stakeholders’ profits to their highest possible profits are equal. It means 
that in this time step the model allocates water to the stakeholders as a manner that they 
make profits only 0.229 of their highest possible profits from utilising their water share. 
Table 6.9 reports the final results of water allocation obtained from the HRHPP
2
 model 
implementation. It should be emphasised here that the results of the HRHPP
2
 model in 
terms of 
2
t  showed that no more stage is needed to improve the optimality of proposed 
water allocation. The yearly average of allocated water to each province is shown in Table 
6.9. As presented in this table, the total surface water allocated to stakeholders is 3234 
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MCM. According to Table 6.9, Provinces 8 and 2 have the largest and the smallest portions 
of the Basin’s surface water with 1194 and 56 MCM, respectively. In addition, Provinces 8 
and 6 have the smallest and the largest water shortages in the Basin with 43% and 73%, 
respectively. The monthly averages of allocated water to the provinces by the HRHPP
1
 
model are also presented in Figure 6.7. In this figure, the monthly averages of allocated water 
to the provinces by the HRHPP
2
 model are compared with maximum and minimum 
allocated water to them by the HPP models. For an example, Figure 6.7(a) corresponds to 
Province 1. The light blue curve represents the allocated water to Province 1 by Model 1 
which maximises the profit of Province 1. The dark blue curve represents the allocated water 
to Province 1 by the HRHPP
1
 model and finally the red curve represents the allocated water 
to Province 1 by a model that maximises the profits of all stakeholders except Province 1. As 
shown in Figure 6.7, the competition over water utilisation concentrates on the spring and 
summer (months 7 to 12) while the main parts of the stakeholders’ water requirements in the 
autumn and winter (months 1 to 6) are satisfied. Note that month 1 is from 23
rd
 September 
to 23
rd
 October. 
Table ‎6.8 The given value of 
1
537  by the HRHPP
1
 model and the ratio of stakeholders’ 
profits to their highest possible profits calculated manually 
Time Step 
1
537  
Province 
1
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
537 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.229 0.229 
Table ‎6.9 The yearly averages of allocated water to provinces by the HRHPP2 model 
Province → 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Basin 
Water Allocated (MCM) 288 56 760 397 207 113 221 1194 3234 
Shortage (%) 72 56 61 47 54 73 49 43 56 
 
As shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.9, the results of the MEO model in terms of allocated water to 
the stakeholders based on the SL and ML solution methods are different. The reason is that 
SL and ML solution methods find the optimal solutions of the MEO model with two 
different algorithms, however, both solutions are non-dominated. 
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(a) Maximum (possible), minimum, and 
proposed allocated water to Province 1 
 
(b) Maximum (possible), minimum, and 
proposed allocated water to Province 2 
 
(c) Maximum (possible), minimum, and 
proposed allocated water to Province 3 
 
(d) Maximum (possible), minimum, and 
proposed allocated water to Province 4 
 
(e) Maximum (possible), minimum, and 
proposed allocated water to Province 5 
 
(f) Maximum (possible), minimum, and 
proposed allocated water to Province 6 
 
(g) Maximum (possible), minimum, and 
proposed allocated water to Province 7 
 
(h) Maximum (possible), minimum, and 
proposed allocated water to Province 8 
Figure ‎6.7 The maximum, minimum, and proposed (by the HRHPP1 model) water supplied 
to the stakeholders (The values are the average of 50 years) 
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The total capacity of the Basin’s water resources available for development can also be 
estimated using the HRHPP
2
 model’s results. Water released to the Caspian Sea (the 
model’s output) and the monthly environmental water supply in the last node in the Basin 
network are presented in Figure 6.8. The total difference of these values was considered as 
the water development capability for the Basin. The annual average of water released to the 
Caspian Sea (without considering the water supply to the environment) is 1852 MCM where 
the portions of months 1 to 6 (autumn and winter) and months 7 to 12 (spring and summer) 
are 79% and 21%, respectively. This result shows the Basin water authority is able to plan for 
regulating 1852 MCM through constructing new dams. By considering the volumes of 
allocated water to stakeholders (3234 MCM) and the total capacity of the new dams (1852 
MCM), the potential of the Basin surface water resource for satisfying the water demands is 
5086 MCM. In other words, the Basin’s stakeholders are able to use 5086 MCM out of 
6214 MCM of the Basin’s surface water resources when the satisfaction of the environmental 
water demand is considered to be a strict water development criterion for the water 
allocation modelling. 
 
Figure ‎6.8 The comparison of monthly averages water released into the Caspian Sea and the 
water supply to the environment in last node in the Basin network (the values are the average 
of 50 years) 
As shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.9, total allocated water to stakeholders by FWP model is 3360 
MCM while it is 3234 MCM for the HRHPP
2
 model. Due to Proposition 2, it is expected 
that these two values have to be equal. For the explanation of the reason of this difference, 
the constraints of (6.7) and (6.8) have to be explained again. Based on these constraints, 
FWP and HRHPP
2
 have to satisfy the environmental water requirement of each node in R 
time steps. As mentioned before, R is the summation of given values to 
ki t
z  by the models, 
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which can be 0 or 1 and 1 means that the model satisfies the environment water supply in 
time step t. In this study, R is considered to be 90% which means that the environmental 
water supply has to be met in 90% of time steps. In these circumstances, the models select 
these time steps for each node in a way that they maximise their different objective functions. 
As explained by Proposition 2, the FWP and HRHPP
2
 models provide non-dominate 
solutions for the MEO model for time step t because the released water to Caspian sea in 
time step t from the last node of the network are a value that no more water could allocate to 
the stakeholders by the models. The evaluation of given values to 
ki t
z  by the models for the 
last node in the network showed that when the values of 
ki t
z  are identical, the released water 
to Caspian Sea by both models are equal but they are different when 
ki t
z  are no equal. In 
fact, models regarding to their objective functions select the value of 
ki t
z  1 or 0 for time step t 
and the given different values to 
ki t
z  by the FWP and HRHPP
2
 models brings about a 
difference between the summation of allocated water to the stakeholders by the models. 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the MEO model formulation is presented. The aim of this model is to find 
sustainable water allocation patterns in multi-stakeholder river basins. Specific sustainability 
criteria such as the profits of stakeholders from their allocated water and water supply to the 
environment are considered and incorporated into the MEO model. The MEO model takes 
into account the equitable allocation of water by maximising the profits of stakeholders 
simultaneously, while, water supply to the environment was considered as a firm constraint 
in the model. The two new solution methods, SL and ML, based on a three-step approach 
are introduced in this chapter, which maximise the minimum ratio of achieved profits of 
stakeholders to their highest possible profits. It is proved that these two new solution 
methods present non-dominate solutions for the MEO model, despite their results are not 
exactly similar. The advantage of these two solution methods is that they do not assign 
weights to the objective functions. It should be noted that determining and justifying the 
weights for the objective functions of MEO is controversial and could be a new reason for 
water conflicts in transboundary basins. 
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Chapter 7 The Integrated Water & Dam Allocation 
Approach 
The necessity of integrating water allocation planning and water resources development was 
widely discussed in Sub-section 2.2.2. This chapter introduces a new approach, which 
incorporates dams’ location-allocation formulation into the general water allocation 
modelling framework. The aim of this approach is to present the optimal locations and 
capacities of new water development projects in a transboundary watershed while allocate 
fairly water resources of the basin, included stored water by the proposed dams, between the 
basin’s stakeholders. 
7.1 Introduction 
Dams play significant roles in the stability of economies and societies. They store rivers’ 
discharges while there are no demands for them and release reserved water to satisfy water 
shortages whenever the water demands exceed the rivers’ discharges. Water is becoming 
more scarce and valued due to water demands increase caused by the population growth. In 
addition, the climate change makes the trends of rainfall more severe and less assured 
(Warren 2010). In these circumstances, dams become a high status in basins’ water 
resources management, not only for increasing the reliability of water supply to 
requirements, but also for raising water security in watersheds. Thus, the planning of dams’ 
locations and capacities is a crucial element of the water resource development in 
underdeveloped watersheds. 
Water shortage becomes a serious concern for water authorities of shared watersheds. This 
developmental constraint enhances competitions between stakeholders for utilising more 
water resources. Water competitions can turn out to serious water conflicts if stakeholders 
struggle to construct dams in their administrative boundaries in order to provide more water 
supplies for their demands. In these circumstances, water developments (dams) not only 
decline water security in the watersheds but also cause social, economic, and ecological 
issues. Therefore, it seems that sustainable water resources planning (constructing dams) is 
strongly tied to water allocation of the watersheds and needs to be managed by a central 
water authority. In other words, selecting dams’ locations and their capacities in an 
underdeveloped watershed have to be implemented along with settling the stakeholders’ 
water shares. 
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Various approaches have been utilised in order to find dams’ capacities in known locations. 
These approaches are mainly based on the integration of hydrological and optimisation 
methods. The methods such as “Mass Curve (Ripple Diagram)”, “Sequent-Peak Algorithm” 
(Maskew Fair et al. 1966), “Operation Study”, and “Optimisation Analysis” are frequently 
used to determine the required capacity and construction cost for a dam. All these methods 
require input data that are obtained from extensive and time-consuming engineering studies. 
In fact, it is impossible to have all these details for all possible locations of dams and use 
them to decide about the optimal locations and capacities of dams. Note that, water 
authorities actually are under severe pressure from public opinion and politicians while 
evaluating various scenarios for water resources developments of a shared watershed. 
Therefore, the availability of an approach which leads the water authorities to an initial 
optimal scheme of water allocation and water development of the watershed is crucial for 
water authorities. The achieved results of this approach can be utilised for preparing the 
initial water shares licenses of stakeholders. However, these licenses can be modified after 
more input data will be prepared for the approach, providing an exact water allocation and 
water development scheme of the basin. 
Chapter 7 introduces a new approach that distributes water resources of a shared watershed 
to its stakeholders and specifies locations and capacities of proposed dams in a way that 
individual profit of each stakeholder maximises. This approach prepares a bright perspective 
of a basin’s optimal water allocation along with the locations and the capacities of proposed 
dams without appealing any time-consuming engineering studies. The aim of this approach is 
to determine the required number of dams, choosing the locations of dams, finding the 
capacities of dams, and finally allocating water to stakeholders of a shared watershed such 
that each stakeholder achieves the highest profit from water usage, while the environmental 
demand in the entire basin is satisfied. Certainly, this method requires intensive post hoc 
engineering studies, which are the major criteria for dam construction, but it can be used as 
an important initial step for engineers to indicate the sites where these studies should be 
implemented.  
7.2 Notations 
7.2.1 Sets and Indices 
All indices which have been used in this chapter are outlined as follows: 
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a : is the superscript for agricultural sector; 
u : is the superscript  for urban sector; 
d : is the superscript for industrial sector; 
k : is the index for stakeholder; 
t : is the index for time step, which can be a month, a half year, or a year; 
T : is the total time steps; 
  : is the set of stakeholders;  
k  : is the set of nods in stakeholder k ( )k  ; 
k
n
 
: is the index for the number of nodes for stakeholder k; 
k
i
 
: is the index for node i that belongs to stakeholder k; 
ki
  : 
is the set of nodes (l) that are neighbour of node ik and are located in upstream of 
node ik; 
'
ki
i
 
: is the node that is neighbour of node ik and is located in downstream of node ik; 

 
: is the set of time periods. 
7.2.2 Decision Variables 
All decision variables which have been used here are outlined as follows: 
i tk
ax  : 
is allocated water to agriculture in node ik from surface water resource at time t 
( , , )kk i t     ; 
i tk
ux  : 
is allocated water to urban sector in node ik from surface water resource at time t
( , , )kk i t     ; 
i tk
dx  : 
is allocated water to industry in node ik from surface water resource at time t
( , , )kk i t     ; 
ki
z  : is a binary variable that is 1 if there is a dam in node ik ( , )kk i   ; 
ki
C  : 
is the capacity of the dam in node ik, it is 0 if there is no dam in node ik 
( , )kk i   . 
105 
 
7.2.3 Exogenous Variables 
All exogenous variables which have been used in this chapter are outlined as follows: 
ki t
AP  : is agricultural profit associated with node ik at time t
 
( , , )kk i t     ; 
ki t
UP  : is urban profit associated with node ik at time t ( , , )kk i t     ; 
ki t
IP  : is industrial profit associated with node ik at time t ( , , )kk i t     ; 
ki t
S
 
: 
is stored water in node ik at time t ( , , )kk i t     ; if there is a dam in node ik 
and 0 otherwise; 
'( )k ik
i i t
R

 : is transferred water from the node ik to node 
'i  at time t ( , , )kk i t     ; 
( )kl i t
R 
 
: is transferred water from the node l to node ik at time t ( , , , )k ik i l t       ; 
ki t
z  : 
is a 0-1 binary variable that is 1 when a dam in node ik at time step t 
( , , )kk i t      if full; 
ki t
z  : 
is a 0-1 binary variable, which equals 1 if the environmental water demand in node ik at 
time step t is satisfied; 
7.2.4 Input and Modelling Parameters 
All inputs and parameters which have been used are outlined as follows: 
k
a
i  : is agricultural net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to agriculture in node ik ( )ki  ; 
k
u
i  : is urban net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to domestic sector in node ik ( )ki  ; 
k
d
i  : is industrial net benefit of allocating 1 unit water to industry in node ik ( )ki  ; 
ki t
  : 
is produced water in node ik ( )ki   at time t, it is actually the produced water 
between nodes 
ki
l   and node ik; 
n : number of required dams; 
M : is a big constant number; 
R  : 
is the reliability level that shows the number of times that dams’ reservoirs must be 
full; 
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R  : is the reliability level of the environmental water satisfaction. The reliability, in fact, 
is a ratio but for the sake of computational efficiency, I used the number of time 
steps that the environmental water requirement must be satisfied, rather than a 
ratio; 
ki t

 
: is agricultural water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
  : is urban water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t
  : is industrial water demands in node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   ; 
ki t

 
: 
is environmental water demand of node ik, at time t ( , )ki t   , it has to flow in 
rivers; 
IV
ki  
: 
is the initial volume of water in dam ik ( , )kk i    if there is a dam in node ik 
otherwise it is 0; 
7.3 The Steps of the Proposed Approach 
Our approach to determine the location and capacities of dams and also the share of water 
to stakeholders consists of the following three steps: 
Step 1: In this step, a model called Multi-Objective Water & Dams Allocation (MOWDA) is 
run to determine the locations and capacities of the given number of dams to the model and 
shares of stakeholders in order to maximise the profits of all stakeholders. 
Step 2: Step 1 is run for different numbers of dams and a sensitivity analysis is undertaken to 
decide on the optimal number of required dams in the basin. 
Step 3: The stakeholders’ profits, achieved from Step 1 for selected number of dams (Step 
2) are an input to a model in Step 3 that it is called Minimum Capacity (MinCap). The 
MinCap model determines the capacity of dams such that the summation of dams’ capacities 
minimises while it goes for the stakeholders’ profits, achieved from Step 1. In many 
occasions, the obtained capacities by Steps 1 and 3 are similar. However, in case of having 
multiple optimal solutions (in terms of the capacities), the MinCap model chooses the one 
with minimum summation of dams’ capacities. Here we assume that the constructions of 
dams of lesser capacities is always preferable than construction of larger dams, disregarding 
to the geographical location. 
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7.3.1 The Formulation of the MOWDA Model 
Similar to other introduced models, the MOWDA model is also formulated based on the 
node-link network of a basin water network, that was already presented in Figure 4.1 without 
considering groundwater resources in nodes as a resource for satisfying nodes’ water 
demands. The characteristics of this network were already described in Subsection 4.2.  
7.3.1.1 The Objective Functions of the MOWDA Model 
The objective functions of the MOWDA model are to maximise the total net profits (Zk) of 
water use for each stakeholder (k). In mathematical form it states as 
Maximise      1 2 K, ,...,Z Z Z  (7.1) 
where 
11
( )
k k k
T
i t i t i t
t
k
k
k
n
i
AP UP IPZ

    k =1, 2, …, K  (7.2) 
ki t
AP , 
ki t
UP , and 
ki t
IP  are calculated using equations (7.3)-(7.5): 
 =
ki t i kk
a a
i tAP x             (7.3) 
 = 
ki t i kk
u u
i tUP x             (7.4) 
 = 
ki t i kk
d d
i tIP x             (7.5) 
7.3.1.2 The Constraints of the MOWDA Model 
The MOWDA model’s constraints should be listed as follows: 
1. Water balance at node ik: 
'( 1) )( ( )k k
ik
i t i t i tk k kik k
i t i t k k
a u d
t l t i i t
l
i iS S R R x x x

 

                  (7.6) 
2. Number of dams in the basin: 
k
k k
i
k i
nz
 

 
  (7.7) 
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Constraint (7.7) specifies the number of dams in the model. For instance, n=1 means that 
the optimised water allocation patterns is explored when only one dam is allowed to be 
constructed in the basin. It should be noted that n is an input (a parameter) of the MOWDA 
model. 
3. Stored water in dam ik and its capacity: 
0
k ki t i
S C             (7.8) 
+M (1-z ) 0
k k ki t i i t
S C   
 
        
 
 (7.9) 
R 0
k ki t
t
iz z




  
 
      
 
 (7.10) 
+M z 0
k ki i
C             (7.11) 
Constraint (7.8) points to this fact that the stored water in dam ik at time t (
ki t
S ) has to be less 
than or equal to its capacity (
ki
C ). Constraint (7.9) indicates that the stored water in dam ik in 
time t (
ki t
S ) has to be greater than or equal to its capacity (
ki
C ) when z
ki t

 is equal to 1. In 
accordance with Constraint (7.10), z
ki t

 has to be equal 1 in at least R  time steps out of total 
time steps. Constraints (7.8), (7.9), and (7.10) work together to determine the capacity of 
dam ik (
ki
C ). When z
ki t

 is 1 in time t, Constraint (7.9) is changed to 
k ki t i
S C  while 
Constraint (7.8) forces the stored water to be less than dam ik’s capacity (
k ki t i
S C ). In this 
circumstance, the model forces the capacity of dam ik (
ki
C ) to be equal to its stored water in 
time step t (
ki t
S ). Similar situations have to be repeated for R  time steps. 
In fact, the model assigns a value for the capacity of dam ik such that it is full in R  time 
steps. This formulation is based on a fact that water authorities prefer to construct dams with 
capacities that operate with full capacities in most time steps. For example, it is obvious that 
no one is interested in dams, which operate with half capacity in 60% of times. Furthermore, 
this formulation warrants water security in the basin where dams have to be full at  time 
steps over total time steps. 
R
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Note that 
ki
z  is 0 when there is no dam in node ik. In these circumstances, Constraint (7.10) 
changes into 0
ki t
t
z

  that is also satisfied when 
ki t
z  is zero. In addition, Constraint (7.11) 
makes the capacity of dam ik (
ki
C ) equal to 0 and consequently (regarding to Constraint 
(7.8)), the stored water (
ki t
S ) are also 0 for all time steps. In this case, Constraint (7.6) 
converts to ')( ( ) 0ik
ik
i t i t i tk k kkk k
a u d
t l t i i t
l
i iR R x x x




       that is water balance for nodes 
without dam. 
4. Environmental water supply reliability: 
'( )
0
kik
kk
i ti ti i t
R z

              (7.12) 
R 0
ki t
t
z

           (7.13) 
5. Stored water in dam ik in first and last time steps: 
1
IV 0
k k ki t i i
S z            (7.14) 
1
0
k k li t i t
S S           (7.15) 
where 
1ki t
S  and 
k li t
S  are the stored water in dam ik in the first and last time steps, 
respectively. Constraint (7.14) indicates that if there is a dam in node ik (
ki
z =1) then the 
stored water of dam ik in the first time step is IV
ki
. IV
ki
 is an input datum to the model that 
could be equal to the annual average of river discharge in node ik. This constraint limits the 
model to consider an unreasonable value for the stored water at the first time step. 
Constraint (7.15) insures that the stored water in the last time step (
k li t
S ) is greater than or 
equal to the stored water in the time step 1 (
1ki t
S ). This constraint is inserted to the model in 
order to make the stored water of dam ik during time steps balanced. 
6. Variables’ Bounds: 
The constraints below express the upper bounds on the allocated water to agricultural 
activities, domestic use, and industry needs, and logical non-negativity bounds for other 
variables, and are given by the following non-equalities and equations: 
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0
i tk k
a
i t x              (7.16) 
0
i tk k
u
i t x              (7.17) 
0
ik kt
d
i t x              (7.18) 
0
ikt
ax             (7.19) 
0
ikt
ux 
 
         
 (7.20) 
0
ikt
dx 
 
         
 (7.21) 
'( )
0
ikk
i i t
R

            (7.22) 
0
ki
C 
 
      
 
 (7.23) 
0
ki t
S 
 
        
 
 (7.24) 
ki
z= 0 or 1         (7.25) 
ki t
z = 0 or 1           (7.26) 
ki t
z = 0 or 1           (7.27) 
The Proposition 1 from Chapter 6 showed that the MEO model has infinite number of non-
dominated solutions, which in each solution the profit of a stakeholder cannot be improved 
in value unless degrading the profits of other stakeholders. That proposition also holds for 
the MOWDA model. 
7.3.1.3 The Solution Method of the MOWDA Model 
In order to find a Pareto-Admissible solution for the MOWDA model, the SL solution 
method which was introduced in Chapter 6 is utilised. The utilisation of the ML solution 
method for this purpose can be considered as a future study. A quick review of the SL 
solution method is presented in continue. 
Step One of SL: The Development of the HPP Model for each Stakeholder 
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Similarly to the approach described in Chapter 6, the Highest Possible Profit (HPP) 
approach is employed for the MOWDA modelling. The aim of the HPP model (see Sub-
section 6.4.1) is to find the highest possible profit of each stakeholder at each time step (
*
ktf ) 
via maximising the profit of the stakeholder subject to Constraints (7.6)-(7.27). The outputs 
of the HHP model are the values of the decision variables that maximise the profit of that 
particular stakeholder at time step t if that stakeholder is allowed to take as much water as 
possible after satisfying the basin environmental demand. It should be noted that the 
developed HPP model for each stakeholder proposes locations and capacities for new dams 
in a way that they provide the highest profit for particular stakeholder. The formulation of 
the HHP model is as follows: 
Maximise     
11
( )
k k k
T
i t i t i t
t
k
k
k
n
i
AP UP IPZ

     k =1, 2, …, K  (7.28) 
 =
ki t i kk
a a
i tAP x             (7.29) 
 = 
ki t i kk
u u
i tUP x             (7.30) 
 = 
ki t i kk
d d
i tIP x             (7.31) 
subject to Constraints (7.6)-(7.27). 
Step Two of SL: The Development of the HRHPP Model 
Similarly to the MEO model described in Chapter 6, the Highest Ratio of Highest Possible 
Profit (HRHPP) approach is employed for the next step of the MOWDA model.  The 
HRHPP model maximises the value of 
t  which is the minimum ratio of the profit obtained 
from allocating water to each stakeholder in time step t to the highest possible profit that 
each stakeholder can achieve in time step t. The formulation of the HRHPP model is as 
follows: 
Maximise      
T
t
t
Z   (7.32) 
subject to: 
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*
1
( ) ( )
k
i i ik k kk k k
k
n
a a u u d d
i i i t kt
i
t t tx x x f   

               (7.33) 
and constraints (7.6)-(7.27). 
Step Three of SL: The Development of the FWP Model  
The FWP (see Sub-section 6.4.3) model allocates water to the stakeholders based on the 
results of Step 2 (when the value of   for each time step is obtained) and apportions the 
leftover of water among other stakeholders with respect to the water profits of them. The 
objective function of this model is to maximise the overall basin’s profit (OBP) while the 
profits of all stakeholders in time step t must be greater than 
' *
t ktf  . It should be noted that 
'
t  is a constant value at time step t which is the given solution of the HRHPP model for λ at 
time step t. The FWP model formulation is as follows: 
Maximise     ( )
k k k
k k
i t i t i t
k ti
AP UP IPOBP
  
    (7.34) 
subject to: 
' *
1
( ) ( )
i
k kki i ikk k
k
t
n
a a u u d d
i i i kt
i
t t tx x x f   

      
 
     
 
 (7.35) 
and constraints (7.6)-(7.27). 
Recall that based on Proposition 2, introduced in Chapter 6, the solution of the FWP model 
is non-dominated for time step t. 
7.3.2 The Number of Required Dams 
A sensitivity analysis is suggested for finding the optimal number of required dams in a basin. 
For this purpose, the MOWDA model is run for various scenarios (number of dams) and 
then, the solutions of the models in terms of λt, the overall profit of the basin, the 
stakeholders’ profits, and the summation of proposed dams’ capacities are taken into 
consideration for selecting the optimal number of dams in the basin. 
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7.3.3 The Formulations of the MinCap Model 
The MOWDA model might have multiple optimal solutions. With regards to Constraint 
(7.8), (7.9), and (7.10), the capacity of dam ik (
ki
C ) has to be equal to the stored water in at 
least R  time steps. Therefore, the MOWDA model could select any value between R  and 
total time steps for dam ik, which maximises the stakeholders’ profits in time step t. In 
accordance with this fact, the MOWDA model might have multiple optimal solutions 
(various capacities of dams), given the same values for the stakeholders’ profits. Hence, the 
MinCap model runs to find a solution that provides minimum dams’ capacities. The 
MinCap model aims to find new capacities for dams such that the summation of dams’ 
capacities minimises while the stakeholders’ profits are equal or greater than the achieved 
values by MOWDA model. The objective function of the MinCap model is to minimise the 
summation of dams’ capacities given by 
k
k k
MinCap i
k i
Z C
 

 
  (7.36) 
Then this objective function is minimised subject to  
( )
k k k
k k
i t i t i t kt
ti
AP UP IP SP
 
  
 
     
 
 (7.37) 
and constraints (7.6)-(7.27), where 
ktSP  is the achieved profit of stakeholder k in time step t 
by the MOWDA model. The flowchart of the proposed approach is presented in Figure 
7.1. 
7.4 The Results of the Approach Implementation 
In this section we implemented the proposed model in this chapter to the Sefidrud Basin. 
The threshold of demand satisfaction in 90% of time steps is a major reliability criterion for 
water supply systems in the Sefidrud Basin (MGC 2011). Thus, the amount of R  is 
0.90×50=45. It means the models have to find a value for the capacity of dam ik that it will be 
full in at least 90% of time steps. 
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Figure ‎7.1 The flowchart of the Integrated Water & Dam Allocation Model 
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7.4.1 The Results of the MOWDA Model 
The results of the HPP models in terms of the highest possible profits of the stakeholders, 
the HRHPP model in terms of the minimum value of λ for each stakeholder in time step t, 
and the FWP model in terms of the final achieved value of λ for each stakeholder in time 
step t are presented in Appendix A. These terms were broadly explained in Chapter 6 for 
the results of the MEO model. The final results of the FWP model in terms of the location 
and capacities of proposed dams and the water shares of the stakeholders are presented 
below. 
Table 7.1 and Figures 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 present the optimal locations and capacities 
of proposed dams in the Sefidrud Basin for scenarios n=1 (n in Constraint (7.7) is equal to 
1), n=2, n=3, n=4, and n=5 respectively, derived from the FWP model, for examples. As 
shown in Table 7.1 and these figures, Node 10 and 20 have significant roles in the Sefidrud 
Basin water planning and development because the model proposes them for constructing 
dams for 4 scenarios. The second important node is Node 15, which is proposed for dam 
construction for 3 scenarios. Nodes 27, 12, and 7 are other proposed nodes, which are 
proposed for dam construction by 2 (Node 27) and 1 scenarios. As shown in the Figures 7.2, 
7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6, most proposed dams by the FWP model are located on the 
Ghezelozan River, due to the large number of the stakeholders located in its catchment. This 
point shows that the Iranian water authority needs to put more attention on water planning 
and development of the Ghezelozan River. Moreover, most dams are proposed to be 
constructed in the administrative boundaries of Provinces 3 and 4. 
Table ‎7.1 The locations and capacities (MCM) of proposed dams by the FWP model 
Node Province River 
Scenarios 
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 
7 1 Ghezelozan 0 0 0 0 115 
10 1, 2, 3 Ghezelozan 0 405 531 326 306 
12 3 Ghezelozan 0 0 0 437 0 
15 4 Ghezelozan 1019 0 191 0 559 
20 4, 5 Ghezelozan 0 823 879 907 1503 
27 7, 8 Sefidrud 0 0 0 102 773 
Dams’ capacities summation 1019 1228 1601 1772 3265 
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Figure ‎7.2 Location and size of the proposed dam for the scenario 1 (one dam in the basin) 
derived by the FWP model. The bold number next to the symbol used for dam shows the 
proposed capacity for the dam 
 
Figure ‎7.3 Location and size of the proposed dam for the scenario 2 (two dams in the basin) 
derived by the FWP model. The bold number next to the symbol used for dam shows the 
proposed capacity for the dam. 
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Figure ‎7.4 Location and size of the proposed dam for the scenario 3 (three dams in the 
basin) derived by the FWP model. The bold number next to the symbol used for dam 
shows the proposed capacity for the dam. 
 
Figure ‎7.5 Location and size of the proposed dam for the scenario 4 (four dams in the basin) 
derived by the FWP model. The bold number next to the symbol used for dam shows the 
proposed capacity for the dam. 
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Figure ‎7.6 Location and size of the proposed dam for the scenario 5 (five dams in the basin) 
derived by the FWP model. The bold number next to the symbol used for dam shows the 
proposed capacity for the dam. 
7.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Figure 7.7 compares the minimum value of λ over time steps achieved by various scenarios 
(number of required dams) and the Summation of Dams’ Capacities (SDC). As shown in 
this figure, the minimum value of λ is 0.23 when no dam is in the Basin (n=0, SDC=0). It 
rises to 0.512 by considering 1 dam (n=1) with 1019 MCM reservoir capacity in the Basin. 
The consideration 2 dams (n=2, SDC=1228) in the Basin increases the minimum value of λ 
from 0.512 to 0.548. If we want to achieve this value of λ, it requires the construction one 
dam with 405 MCM capacity in node 10 and another with 823 MCM capacity in node 20. 
Put differently, the equity of water sharing in the Basin gets rise 0.036 (0.548-0.512) if the 
potential of surface water storing in the Basin increases by 209 (1228-1019) MCM. Growing 
the minimum value of λ continues to go up with a lower slop to 0.561 when the model 
considers three dams (n=3, SDC=1601 MCM) in the Basin. There is not a significant jump 
in the minimum value of λ when four dams (n=4, SDC=1772 MCM) are considered for the 
Basin water development. In this situation, the minimum value of λ grows slowly from 0.561 
to 0.563 (only 0.002). The increasing trend of minimum value of λ continues by considering 
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five dams (n=5, SDC=3265 MCM) in the Basin and it gets the value 0.571 in these 
circumstances. For obtaining this amount of increase in the value of λ (0.571-0.563=0.008), a 
rise of reservoir capacity equal to 1493 (3265-1772) MCM is required. This fact shows 
further increase in the value of λ needs huge reservoir capacities in the Basin. The given 
value of λ for scenario 27 (n=27, without considering the dummy nodes), 0.62, showed that 
the maximum possible development in the Basin (dams construction on all feasible nodes) 
would not increase the value of λ further than given values for scenarios 1-5 when it needs a 
huge water storing capacity in the Basin. 
 
Figure ‎7.7 Comparing the minimum value of λ over time steps achieved by various scenarios 
(number of dams) and the summation of dams’ capacities 
Table 7.2 presents the profits of the stakeholders for various numbers of dams in the Basin. 
As shown in this table, the Basin profit for scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are 610, 605, 604, 607, 
and 607 Billion Rials. Based on these data, the Basin’s highest profit achieves by considering 
1 dam in the Basin when the model presents the lowest level of water sharing equity in the 
Basin. In this case, the FWP model satisfies more water demands of Province 8 which has 
the highest marginal value of water in the Basin. The profit of Province 8 decreases with 
increasing the minimum value of λ. The Basin profit does not demonstrate a significant 
variability by increasing the numbers of dams. It varies between 604 to 610 Billion Rials for 
various scenarios while the requested water storing capacities varies between 1019 MCM to 
3265 MCM. According to Table 7.2, the increase of dams’ number has an effect on the 
achieved profits of Provinces 3 and 8 while the profits of other provinces have not changed 
meaningfully. 
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Table ‎7.2 The average annual of stakeholders’ profits for various scenarios  
Number 
of Dams 
Province Profit (Billion Rials) 
Basin Profit 
(Billion Rials) 
Dams' Capacities 
Summation (MCM) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
n=1 13 3 127 79 44 22 36 285 610 1019 
n=2 14 3 131 79 45 23 37 274 605 1228 
n=3 14 3 133 79 44 23 37 270 604 1601 
n=4 14 3 133 79 44 23 38 273 607 1772 
n=5 14 3 134 80 45 23 38 270 607 3265 
According to Figure 7.7 and Table 7.2, the increase of the numbers of dams in the Sefidrud 
Basin, more than three does not result in significant additional water sharing equity (after 
number of dams exceeds 3, the value of λ reaches a plateau, see Figure 7.7) and the Basin 
profit while makes a significant cost for dams constructions. Hence, it shows 3 dams lead to a 
reasonable water allocation schemes for the Sefidrud Basin. It is very important to be noted 
that this results could be modified if new information such as practical reservoirs capacities 
and the cost of dam construction for various nodes in the Basin are given to the model. 
7.4.3 The Results of MinCap Model 
The MinCap model ran for scenario 3. The results of the MinCap model were same as the 
results of the MOWDA model for this scenario. In other words, for this case study, there 
are no lower dams’ capacities which bring about same profits, achieved by the MOWDA 
model. Table 7.3 presents the annual average of allocated water to the stakeholders for 
Scenario 3, derived from the MinCap model’s results. To sum up, the water shares of 
Provinces 1 to 8 are 408, 79, 1087, 536, 298, 200, 305, and 1734 MCM, respectively if 3 
dams in Node 10 with storing capacity 531 MCM, Node 15 with storing capacity 191 MCM, 
and Node 20 with storing capacity 879 MCM will be constructed. 
Table ‎7.3 The annual average of allocated water to the stakeholders by the MinCap model 
for Scenario 3 (MCM) 
Scenario 
Province 
Sum 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
n=3 408 79 1087 536 298 200 305 1734 4646 
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7.4.4 The Comparison of the MinCap Model and a Single Objective 
Water and Dam Allocation Model 
In order to evaluate the capability of the MOWDA model for water allocation and locating 
and sizing new dams in a transboundary basin, the Single Objective Water and Dam 
Allocation (SOWDA) model was developed and the results of its implementation into the 
Sefidrud Basin are compared with the results of the MOWDA model in this sub-section.  
The SOWDA model is formulated as follows. Its objective function is the profit of the 
Sefidrud Basin. This single objective function is maximised, subjects to Constraints (7.6)-
(7.27) described in Sub-section 7.3.1.2. 
Table 7.4 compares the locations and capacities of proposed dams for the Sefidrud Basin, 
given by the MOWDA and SOWDA models for scenario 3. As shown in this table, the 
summations of dams’ capacities, proposed by the MOWDA and SOWDA models are 1601 
and 5168 MCM while the annual average of the Basin’s profits achieved from these model 
are 604 and 682 Billion Rials (Table 7.5), respectively. These compared data describe that 
the maximisation of the Basin profit is not an efficient water allocation indicator for sharing 
surface water resources of the Sefidrud Basin. 
Table ‎7.4 The comparison of locations and capacities of proposed dams by the MOWDA 
and SOWDA models for scenario 3 
MOWDA SOWDA 
Province Node Capacity (MCM) Province Node Capacity (MCM) 
1, 2, 3 10 531 3 12 1043 
4 15 191 4, 5 20 1813 
4, 5 20 879 7, 8 27 2312 
Sum 1601 Sum 5168 
Table 7.5 presents the allocated water to the stakeholders by the MOWDA and SOWDA 
models. As presented by Table 7.5, the main portion of supplied water to the stakeholders 
by the SOWDA model belongs to Province 8 (about 43%) which has the highest marginal 
value of water in the Basin and the shares of upstream provinces such as Province 1 is about 
2.1% (
   
    
    ). The portions of Provinces 8 and 1 from supplied water to the 
stakeholders by the MOWDA model are 37% and 9%, respectively. It should be noted here 
that the water demands of these provinces are 2107 MCM (Province 8) and 1029 MCM 
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(Province 1) and Province 8 has the highest marginal value of water in the Basin while 
Province 1 has the lowest ones. The difference in the sum columns between MOWDA and 
SOWDA is due to the selection of different years to satisfy the environmental demands 
(Environmental Reliability). Note that as MOWDA increases the proportion of the satisfied 
demand for all stakeholders it does not necessarily select the same years to satisfy the 
environmental demand in order to reach the environmental reliability factor. 
Table ‎7.5 Allocated water to the stakeholders by the MOWDA and SOWDA models for 
scenario 3 
Model 
Province 
Sum 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
MOWDA 408 79 1087 536 298 200 305 1734 4646 
SOWDA 101 17 1103 678 371 134 313 2072 4789 
Demand 1029 126 1967 753 447 410 431 2107 7270 
7.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the MOWDA model formulation is presented. This model determines the 
locations and capacities of the required dam and allocates the water to the watershed’s 
stakeholders in a way that maximises the profits of all stakeholders. The SL solution method, 
introduced in Chapter 6 was utilised to find the solution of this model. The required 
number of dams in the basin is evaluated using the sensitivity analysis. To cope with the 
possibility of having multiple optimal solutions for the MOWDA model, the MinCap model 
was proposed that test the possibility of achieving the same profits for the stakeholders with 
lower dams’ capacities. The major contributions of the MOWDA model are, firstly, to 
introduce and apply the concepts of Location-Allocation problem in the shared watershed 
water allocation; secondly, to formulate the problem of finding the capacity of dams without 
requiring cost-capacity function for each dam location. The comparison of the MOWDA 
and SOWDA models showed that the maximisation of the Basin profit is not an efficient 
water allocation indicator for allocating surface water resources of the Sefidrud Basin and it 
results in unbalanced water allocation. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Research 
8.1 Conclusions 
The overall contribution of this dissertation is the development and comparison of several 
water allocation models for equitable and efficient water allocation among competing 
stakeholders of a transboundary basin. All these models have advantages and disadvantages 
that are elaborated below.  
The contribution of this dissertation can be summarised as follows: 
 Developing a single objective mathematical model to allocate the water resources of a 
transboundary basin to its stakeholders based on the economic indicator while the 
environmental water demands in the entire basin are satisfied. 
 Developing a multi-objective mathematical model to allocate the water resources of a 
transboundary basin to its stakeholders based on social, the environmental and 
economic indicators. This model requires the weighting preferences for each objective 
from the water authorities. 
 Developing a multi-objective mathematical model to allocate the water resources of a 
transboundary basin to its stakeholders based on a maximising individual profit of each 
stakeholder. This model does not require weights for objective functions. 
 Developing two new solution techniques for solving the proposed multi-objective model 
in the previous item. 
 Developing a new mathematical model for determining number, locations, and 
capacities of new water projects (dams) that need to be constructed in a transboundary 
basin. The model is a multi-objective mathematical model that also determines the water 
share of each stakeholder. Our model mimics the concepts of Location-Allocation 
problem. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that dam location-allocation is 
formulated for a water system. 
In the following, the modelling methodology, components, and main contributions are 
summarised. 
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8.1.1 The SOE model 
The potential of linear programming with economic objective for conflict resolution was 
evaluated using the SOE model. The SOE model is a single economic objective model that 
maximises the overall profit of a transboundary basin, given from the allocation of water to 
various sectors subjects to river water system constraints and the environmental water 
requirement satisfaction in the entire basin. The water resources planning and development 
of the basin through dams constructions was not considered in the SOE model formulation. 
The results of implementation of SOE model in Sefidrud Basin showed that the model is 
able to optimally allocate 5511 MCM to the stakeholders when there is not water 
development in the Basin and the environmental water supply is satisfied in the entire basin. 
The evaluation of the model’s results showed that it is not able to provide a sustainable 
resolution for the Basin water conflict when it unfairly distributed water among the 
stakeholders. According to the proposed water allocation of the Basin by the model, the 
downstream stakeholder (Province 8) suffered from water shortages in 10% of times, while 
the upstream stakeholders (Provinces 1, 2, 3, and 6) faced water shortages, at least in 84% of 
times. This inequity causes a big gap between obtained profits of the upstream and 
downstream stakeholders, which remains the conflict unresolved. In addition, when the 
water conflict in the Basin is over surface water resources, the model supplied the main 
portion of water demand of the downstream stakeholder from surface water resources (up to 
45.7%), while this portion for the upstream provinces was 7.7% at most. 
The simplicity of the SOE model and the consideration one aggregated economic objective 
function are the main advantages of this model. However, the proposed water allocation by 
the model for the Basin causes an inequitable distribution of profits between the 
stakeholders. It means that this model cannot be employed for resolving the conflicts 
between water users in the Basin. Therefore, the development of a multi-objective model 
that its objective functions represent economic, social, and the environmental indicators was 
considered for the next step of my study. 
8.1.2 The CWA model 
The capability of multi-objective programming with aggregated objective functions for 
providing a sustainable water allocation for a transboundary basin was assessed with the 
CWA model, which employs the compromise programming approach. The aggregated 
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objective functions mean those objectives, which do not directly involve the stakeholders of 
the basin in water allocation modelling. Three basin-wide aggregated objective functions, 
included the maximisation of the basin’s profit, the minimisation of the environment water 
shortage, and the minimisation of transferred water from upstream to downstream were 
considered in this model. It should be pointed out that the environment is a stakeholder in 
this model, which competes with other stakeholders for more water supplies. In other words, 
the satisfaction of the environmental water requirement in the entire basin is not a firm 
constraint in the CWA model. The compromise programming technique was used to solve 
this model and 36 sets of weights for these three objectives, indicating how they contribute to 
the general objective function, were examined in this model. 
The results of the CWA model implementation to the Sefidrud Basin showed that the 
stakeholders could be classified into two categories, insensitive and sensitive stakeholders to 
the objective functions weights. The water shares of non-sensitive stakeholders, which 
included the stakeholders, located in the midstream (Provinces 2, 3, 4, and 5) do not 
significantly depend on the weights of objective functions, however, the results showed an 
opposite circumstance for the sensitive stakeholders which are located upstream and 
downstream (Provinces 1, 6, 7, and 8). The assessment of the CWA model showed that this 
model is not able to provide a sustainable water allocation for the Basin, because the 
environment suffered from water shortages for the most sets of weights. According to the 
model results, the reliability of the environmental water satisfaction is less than 90% for 34 
sets of weights out of 36. For the cases that the reliability is more than 90%, the water 
allocation schemes are not beneficial in terms of the Basin profit. Moreover, the CWA 
model tends to provide more water for satisfying water demands of upstream stakeholders 
from groundwater resources while groundwater is no transferable and the conflicts of the 
stakeholders are on shared surface water resources. 
The consideration of multiple conflicting objectives with economic, social and environmental 
dimensions, which did not allow the CWA model to be in favour of particular stakeholders, 
can be mentioned as the key advantage of the model. On the opposite side, the introduction 
of 36 water allocation schemes for the Basin, corresponding to the different weights of these 
three objectives could cause confusion for the water authority of the Basin. In addition, the 
lack of an approach for selecting and assigning one set of weights to the objective functions 
and justifying them is another disadvantage of the CWA model. These limitations of the 
CWA approach challenged us to move to more sophisticated model which allows taking into 
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consideration the individual objectives of all Basin’s stakeholders instead of overall basin’s 
objectives. 
8.1.3 The MEO model 
The MEO model is a water allocation model, which involves the stakeholders of a 
transboundary basin in water allocation modelling. The objective functions of this model are 
to maximise the profits of all stakeholders simultaneously, while the environmental water 
satisfaction in the entire basin is considered as a firm constraint. In order to solve this model, 
two three-step approaches (the SL and ML solution methods) were introduced. These 
approaches were established based on allocating the water resources of the basin to the 
stakeholders in a way that their obtained profits are a ratio of their highest possible 
profits while this ratio is the same value for all stakeholders. Put differently, the equity 
criterion of water allocation is that all stakeholders should obtain the same percentage 
of their highest possible profits from allocated water to them. This criterion indirectly 
takes into account the variabilities of marginal values of water and water demands in 
the stakeholders. In the nutshell, these approaches are introduced below. 
8.1.3.1 The SL solution Method 
 First step: The first step employs the HPP model to find the highest possible 
profit of each stakeholder in the basin after satisfying the environment water 
supply. The objective function of the HPP model is to maximise the profit of 
particular stakeholder from allocated water to it. The HPP model is developed 
based on mixed-integer linear programming and has to be run for all 
stakeholders. 
 Second step: The second step utilises the HRHPP model in order to find the 
highest ratio of obtained profits of the stakeholders from allocated water to 
them to their highest possible profits (achieved from the first step). The 
HRHPP model is a mixed-integer linear model and the environmental water 
satisfaction is a firm constraint in the model. 
 Third step: The third step of the SL solution method employs the FWP model in 
order to finalise the water shares of stakeholders. The FWP model is a mixed-
integer linear model that maximises the profit of the basin while ensures that 
the profits of all stakeholders are greater or equal than a ratio of their highest 
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possible profits. This ratio is given from the step two and is equivalent for all 
stakeholders. 
8.1.3.2 The ML solution Method 
It should be noted that the first and second steps of the ML solution method are the 
same as the first and second steps of the SL solution method. 
 Third step: The third step of the ML solution method comprises multiple sub-steps 
that the HRHPP
s
 model is run for each sub-step. The HRHPP
s
 model for sub-step 
“s” maximises the ratio of obtained profits of the stakeholders from allocated water 
to them to their highest possible profits (λ) while the HRHPPs model guaranties the 
profits of the stakeholders, which λ could not increase anymore for them due to the 
model constraints. The results of each HRHPP
s
 model determine the value of λ for 
what stakeholder/s could not increase in further sub-steps. These sub-steps and 
running of their corresponded HRHPP
s
 models are continued until no stakeholder 
can be found to increase its λ anymore.  
8.1.3.3 The Results of the MEO model implementation to the Sefidrud Basin 
The results of the HPP models elucidated that the profit of Province 1 is mainly in conflict 
with the profit of Provinces 2, 3, and 6 and Province 3’s profit is mainly in conflict with 
Province 4, 5, and 8 profits. There is also a conflict of interest between Province 7 and 
Province 6. Moreover, the allocated water to only Province 8; located at the Basin 
downstream, does not significantly depend on the allocated water to other provinces due to 
the firm constraint of the environmental water satisfaction in the entire basin. The models’ 
results also show that the water share of Province 6 is very sensitive to the environmental 
water supply while its highest profits increase 28% without enforcing the models to satisfy the 
environmental water requirements. The results of the HRHHP model showed that the value 
of λ is always larger than 0.3, which implies that the profits of stakeholders are always more 
than 30% of their highest possible profits. In addition, the profits of provinces given by the 
HRHPP model displayed that the general trends of the water allocation for the Sefidrud 
Basin are such that the provinces’ profits are closer to the highest possible profit in 
comparison to their lowest profits. 
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The results of the FWP model, as the third step of SL, showed that the model could allocate 
3360 MCM of water resources of the Basin to stakeholders, in which the water shares of 
Provinces 1 to 8 (without the Basin water development) are 286,  55, 762, 405, 212, 114, 
232, and 1294 MCM, respectively. Province 8 with 39% and Provinces 1 and 6 with 73% and 
72%, respectively have the smallest and the largest water shortages between stakeholders. 
The results of the HRHPP
s
 model, as the third step of ML, showed that only two sub-steps 
are needed in order to improve the optimality of proposed water allocation for the Sefidrud 
Basin. The average annual of allocated water to the Basin water demands by the HRHPP
2
 
model is 3234 MCM and the water shares of Provinces 1 to 8 are 288, 56, 760, 397, 207, 
113, 221, and 1194 MCM, respectively. Province 8 with 43% and Provinces 1 and 6 with 
72% and 73%, respectively have the smallest and the largest water shortages in the Basin. 
The increase of Province 8’s water shortage, in comparison with its water shortage achieved 
from the FWP model’s results, showed that the HRHPP2 model distributes the Basin water 
resources between the stakeholders more equitable than the FWP model. The results of the 
HRHPP
2
 model also show that the Basin water authority is able to plan for regulating 1852 
MCM at most through constructing new dams. 
As noted, the MEO model directly involves the profits of the stakeholders in water 
allocation modelling and satisfies the environmental water requirements in the entire Basin. 
These two aspects are the main advantages of this model. The comparison of the MEO 
model’s results with the CWA and SOE models lead to the selection of the MEO model as 
the basis of the IWDA approach. The IWDA approach, which was the major research focus 
of the final milestone of this thesis, provides the sustainable water allocation of the Sefidrud 
Basin, along with the optimal locations and sizes of proposed reservoirs in the Basin. 
8.1.4 The IWDA Approach 
The introduction of IWDA; a three-step methodology is the main contribution of this study, 
which enables the water authority of a transboundary basin to find the initial optimal water 
allocation of the basin and the optimal locations and capacities of proposed infrastructures. 
The final water allocation scheme of the basin will be provided by IWDA when more 
accurate data, achieved from the exact engineering studies are given to the approach. 
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8.1.4.1 The MOWDA Model (First Step) 
The first step of the IWDA approach is to allocate equitably water to the stakeholders of the 
basin along with providing the optimal locations and capacities of new proposed dams for 
various scenarios (number of dams). For this purpose, the MOWDA model for each 
scenarios runs to pursue the maximisation of all stakeholders’ profits while it satisfies the 
environmental water requirements of the entire basin. 
The results of the MOWDA model for scenarios (number of dams) 1 to 5 showed that 
Node 10 and 20 have significant roles in the development of the Basin infrastructure when 
the model proposes them for constructing dams for at least 4 scenarios. The second 
important node in the Basin is Node 15, which is proposed for dam construction for at least 
3 scenarios. Nodes 27, 12, and 7 are other proposed nodes, which are proposed for dam 
construction by 2 (Node 27) and 1 scenarios. These results indicate that the associated 
studies for dam construction have to be done for these nodes as a high priory by the Basin 
water authority. In addition, due to the locations of all these nodes on the Ghezelozan River, 
more attention has to be done on water planning and development of this River in 
comparison with other rivers in the Basin. 
8.1.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The second step of IWDA utilises a sensitivity analysis approach to provide the optimal 
number of required reservoirs in the basin. To achieve this target, the results of the 
MOWDA model for various scenarios (number of dams) in terms of the equity of water 
sharing, the basin profit, the stakeholders’ profits, and the summation of proposed dams’ 
capacities are compared. 
The results of sensitivity analysis on the results of the MOWDA model for various scenarios 
showed that the value of λ has an acceptable increase up to 3 dams consideration in the 
Basin. Although, this raise continues for scenarios 4 and 5, a small increase of λ requires 
large amounts of water storing capacities. For instance, a rise of reservoir capacity equal to 
1493 is required for 0.008 increase in the value of λ. The comparison of the Basin profit, 
given by the MOWDA model for scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 show that there is not a 
significant variability of the Basin profit by increasing the numbers of dams when they are 
between 604 to 610 Billion Rials. These results indicated that the increase of the numbers of 
dams in the Sefidrud Basin, more than three does not result in significant additional water 
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sharing equity and the Basin profit while makes a significant cost for dams constructions. 
Hence, it seemed three dams can lead to a reasonable water allocation schemes for the 
Sefidrud Basin 
8.1.4.3 The MinCap Model 
The third step of IWDA employs the MinCap model to find how much the proposed dams’ 
capacities, for the final number of required dams (determined by step 2) can be reduced 
while the model provides the same profits for the stakeholders, achieved from the 
MOWDA model. 
The results of the MinCap model by considering scenario 3 showed that for this case study, 
there are no lower dams’ capacities, which bring about same profits, achieved by the 
MOWDA model. Hence, the ultimate result of this study is to construct three reservoirs in 
Node 10 with capacity 531 MCM, Node 15 with capacity 191 MCM, and Node 20 with 
capacity 879 MCM. In this circumstance, the average annual of Provinces 1 to 8’s water 
shares from the Basin surface water resources are 408, 79, 1087, 536, 298, 200, 305, and 
1734 MCM, respectively. 
8.1.5 General conclusion 
To sum up all aforementioned, it can be stated that several effective water allocation 
modelling toolboxes were developed in the present research. The water authorities dealing 
with transboundary basins such as Iranian water authorities can utilise them for different 
managerial purposes. The SOE model can be employed when the water authority is 
interested to share water to the stakeholders based on a simple economic analysis and the 
satisfaction of the environmental water requirements. The CWA model is the proper model 
for providing the water allocation scheme of the basin, based on an economic analysis along 
with social and the environmental objectives consideration. The CWA model enables the 
water authority to compare various water allocation schemes for the basin, established upon 
the given importance to the objective functions. The MEO model is a suitable model for 
water allocation of the basin, when the water authority wants to involve directly all 
stakeholders in finding a water allocation scheme for the basin, while the environment is not 
considered as a stakeholder in the water competition of the basin and the satisfying its water 
requirements is necessary. By the employment of the MEO model, the water authority could 
find the highest potential profits of the stakeholders for water utilisations in their 
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administrative boundaries. This information helps the water authority to evaluate the reliable 
capabilities of the stakeholders for withdrawing the basin water resources. Moreover, the 
water authority could find the profits of what stakeholders is limited to their produced water 
resources and the satisfaction of the environmental water supply. Finally, if sophisticated 
analysis of potential infrastructure development is needed, the IWDA approach can be used 
for critical assessing the different dam development scenarios. This approach enables the 
water authority to figure out the initial plan of the development of the basin infrastructure 
and the allocation of water to the stakeholders. This initial plan shows that the exact 
engineering studies should be undertaken for which locations at first. In addition, it 
determines that in which stakeholders’ boundary no dam should be constructed. This 
important result helps the water authority to start working on decreasing the level of social 
expectation for dam construction in the provinces (stakeholders) constituting a 
transboundary basin such as the Sefidrud basin. 
8.2 Future Research 
The application of the IWDA approach to the Sefidrud Basin demonstrates its capability to 
provide a reliable water resources management planning and development for 
transboundary basins. To improve the applicability of the methodology, some potential 
directions for future research are as follows: 
1. The utilisation the ML solution method for the MOWDA model: In the current 
study, the SL solution method was employed to solve the MOWDA model. As a 
future study, the utilisation of the ML solution method for finding the solutions of 
the MOWDA model can be considered and its results could be compared with the 
results of the current study. 
2. The consideration of non-linear relation between water profit and allocated water: In 
this study, the relation between the marginal value of water usage by a sector and the 
allocated water to it is assumed linear. However, in fact, they have a quadratic 
relation.  
3. The consideration other economic sectors: In this study, we assume that the users of 
water in a basin are agricultural, urban, and industrial sectors and other sectors 
similar hydropower generation and recreation are ignored. Regarding to the high 
return values of water usages in these sectors, the consideration of them in water 
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allocation modelling could provide different water allocation schemes for 
transboundary basins. 
4. The consideration of water quality limitation: In this study, we assume that the 
decrease of the quantity of water does not have a significant effect on water quality. In 
fact, there is a strong relation between these parameters, especially in dry regions. 
Therefore, as a further study, a firm water quality constraint has to considered in the 
models. 
5. The consideration of uncertainties: All involved optimisation models in the IWDA 
approach are deterministic and do not explicitly include uncertainty perspectives in 
the structure. The uncertainties in the hydrologic, economic, and social aspects have 
to be taken into consideration through scenario analysis.  
6. The development a GIS-based decision support system for the IWDA approach: 
Geographic Information system technology can be utilised to facilitate the 
management of numerous spatial and attribute data, and to enable the formulation of 
models and analysis of spatial equity among water users in a river basin.  
7. The consideration of climate changes effects on the water allocation: The climate 
changes strongly varies the patterns of rainfall and consequently produced runoff in 
most transboundary basins. Then, it is not a reliable assumption that the long 
recorded runoffs of a transboundary river would repeat in the future. A further study 
is to find the optimal water allocation scheme of the Sefidrud Basin, using a new 
runoff data set that the climate changes effect is considered to it.  
8. The conjunctive use of surface and groundwater resources in another subject that can 
be considered as a future study. 
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Table A-1 The HPP model’s results in terms of the highest possible profits for Province 1 
(Unit: Billion Rials) 
Time 
Step 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 15 10 15 13 12 
2 20 20 20 18 18 
3 18 18 18 18 18 
4 15 15 15 15 15 
5 16 16 16 16 18 
6 23 23 23 23 23 
7 23 23 23 23 23 
8 15 15 15 15 15 
9 15 15 15 15 15 
10 14 18 19 16 16 
11 23 25 25 31 31 
12 34 34 34 33 33 
13 23 23 23 23 23 
14 21 21 21 21 21 
15 29 29 29 29 29 
16 25 25 25 25 25 
17 27 27 27 27 27 
18 24 24 24 24 24 
19 26 26 26 26 26 
20 22 22 22 22 22 
21 24 24 24 24 24 
22 18 18 18 18 18 
23 27 27 27 27 27 
24 26 26 26 26 26 
25 23 23 23 23 23 
26 29 29 29 29 29 
27 19 19 22 22 22 
28 25 25 25 25 25 
29 23 23 23 23 23 
30 21 24 24 23 24 
31 34 32 32 33 33 
32 25 25 25 25 25 
33 19 19 21 21 21 
34 21 21 21 23 23 
35 33 33 33 32 32 
36 25 25 25 27 27 
37 30 29 29 32 32 
38 34 34 34 32 32 
39 32 32 32 32 32 
40 24 24 24 24 24 
41 30 30 30 30 30 
42 15 15 14 15 15 
43 19 19 12 12 12 
44 14 14 14 14 14 
45 16 16 16 16 16 
46 19 19 19 19 19 
47 21 21 21 21 19 
48 16 16 16 16 16 
49 17 20 21 19 19 
50 17 19 21 25 27 
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Table A-2 The HPP model’s results in terms of the highest possible profits for Province 2 
(Unit: Billion Rials) 
Time 
Step 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 4 4 4 4 4 
2 4 4 4 4 4 
3 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 4 4 4 4 4 
6 4 4 4 4 4 
7 4 4 4 4 4 
8 4 4 4 4 4 
9 4 4 4 4 4 
10 4 4 4 4 4 
11 4 4 4 4 4 
12 4 4 4 4 4 
13 4 4 4 4 4 
14 4 4 4 4 4 
15 4 4 4 4 4 
16 4 4 4 4 4 
17 4 4 4 4 4 
18 4 4 4 4 4 
19 4 4 4 4 4 
20 4 4 4 4 4 
21 4 4 4 4 4 
22 4 4 4 4 4 
23 4 4 4 4 4 
24 4 4 4 4 4 
25 4 4 4 4 4 
26 4 4 4 4 4 
27 4 4 4 4 4 
28 4 4 4 4 4 
29 4 4 4 4 4 
30 4 4 4 4 4 
31 4 4 4 4 4 
32 4 4 4 4 4 
33 4 4 4 4 4 
34 4 4 4 4 4 
35 4 4 4 4 4 
36 4 4 4 4 4 
37 4 4 4 4 4 
38 4 4 4 4 4 
39 4 4 4 4 4 
40 4 4 4 4 4 
41 4 4 4 4 4 
42 4 4 4 4 4 
43 4 4 4 4 4 
44 4 4 4 4 4 
45 4 4 4 4 4 
46 4 4 4 4 4 
47 4 4 4 4 4 
48 4 4 4 4 4 
49 4 4 4 4 4 
50 4 4 4 4 4 
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Table A-3 The HPP model’s results in terms of the highest possible profits for Province 3 
(Unit: Billion Rials) 
Time 
Step 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 162 110 102 98 60 
2 157 157 157 157 157 
3 152 88 152 88 152 
4 131 146 147 145 131 
5 171 171 171 171 171 
6 191 191 191 191 191 
7 207 207 206 207 207 
8 142 142 142 142 168 
9 134 179 174 179 179 
10 192 192 192 190 192 
11 194 194 204 204 204 
12 237 237 237 237 237 
13 201 211 211 211 211 
14 187 187 187 187 187 
15 219 219 219 219 219 
16 210 199 199 210 199 
17 217 217 217 217 217 
18 214 203 214 203 203 
19 204 204 204 204 215 
20 202 202 206 202 202 
21 206 206 206 195 199 
22 198 188 188 198 194 
23 200 200 200 211 200 
24 211 211 211 211 222 
25 200 207 196 196 196 
26 229 229 229 229 229 
27 194 194 194 194 194 
28 217 227 217 217 217 
29 206 199 206 199 199 
30 183 183 196 204 204 
31 234 234 234 234 234 
32 201 201 212 212 201 
33 184 184 184 196 196 
34 183 183 190 203 204 
35 224 224 224 224 222 
36 207 217 207 207 207 
37 236 236 236 236 236 
38 214 214 214 214 225 
39 221 221 221 221 221 
40 187 187 197 197 197 
41 224 224 224 224 224 
42 166 166 166 166 166 
43 109 173 173 173 173 
44 145 145 145 145 145 
45 156 156 92 156 92 
46 199 199 199 199 199 
47 122 122 122 122 156 
48 138 171 178 169 179 
49 175 177 171 177 177 
50 165 176 189 190 190 
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Table A-4 The HPP model’s results in terms of the highest possible profits for Province 4 
(Unit: Billion Rials) 
Time 
Step 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 101 99 99 103 103 
2 109 109 109 109 109 
3 108 104 104 108 108 
4 102 104 104 109 104 
5 102 102 102 102 102 
6 111 111 111 107 107 
7 112 112 112 112 112 
8 106 110 110 106 110 
9 107 107 107 107 111 
10 112 112 112 112 112 
11 111 111 111 111 111 
12 112 112 112 112 112 
13 110 110 110 110 110 
14 107 107 107 107 111 
15 112 112 112 112 112 
16 110 110 110 110 110 
17 112 112 112 112 112 
18 109 109 109 109 109 
19 112 112 112 112 112 
20 109 109 109 109 109 
21 110 110 110 110 110 
22 112 112 112 112 112 
23 112 112 112 112 112 
24 112 112 112 112 112 
25 110 110 110 110 110 
26 112 112 112 112 112 
27 110 110 110 110 110 
28 112 112 112 112 112 
29 111 111 111 111 111 
30 109 109 109 109 109 
31 112 112 112 112 112 
32 108 108 108 108 108 
33 110 110 110 110 110 
34 110 110 110 110 110 
35 112 112 112 112 112 
36 112 112 112 112 112 
37 112 112 112 112 112 
38 112 112 112 112 112 
39 108 108 108 108 108 
40 111 111 111 111 111 
41 107 111 111 111 107 
42 100 100 100 100 100 
43 99 95 100 100 100 
44 106 109 109 104 104 
45 109 112 112 112 112 
46 112 112 112 112 112 
47 105 109 109 105 105 
48 106 106 106 110 106 
49 112 109 111 111 111 
50 110 112 110 110 110 
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Table A-5 The HPP model’s results in terms of the highest possible profits for Province 5 
(Unit: Billion Rials) 
Time 
Step 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 47 47 47 47 47 
2 57 56 56 56 56 
3 50 50 50 50 50 
4 50 56 56 56 56 
5 54 53 53 47 53 
6 54 54 54 54 54 
7 62 62 62 62 62 
8 59 53 53 53 53 
9 54 60 54 54 54 
10 55 56 56 56 56 
11 66 66 66 66 66 
12 66 66 66 66 66 
13 66 66 66 66 66 
14 50 50 50 56 50 
15 66 66 66 66 66 
16 62 62 62 62 62 
17 64 64 64 64 64 
18 58 58 58 58 58 
19 65 65 65 65 65 
20 54 54 54 54 54 
21 54 54 54 54 54 
22 55 55 55 55 55 
23 65 65 65 65 65 
24 66 66 66 66 66 
25 66 66 66 66 66 
26 66 66 66 66 66 
27 64 64 64 64 64 
28 66 66 66 66 66 
29 60 54 54 54 54 
30 65 65 65 65 65 
31 66 66 66 66 66 
32 61 61 61 55 61 
33 59 59 59 59 59 
34 65 65 65 65 65 
35 66 66 66 66 66 
36 65 66 66 65 66 
37 66 66 66 66 66 
38 66 66 66 66 66 
39 55 55 55 62 55 
40 49 49 49 55 49 
41 54 55 54 55 54 
42 39 39 39 39 39 
43 45 45 45 45 45 
44 39 39 39 39 39 
45 55 54 54 54 54 
46 66 66 66 66 66 
47 54 54 61 54 61 
48 59 59 59 59 59 
49 52 52 52 53 52 
50 65 65 65 65 65 
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Table A-6 The HPP model’s results in terms of the highest possible profits for Province 6 
(Unit: Billion Rials) 
Time 
Step 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 23 37 37 37 37 
2 47 47 47 47 47 
3 26 26 26 26 26 
4 25 25 25 25 25 
5 37 37 37 37 37 
6 46 46 46 46 46 
7 37 37 37 37 37 
8 39 39 39 39 39 
9 40 40 40 40 40 
10 21 21 21 21 21 
11 47 47 47 47 47 
12 47 47 47 47 47 
13 42 42 42 42 42 
14 44 44 44 44 44 
15 47 47 47 47 47 
16 39 39 39 39 39 
17 28 28 28 28 28 
18 36 36 36 36 36 
19 37 37 37 37 37 
20 19 19 19 19 19 
21 29 29 29 29 29 
22 41 41 41 41 41 
23 30 30 30 30 30 
24 44 44 44 44 44 
25 27 27 27 27 27 
26 31 31 31 31 31 
27 30 30 30 30 30 
28 41 41 41 41 41 
29 35 35 35 35 35 
30 47 47 47 47 47 
31 47 47 47 47 47 
32 24 24 24 24 24 
33 21 21 21 21 21 
34 19 19 19 19 19 
35 29 29 29 29 29 
36 30 30 30 30 30 
37 47 47 47 47 47 
38 47 47 47 47 47 
39 39 39 39 39 39 
40 22 22 22 22 22 
41 27 41 41 27 41 
42 11 11 11 24 11 
43 25 25 25 25 25 
44 19 6 6 6 6 
45 25 12 12 12 12 
46 43 43 43 43 43 
47 39 39 39 39 39 
48 39 39 39 39 39 
49 47 47 47 47 47 
50 47 47 47 47 47 
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Table A-7 The HPP model’s results in terms of the highest possible profits for Province 7 
(Unit: Billion Rials) 
Time 
Step 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 53 53 53 53 53 
2 53 53 53 53 53 
3 53 53 53 53 53 
4 53 53 53 53 53 
5 53 53 53 53 53 
6 53 53 53 53 53 
7 53 53 53 53 53 
8 53 53 53 53 53 
9 53 53 53 53 53 
10 53 53 53 53 53 
11 53 53 53 53 53 
12 53 53 53 53 53 
13 53 53 53 53 53 
14 53 53 53 53 53 
15 53 53 53 53 53 
16 53 53 53 53 53 
17 53 53 53 53 53 
18 53 53 53 53 53 
19 53 53 53 53 53 
20 53 53 53 53 53 
21 53 53 53 53 53 
22 53 53 53 53 53 
23 53 53 53 53 53 
24 53 53 53 53 53 
25 53 53 53 53 53 
26 53 53 53 53 53 
27 53 53 53 53 53 
28 53 53 53 53 53 
29 53 53 53 53 53 
30 53 53 53 53 53 
31 53 53 53 53 53 
32 53 53 53 53 53 
33 53 53 53 53 53 
34 53 53 53 53 53 
35 53 53 53 53 53 
36 53 53 53 53 53 
37 53 53 53 53 53 
38 53 53 53 53 53 
39 53 53 53 53 53 
40 53 53 53 53 53 
41 53 53 53 53 53 
42 53 53 53 53 53 
43 53 53 53 53 53 
44 53 53 53 53 53 
45 53 53 53 53 53 
46 53 53 53 53 53 
47 53 53 53 53 53 
48 53 53 53 53 53 
49 53 53 53 53 53 
50 53 53 53 53 53 
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Table A-8 The HPP model’s results in terms of the highest possible profits for Province 8 
(Unit: Billion Rials) 
Time 
Step 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 328 328 328 328 328 
2 328 328 328 328 328 
3 328 328 328 328 328 
4 328 328 328 328 328 
5 328 328 328 328 328 
6 328 328 328 328 328 
7 328 328 328 328 328 
8 328 328 328 328 328 
9 328 328 328 328 328 
10 328 328 328 328 328 
11 328 328 328 328 328 
12 328 328 328 328 328 
13 328 328 328 328 328 
14 328 328 328 328 328 
15 328 328 328 328 328 
16 328 328 328 328 328 
17 328 328 328 328 328 
18 328 328 328 328 328 
19 328 328 328 328 328 
20 328 328 328 328 328 
21 328 328 328 328 328 
22 328 328 328 328 328 
23 328 328 328 328 328 
24 328 328 328 328 328 
25 328 328 328 328 328 
26 328 328 328 328 328 
27 328 328 328 328 328 
28 328 328 328 328 328 
29 328 328 328 328 328 
30 328 328 328 328 328 
31 328 328 328 328 328 
32 328 328 328 328 328 
33 328 328 328 328 328 
34 328 328 328 328 328 
35 328 328 328 328 328 
36 328 328 328 328 328 
37 328 328 328 328 328 
38 328 328 328 328 328 
39 328 328 328 328 328 
40 328 328 328 328 328 
41 328 328 328 328 328 
42 328 328 328 328 328 
43 328 328 328 328 328 
44 328 328 328 328 328 
45 328 328 328 328 328 
46 328 328 328 328 328 
47 328 328 328 328 328 
48 328 328 328 328 328 
49 328 328 328 328 328 
50 328 328 328 328 328 
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Table A-9 The HRHPP model’s results in terms of the minimum value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 1) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
2 0.512 0.512 0.729 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
3 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
4 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
5 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
6 0.512 0.512 0.534 0.517 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
7 0.512 0.512 0.620 0.981 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.512 
8 0.512 0.512 0.719 0.689 0.669 0.512 0.752 0.512 
9 0.512 0.512 0.749 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
10 0.791 0.667 0.603 0.873 0.704 0.512 0.752 0.512 
11 0.528 0.512 0.615 0.641 1.000 0.512 0.752 0.512 
12 0.831 1.000 0.890 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.512 
13 0.626 0.512 0.742 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.512 
14 0.512 0.512 0.550 0.558 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
15 0.587 0.512 0.664 1.000 0.977 0.512 0.752 0.512 
16 0.518 0.667 0.665 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
17 0.965 0.544 0.729 0.781 0.981 0.512 0.752 0.512 
18 0.644 0.667 0.693 0.782 0.956 0.512 0.512 0.512 
19 0.589 0.512 0.632 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.752 0.512 
20 0.754 0.667 0.643 0.753 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
21 0.512 0.512 0.628 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
22 0.512 0.512 0.682 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.512 
23 0.948 0.667 0.646 0.873 0.979 0.512 0.752 0.512 
24 0.521 1.000 0.807 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.752 0.512 
25 0.582 1.000 0.624 0.888 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.512 
26 0.542 1.000 0.814 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.752 0.512 
27 0.512 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.589 0.512 0.752 0.512 
28 0.544 0.667 0.758 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.512 
29 0.659 0.667 0.803 0.876 0.654 0.512 0.752 0.512 
30 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.545 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
31 0.846 0.807 1.000 1.000 0.973 0.512 0.752 0.512 
32 0.512 0.512 0.941 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
33 0.559 0.689 0.554 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
34 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.543 0.576 0.512 0.512 0.512 
35 0.915 0.667 0.707 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.752 0.512 
36 0.512 1.000 0.802 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.512 
37 0.559 0.512 0.585 0.512 1.000 0.512 0.752 0.512 
38 1.000 0.512 0.985 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.512 0.512 
39 0.916 0.667 0.699 1.000 0.714 0.512 0.512 0.512 
40 0.605 0.667 0.512 0.735 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
41 0.806 0.667 0.734 1.000 0.713 0.512 0.512 0.512 
42 0.531 0.512 0.711 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
43 0.512 0.512 0.619 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
44 0.513 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
45 0.517 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
46 0.512 0.512 0.555 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
47 0.521 0.512 0.542 0.549 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
48 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
49 0.520 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
50 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
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Table A-10 The HRHPP model’s results in terms of the minimum value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 2) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
2 0.548 0.548 0.649 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
3 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
4 0.548 0.548 0.814 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
5 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
6 0.632 0.548 0.579 0.657 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
7 0.620 0.548 0.629 0.873 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
8 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.744 0.994 0.548 0.548 0.548 
9 0.548 0.548 0.632 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
10 0.570 0.548 0.635 0.548 0.983 0.548 0.548 0.548 
11 0.555 0.548 0.548 1.000 0.605 0.548 0.548 0.548 
12 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
13 0.631 0.548 0.621 0.889 1.000 0.548 0.548 0.548 
14 0.621 0.548 0.552 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
15 0.693 0.548 1.000 1.000 0.975 0.548 0.548 0.548 
16 0.548 0.548 0.611 1.000 0.993 0.548 0.548 0.548 
17 0.548 0.548 0.772 0.548 1.000 0.548 0.548 0.548 
18 0.725 0.548 0.609 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
19 0.548 0.548 0.612 1.000 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
20 0.683 0.548 0.637 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
21 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
22 0.698 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.677 0.548 0.548 0.548 
23 0.548 0.548 0.633 0.966 1.000 0.548 0.548 0.548 
24 0.597 0.691 0.732 1.000 0.571 0.548 0.548 0.548 
25 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.888 0.612 0.548 0.548 0.548 
26 0.573 0.548 0.548 1.000 0.570 0.548 0.548 0.548 
27 0.548 0.548 0.595 1.000 0.589 0.548 0.548 0.548 
28 0.577 0.548 0.548 1.000 0.594 0.548 0.548 0.548 
29 0.548 0.548 0.750 0.833 1.000 0.548 0.548 0.548 
30 0.548 0.548 0.552 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
31 0.548 0.548 0.601 1.000 0.596 0.548 0.548 0.548 
32 0.548 0.548 0.766 0.548 0.897 0.548 0.548 0.548 
33 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
34 0.548 0.548 0.575 0.548 0.569 0.548 0.548 0.548 
35 0.548 0.548 0.600 0.548 0.568 0.548 0.548 0.548 
36 0.548 0.548 0.548 1.000 0.995 0.548 0.548 0.548 
37 0.605 0.548 0.548 1.000 0.595 0.548 0.548 0.548 
38 0.548 0.548 0.873 0.548 0.564 0.548 0.548 0.548 
39 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.678 0.548 0.548 0.548 
40 0.582 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
41 0.601 0.548 0.722 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
42 0.568 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
43 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
44 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
45 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
46 0.548 0.548 0.550 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
47 0.624 0.548 0.561 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
48 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
49 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
50 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
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Table A-11 The HRHPP model’s results in terms of the minimum value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 3) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
2 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
3 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
4 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
5 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
6 0.744 0.561 0.589 0.737 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
7 0.561 0.561 0.661 0.763 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
8 0.561 0.561 0.719 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
9 0.561 0.561 0.565 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
10 0.661 0.561 0.571 0.861 0.692 0.561 0.561 0.561 
11 0.576 0.561 0.561 1.000 0.581 0.561 0.561 0.561 
12 0.561 0.561 0.605 0.873 1.000 0.561 0.561 0.561 
13 0.627 0.561 0.774 0.889 1.000 0.561 0.561 0.561 
14 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
15 0.585 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.589 0.561 0.561 0.561 
16 0.680 0.561 0.796 0.561 1.000 0.561 0.561 0.561 
17 0.561 0.561 0.598 1.000 0.608 0.561 0.561 0.561 
18 0.561 0.561 0.690 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
19 0.646 1.000 0.698 1.000 1.000 0.561 0.561 0.561 
20 0.561 0.561 0.630 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
21 0.561 0.561 0.604 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
22 0.561 0.561 0.639 0.781 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
23 0.958 0.561 0.561 0.966 0.611 0.561 0.561 0.561 
24 0.561 0.561 0.561 1.000 0.564 0.561 0.561 0.561 
25 0.561 0.561 0.714 0.947 1.000 0.561 0.561 0.561 
26 0.602 0.561 0.561 1.000 0.563 0.561 0.561 0.561 
27 0.630 0.561 0.573 0.561 0.917 0.561 0.561 0.561 
28 0.561 0.561 0.561 1.000 0.612 0.561 0.561 0.561 
29 0.767 0.561 0.561 0.876 0.730 0.561 0.561 0.561 
30 0.561 0.561 0.619 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
31 0.600 0.561 0.606 1.000 0.568 0.561 0.561 0.561 
32 0.561 0.561 0.596 0.561 0.606 0.561 0.561 0.561 
33 0.561 0.561 0.577 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
34 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
35 0.619 0.561 0.600 1.000 0.589 0.561 0.561 0.561 
36 0.598 0.561 0.561 1.000 0.562 0.561 0.561 0.561 
37 0.604 0.561 0.561 1.000 0.569 0.561 0.561 0.561 
38 0.655 0.561 0.661 1.000 0.564 0.561 0.561 0.561 
39 0.632 0.561 0.682 0.561 0.714 0.561 0.561 0.561 
40 0.595 0.561 0.677 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
41 0.609 0.561 0.684 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
42 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
43 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
44 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
45 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
46 0.561 0.561 0.674 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
47 0.623 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
48 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
49 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
50 0.561 1.000 0.561 0.600 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
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Table A-12 The HRHPP model’s results in terms of the minimum value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 4) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
2 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
3 0.579 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
4 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
5 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
6 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.857 0.686 0.563 0.563 0.563 
7 0.581 1.000 0.630 0.635 0.601 0.563 0.563 0.563 
8 0.563 0.563 0.719 0.748 0.994 0.563 0.563 0.563 
9 0.563 0.563 0.600 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
10 0.645 0.563 0.630 0.854 0.983 0.563 0.563 0.563 
11 0.670 0.563 0.728 1.000 0.969 0.563 0.563 0.563 
12 0.883 0.563 0.983 1.000 0.591 0.563 0.563 0.563 
13 0.607 0.563 0.616 0.981 0.614 0.563 0.563 0.563 
14 0.673 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
15 0.563 0.563 0.577 0.873 0.977 0.563 0.563 0.563 
16 0.593 0.563 0.625 1.000 0.993 0.563 0.563 0.563 
17 0.744 0.563 0.599 1.000 0.628 0.563 0.563 0.563 
18 0.573 0.563 0.635 0.563 0.656 0.563 0.563 0.563 
19 0.636 1.000 0.563 1.000 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
20 0.886 0.563 0.636 0.563 0.719 0.563 0.563 0.563 
21 0.563 0.563 0.602 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
22 0.812 0.563 0.640 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
23 0.563 0.563 0.569 0.873 0.993 0.563 0.563 0.563 
24 0.731 1.000 0.917 0.873 1.000 0.563 0.563 0.563 
25 0.816 0.563 0.563 0.563 1.000 0.563 0.563 0.563 
26 0.563 0.563 0.798 1.000 0.570 0.563 0.563 0.563 
27 0.630 0.563 0.624 0.646 0.884 0.563 0.563 0.563 
28 0.669 0.563 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.563 0.563 0.563 
29 0.563 0.563 0.796 0.858 0.708 0.563 0.563 0.563 
30 0.563 0.563 0.633 0.798 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
31 1.000 0.563 0.753 1.000 1.000 0.563 0.563 0.563 
32 0.616 0.563 0.608 0.884 0.719 0.563 0.563 0.563 
33 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
34 0.563 0.563 0.616 0.563 0.576 0.563 0.563 0.563 
35 0.563 0.563 0.741 1.000 0.972 0.563 0.563 0.563 
36 0.580 0.563 1.000 0.873 0.979 0.563 0.563 0.563 
37 0.910 0.563 0.823 1.000 1.000 0.563 0.563 0.563 
38 0.761 0.563 0.847 0.781 0.977 0.563 0.563 0.563 
39 0.599 0.563 0.663 1.000 0.885 0.563 0.563 0.563 
40 0.644 0.563 0.650 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
41 0.595 0.563 0.650 0.857 0.679 0.563 0.563 0.563 
42 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
43 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
44 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
45 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
46 0.563 0.563 0.602 0.635 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
47 0.563 0.563 0.595 0.678 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
48 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
49 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
50 0.563 0.710 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
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Table A-13 The HRHPP model’s results in terms of the minimum value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 5) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
2 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
3 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
4 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
5 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
6 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
7 0.666 0.572 0.745 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
8 0.573 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
9 0.572 0.572 0.609 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
10 0.572 0.572 0.625 1.000 0.962 0.572 0.572 0.572 
11 0.705 0.572 0.593 1.000 0.990 0.572 0.572 0.572 
12 0.572 0.572 0.832 1.000 0.591 0.572 0.572 0.572 
13 0.643 0.572 0.690 0.766 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
14 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
15 0.891 0.572 0.887 1.000 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
16 0.837 0.572 0.632 1.000 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
17 0.721 0.572 0.807 1.000 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
18 0.572 0.572 0.598 0.752 0.656 0.572 0.572 0.572 
19 0.684 0.653 0.649 1.000 0.590 0.572 0.572 0.572 
20 0.572 0.572 0.642 0.775 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
21 0.572 0.572 0.609 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
22 0.572 0.572 0.642 0.763 0.986 0.572 0.572 0.572 
23 0.616 0.572 0.662 0.855 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
24 0.771 0.600 0.952 1.000 0.977 0.572 0.572 0.572 
25 0.579 0.572 0.572 1.000 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
26 0.929 0.572 0.680 1.000 0.993 0.572 0.572 0.572 
27 0.572 0.572 0.697 0.877 0.917 0.572 0.572 0.572 
28 0.721 0.572 0.636 1.000 0.976 0.572 0.572 0.572 
29 0.767 0.572 0.761 0.876 0.730 0.572 0.572 0.572 
30 0.572 0.572 0.619 0.572 0.599 0.572 0.572 0.572 
31 0.611 0.572 0.902 1.000 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
32 0.712 0.572 0.709 1.000 0.646 0.572 0.572 0.572 
33 0.572 0.572 0.576 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
34 0.572 0.572 0.586 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
35 0.869 0.572 0.949 1.000 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
36 0.572 0.572 0.802 1.000 0.995 0.572 0.572 0.572 
37 0.572 0.572 0.672 0.781 0.955 0.572 0.572 0.572 
38 0.883 0.572 0.864 1.000 0.952 0.572 0.572 0.572 
39 0.607 0.572 0.820 0.898 1.000 0.572 0.572 0.572 
40 0.593 0.572 0.605 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
41 0.584 0.572 0.572 0.772 0.727 0.572 0.572 0.572 
42 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
43 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
44 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
45 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
46 0.572 0.572 0.597 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
47 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
48 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
49 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
50 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
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Table A-14 The FWP model’s results in terms of the final achieved value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 1) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.588 
2 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.889 
3 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.674 
4 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.684 
5 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
6 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.610 0.512 0.512 0.512 1.000 
7 0.727 0.657 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
8 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.926 
9 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.886 
10 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.873 1.000 0.512 0.631 1.000 
11 0.512 0.512 0.647 1.000 1.000 0.512 1.000 1.000 
12 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
13 0.512 0.512 0.855 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
14 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.667 
15 0.928 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
16 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.736 1.000 0.512 0.512 1.000 
17 0.512 0.512 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.895 1.000 1.000 
18 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.892 
19 0.512 0.512 0.673 1.000 1.000 0.512 1.000 1.000 
20 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.671 0.546 0.512 0.512 1.000 
21 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.625 
22 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.711 1.000 0.512 0.512 1.000 
23 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.768 1.000 0.512 0.512 1.000 
24 0.512 0.512 0.811 1.000 1.000 0.512 1.000 1.000 
25 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.665 0.748 0.512 0.512 1.000 
26 0.856 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
27 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.517 0.512 0.512 0.512 1.000 
28 0.518 0.512 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
29 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.876 1.000 0.512 0.798 1.000 
30 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.680 
31 0.901 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
32 0.512 0.512 0.545 1.000 1.000 0.512 1.000 1.000 
33 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.696 
34 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.717 
35 0.804 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
36 0.512 0.512 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.921 1.000 1.000 
37 0.830 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
38 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
39 0.512 0.512 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.851 1.000 1.000 
40 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.787 
41 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.772 1.000 0.512 0.512 1.000 
42 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.644 
43 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.651 
44 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
45 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.917 
46 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.717 
47 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.737 
48 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.678 
49 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 
50 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.854 
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Table A-15 The FWP model’s results in terms of the final achieved value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 2) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
2 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.824 
3 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.692 
4 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.646 
5 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
6 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.863 
7 0.730 0.657 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
8 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.868 
9 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.719 
10 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.743 0.983 0.548 0.548 1.000 
11 0.548 0.548 0.603 1.000 0.995 0.548 1.000 1.000 
12 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
13 0.548 0.548 0.796 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
14 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.597 
15 0.928 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
16 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.663 0.962 0.548 0.548 1.000 
17 0.548 0.548 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.766 1.000 1.000 
18 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.839 
19 0.548 0.548 0.647 1.000 1.000 0.548 1.000 1.000 
20 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.991 
21 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.553 
22 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.654 0.954 0.548 0.548 1.000 
23 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.654 0.934 0.548 0.548 1.000 
24 0.548 0.548 0.785 1.000 1.000 0.548 1.000 1.000 
25 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.596 0.548 0.548 0.548 1.000 
26 0.856 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.906 1.000 1.000 
27 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.932 
28 0.548 0.548 0.953 1.000 1.000 0.929 1.000 1.000 
29 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.876 1.000 0.548 0.736 1.000 
30 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.586 
31 0.939 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
32 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.943 1.000 0.548 1.000 1.000 
33 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.629 
34 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.649 
35 0.804 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
36 0.548 0.548 0.951 1.000 1.000 0.796 1.000 1.000 
37 0.848 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.548 0.978 1.000 
38 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
39 0.548 0.548 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.745 1.000 1.000 
40 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.720 
41 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.656 0.663 0.548 0.548 1.000 
42 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.587 
43 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.698 
44 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
45 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
46 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.684 
47 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.669 
48 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
49 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 
50 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.717 
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Table A-16 The FWP model’s results in terms of the final achieved value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 3) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.564 
2 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.574 
3 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.594 
4 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
5 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.568 
6 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.792 
7 0.730 0.706 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
8 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.846 
9 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.718 
10 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.656 0.983 0.561 0.561 1.000 
11 0.561 0.561 0.567 1.000 0.995 0.561 0.990 1.000 
12 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
13 0.561 0.561 0.790 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
14 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.572 
15 0.928 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
16 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.663 0.860 0.561 0.561 1.000 
17 0.561 0.561 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.719 1.000 1.000 
18 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.789 
19 0.561 0.561 0.638 1.000 1.000 0.561 1.000 1.000 
20 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.957 
21 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.616 
22 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.993 
23 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.654 0.838 0.561 0.561 1.000 
24 0.561 0.561 0.775 1.000 1.000 0.561 1.000 1.000 
25 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.598 0.561 0.561 0.561 1.000 
26 0.853 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.906 1.000 1.000 
27 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.883 
28 0.561 0.561 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.898 1.000 1.000 
29 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.876 1.000 0.561 0.582 1.000 
30 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.621 
31 0.939 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
32 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.903 1.000 0.561 0.870 1.000 
33 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.592 
34 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.605 
35 0.804 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
36 0.561 0.561 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.753 1.000 1.000 
37 0.856 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.561 0.966 1.000 
38 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
39 0.561 0.561 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.706 1.000 1.000 
40 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.672 
41 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.644 0.561 0.561 0.561 1.000 
42 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.575 
43 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.566 
44 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
45 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.861 
46 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.580 
47 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.635 
48 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 
49 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.600 
50 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.702 
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Table A-17 The FWP model’s results in terms of the final achieved value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 4) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
2 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
3 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.576 
4 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.653 
5 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.587 
6 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.785 
7 0.662 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
8 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.850 
9 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.702 
10 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.729 0.983 0.563 0.563 1.000 
11 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.875 0.995 0.563 0.988 1.000 
12 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
13 0.563 0.563 0.789 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
14 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.987 
15 0.928 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
16 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.663 0.726 0.563 0.563 1.000 
17 0.563 0.563 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.711 1.000 1.000 
18 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.808 
19 0.563 0.563 0.637 1.000 1.000 0.563 1.000 1.000 
20 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.962 
21 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.593 
22 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.585 0.563 0.563 0.563 1.000 
23 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.654 0.712 0.563 0.563 1.000 
24 0.563 0.563 0.774 1.000 1.000 0.563 1.000 1.000 
25 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.589 0.563 0.563 0.563 1.000 
26 0.853 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.906 1.000 1.000 
27 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.879 
28 0.563 0.563 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.893 1.000 1.000 
29 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.876 1.000 0.563 0.640 1.000 
30 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.669 
31 0.932 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
32 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.903 1.000 0.563 0.955 1.000 
33 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
34 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.608 
35 0.734 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
36 0.563 0.563 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.674 1.000 1.000 
37 0.782 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.563 0.964 1.000 
38 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
39 0.563 0.563 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.577 1.000 1.000 
40 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.655 
41 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.656 0.688 0.563 0.563 1.000 
42 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
43 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.564 
44 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 
45 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.590 
46 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.673 
47 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.651 
48 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.564 
49 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.595 
50 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.750 
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Table A-18 The FWP model’s results in terms of the final achieved value of λ for each 
stakeholder (Scenario 5) 
Time 
Step 
Province 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 0.572 0.268 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
2 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
3 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
4 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
5 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
6 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
7 0.572 0.572 0.874 1.000 1.000 0.572 1.000 1.000 
8 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.769 
9 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.679 
10 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.688 0.983 0.572 0.572 1.000 
11 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.874 0.990 0.572 0.929 1.000 
12 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
13 0.572 0.572 0.785 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
14 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.598 
15 0.928 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
16 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.663 0.779 0.572 0.572 1.000 
17 0.572 0.572 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.681 1.000 1.000 
18 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.790 
19 0.572 0.572 0.599 1.000 1.000 0.572 1.000 1.000 
20 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.945 
21 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
22 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.991 
23 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.654 0.762 0.572 0.572 1.000 
24 0.572 0.572 0.731 1.000 1.000 0.572 1.000 1.000 
25 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.992 
26 0.853 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.906 1.000 1.000 
27 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.862 
28 0.572 0.572 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.874 1.000 1.000 
29 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.876 1.000 0.572 0.587 1.000 
30 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.753 
31 0.932 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
32 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.903 1.000 0.572 0.918 1.000 
33 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
34 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.660 
35 0.572 0.666 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
36 0.572 0.572 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.637 1.000 1.000 
37 0.782 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.572 0.956 1.000 
38 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
39 0.572 0.572 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.675 1.000 1.000 
40 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.650 
41 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.612 0.572 0.572 0.572 1.000 
42 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.675 
43 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
44 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
45 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
46 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.666 
47 0.572 0.495 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.616 
48 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
49 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
50 0.572 0.572 0.604 1.000 0.934 0.572 1.000 1.000 
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